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With all the drama surrounding Iraq and North Korea, Beijing looks like a cool customer. On Iraq, it quietly backed the French and German line to give international inspectors more time before the war. But, at the same time, it kept Washington hopeful that it might jump off the fence to support US-led military action or, at the very least, abstain on the second resolution.

On North Korea, Beijing is letting the Americans know that it is exerting quiet pressure on Pyongyang on the nuclear question, and is unhappy that Washington is not appreciative of its efforts.

On Taiwan, it appears that Beijing is planting press reports about progressively cutting its missiles directed across the Taiwan Strait.

The cumulative message appears to be that China is seeking to maintain its `strategic partnership' with the US. Taiwan, obviously, remains a major hurdle, with the US committed to its security in the event of a Chinese invasion. Washington is encouraging Taiwan to beef up its defenses, urging it to buy more advanced weapons because "surprise and speed will be used [by China] to make any potential assistance to Taiwan [by the US] in an unprovoked attack ineffective."

The reports about China thinning out its missile concentrations aimed at Taiwan must be read in this context. Beijing seemed to be saying to Washington that it has no intention to attack Taiwan, though it would refuse to go on record. The US should, therefore, curtail its arms sales to Taipei. In that case, Beijing might be cooperative in other areas, like Iraq and North Korea. On Iraq, for instance, there is political polarization between the "coalition of the willing," on one side, and France, Germany and Russia, on the other. Beijing might easily tilt toward the US to shore-up a "strategic partnership," which, in turn might give it the necessary leverage to influence the US policy on Taiwan, starting with some curbs on arms sales.

On North Korea, Beijing is in an even better position. Pyongyang is overwhelmingly dependent on Beijing for its economic lifeline, thin as it is. Imagine: China becoming part of an international sanctions regime to strangle its neighbor. True, this could provoke Pyongyang into some dangerously crazy adventure but at the cost of its imminent total destruction. Even its dear leader, Kim Jong-il, might not be too keen to make a radical move.

China, in a sense, is the Stalinist state's ultimate protector. Any drastic military action designed to bring down the last Cold War remnant will have to reckon with Beijing's unpredictable response. And if the Korean War is any guide, China might find itself, wittingly or unwittingly, drawn into a repeat of the last action -- this time with even more dangerous consequences. But if China were acting in concert with the US, it could manage the Korean imbroglio with greater dexterity. And this would enhance its influence with the US and regionally.

It has its own downside, though. As Hugh White, an Australian defense analyst, has pointed out, "Washington must be anxious about the [long-term] implications of normalization [on the Korean Peninsula] for the future of the US strategic footprint in North-East Asia. If tensions with North Korea reduce, Seoul will expect US military deployments in their country to be cut substantially" with its ripple effect on Japan. In that case, China alone might emerge with enhanced status and clout regionally by undercutting the US role.

Either way, short or long term, Beijing's privileged relationship with Pyongyang gives it a strategic advantage in dealing with the US in an ongoing political tug-of-war.

At the same time, there is an important constituency in the US that favors closer ties with China. An important segment of the US business community, with its growing investments and the lure of the Chinese market (more so after its entry into the WTO), is notable in this respect. During his recent tour of China for trade talks, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick emphasized the importance of a "new and deeper phase of Sino-US economic ties."

While aware of the myriad economic problems between the two countries, particularly China's growing trade surplus, he was keen to look into the "longer-term goal of our economic relationship." Which seemed to tally nicely with Wen Jiabao's view that both countries should build their ties with a strategic view of a long-term relationship.

But any strategic partnership means shared interests and a shared world view. Neither exists at present or in the medium term. Even though China might see opportunities from a political spat that pits the US against France, Germany and Russia over Iraq, there is no strategic depth to a Sino-US relationship. China's concept of "strategic partnership" is for the US to facilitate its regional and global ambitions. Which means helping China to erode US supremacy.

There is a view that the US might have to accommodate China as a "strategic partner" over a period of time, because of its anticipated weak position. According to Norman Mailer, "Looking 20 years ahead, the [US] Administration perceives that there will come a time when China will have technology superior to ours [more Asians doing PhDs in science, technology and engineering]. When that time comes, the US might well say to China that `we can work together ? But don't try to dominate us.'" By then, one might as well say that it will be too late and China would have emerged as the brightest star on the horizon.

Of course, all this is based on the assumption that China, under its communist oligarchy, will continue to have smooth sailing while others (like the US) will get bogged down. Which is a tad too simplistic. However, if the US finds itself over-stretched on two fronts (Iraq and North Korea), compounded by the ongoing struggle against global terrorism, it can work to China's strategic advantage.

Minister of foreign affairs says offers of humanitarian aid to Iraq are genuine

DIPLOMACY: Eugene Chien denied any suggestion that the government's hopes of setting up a diplomatic mission in Baghdad were linked to pledges of money

"To my knowledge, the national security branch [of the government] has not forged any deals with the US side."－Eugene Chien, foreign affairs minister

The government's support for the US-led war in Iraq is unrelated to any attempts to set up a representative office in Baghdad after the war, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien said yesterday.

The comment came in response to questions from opposition lawmakers in the legislature's Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee on whether the government's support for the US-led attack on Iraq involved any trade-offs between Taipei and Washington.

"To my knowledge, the national security branch [of the government] has not forged any deals with the US side," Chien said.

When asked if the foreign ministry had plans to set up a representative office in Baghdad once a pro-US government was installed there, Chien said: "It's too early to say."

But the foreign minister said he didn't rule out contacts with Baghdad if both sides' interests overlap.

He said the foreign ministry always sought to set up new representative offices in countries that did not officially recognize Taiwan, should opportunities arise.

But he said Taiwan's support for the US-led war in Iraq was based on the country's backing of the wider war against terror and had nothing to do with the ministry's efforts to set up a new representative office in Baghdad.

Regarding the government's promised humanitarian aid to Iraq, Chien said so far the US government had not come up with the exact amount of money that it hoped Taipei would contribute to the relief effort.

But Chien said the ministry expected that the implementation of large-scale humanitarian aid would not occur until next year.

Chien, however, declined to respond directly to a question from KMT Legislator Kwan Yuk-noan on what amount of aid Taiwan could afford.

The government has launched a joint campaign with the private sector to collect donations for humanitarian aid for Iraq.

In a meeting with more than 20 non-governmental organizations, ministries and air and sea transportation representatives last Friday, the foreign ministry said the government would collect the money in a fund called "Love from Taiwan."

A US Army soldier atop a Humvee armed with a heavy machine gun secures an area by a burning oil well in Iraq's vast southern Rumaila oilfields on Sunday. US engineers moved through the oilfields on Sunday, shutting down wellheads in an operation that could take months to complete.

GIVING UP THE NATION: Chen Shui-bian says the KMT chairman's plan to visit China if elected in 2004 shows he plans to make Taiwan a special administrative region under Beijing's control

"If a certain person [promises to] immediately deny [the existence of] our nation once he is elected as president, [I] don't believe this sort of person would be elected."－Chen Shui-bian, president

President Chen Shui-bian yesterday called KMT Chairman Lien Chan's proposal to visit China should he be elected president a "voyage of surrendering," saying the trip would only be possible if Taiwan's leader accepts the "one China" principle.

While meeting with Gordon Chang, the Chinese-American writer of The Coming Collapse of China, Chen lambasted Lien's idea, which Lien floated on Sunday after the KMT selected him as its candidate for next year's presidential election.

Lien said that, if elected, he would make an immediate visit to China, dubbing the trip a "journey of peace."

He promised that he would push for the immediate opening of direct air links with China and sign agreements with Beijing so that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can live in peace.

"China has never acknowledged Taiwan's name and its nationhood. If a certain person [promises to] immediately deny [the existence of] our nation once he is elected as president, [I] don't believe this sort of person would be elected," Chen said.

Chen said the nation's leader could only visit China if he accepts the "one China" principle, which would also mean accepting Beijing's "one country, two systems" and agreeing that Taiwan is a Chinese province or a special administrative region like Hong Kong.

Chen said there would be no Republic of China (ROC) under this scheme and no ROC president.

Defending his plan, Lien urged the president to refrain from setting a bad example in the presidential campaign by using vicious language and encouraged Chen to be "broad-minded."

He said the Chinese government has trampled on human rights by deliberately hiding the spread of a deadly illness and by forbidding the media to cover the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome. (SARS).

Chang said Beijing has made a negative impression on the world with its handling of the outbreak, adding that the incident has reminded the international community that it is irrational to prevent Taiwan from joining international organizations due to pressure from China.

"Taiwan's being excluded from the World Health Organization shows disregard for the interests of 23 million Taiwanese," he said.

The president also disagreed with statements by Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese academic, who predicted that China and Taiwan would form a "Chinese federation" as growing cross-strait integration gives way to political integration.

Chen said he is confident that the DPP will continue to rule after next March's presidential election and that political integration with China would not happen under a DPP administration.

When Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Richard Shih echoed US President George W. Bush's ultimatum for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to step down, the opposition took advantage of his gaffe by accusing the government of dragging Taiwan into the war.

After the Iraq war broke out, the pan-green and pan-blue camps have turned into pro-US and pro-China factions respectively. The Chen Shui-bian administration reiterated its stance of supporting the US-led anti-terrorism campaign. The DPP also endorsed the government's position to back the US on the war against Iraq. Meanwhile, opposition lawmakers described Chen as a "puppet emperor" under the control of the US government.

Both the ruling and the opposition, as well as some anti-war advocates who marched outside the American Institute in Taiwan and the British Representative Office, failed to grasp the essence of the war.

The anti-war or anti-US camp argue that Washington's unilaterally bypassing the UN resolution was not justifiable. But the fact is, the five permanent members from the UN Security Council all voted for the resolution to demand that Saddam should account for and relinquish all his biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs, or face "serious consequences."

Therefore, the difference between Britain and the US on one side, and France, Russia and China on the other side, was not about that demand or the ultimate objective but about how much time Iraq should have been given to comply with it.

A clear majority of the UN Security Council would have accepted the war if Iraq was proved to have violated the resolution and if the military attack had been authorized by the UN. The issue, hence, lay in whether the timing of the US-led war was legitimate and whether war was the last resort. It had nothing to do with a dichotomy of pro-war and anti-war camps.

Too bad that most people in Taiwan did not understand the rationale behind it. Things got even worse when politicians tried to turn the war into a domestic election issue.

The Chen administration's nearly unconditional backing for the US-led war is natural and understandable. As a small country, Taiwan can play no significant role in terms of helping Washington in the military confrontation with Iraq. However, as a potential member of its alliance and with its strategic position for anti-terrorism cooperation and post-war reconstruction projects, Taipei has no choice but to side with Washington.

After all, the consolidation of US-Taiwan relations is at the top of Chen's foreign policy agenda. The US government's appreciation for what Taiwan government has done demonstrates a strengthening in the relationship.

The mistakes the administration has made, therefore, were more to do with the way it expressed this support.

The opposition, on the other hand, has been nothing but a loose canon. Since the government's crisis management was relatively good, the pan-blue camp made the best use of the government's poor skills in public relations by portraying Chen as "kissing American ass." The opposition lawmakers' insults against the nation's leader and government will damage their own reputations.

Moreover, both KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong, who will team up for the next presidential election, so far have not made any comment on the issue. If the pan-blue camp's strategy is for both of them to hide behind enemy lines and let legislators play the bad cop, how can they convince voters that they are capable of handling an international crisis like this?