DPP says pan-blue strategy backfired

REFERENDUM LEGISLATION: The party says the KMT-PFP alliance was forced to do another U-turn on plebiscites after a trap it had set for the DPP failed

By Chang Yun-ping

STAFF REPORTER

"The pan-blue camp's maneuvers in supporting the referendum bill have backfired. Having admitted its support for a referendum law ... the opposition parties chickened out at the last minute."－Ker Chien-ming, DPP caucus whip

The DPP said yesterday the deaths of the referendum bill and two key economic development bills in the extraordinary legislative session were a result of the blue camp's efforts to dent the government's administrative performance.

"The pan-blue camp's maneuvers in supporting the referendum bill have backfired. Having admitted its support for a referendum law amid high public demand, the opposition parties chickened out at the last minute," DPP caucus whip Ker Chien-ming said yesterday in a press conference at the party's headquarters.

Only four of the six financial and economic bills were passed in the legislative session, which ended on Thursday.

Amendments to the Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, the Statute Regarding the Establishment and Management of the Financial Reconstruction Fund and DPP Legislator Trong Chai's referendum bill were held over until the next session, slated to begin in September.

Commenting on the performance of the three-day special legislative session, Ker said, "I give it 60 marks out of 100. The results may not be satisfactory, but they will have to do."

The referendum bill, which sparked a fierce battle between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, was finally sacrificed when the blue camp suddenly withdrew its support for the legislation.

Another DPP legislative whip, Chen Chi-mai, said yesterday the opposition alliance had done a complete about-face on the referendum legislation, revealing a scam in which they attempted to use the plebiscite issue to gain an edge in their presidential campaign.

"Their scheme backfired. At first, they claimed support for Chai's version of the referendum law -- which advocated a vote on Taiwan's future by choosing unification with China or independence -- because they presupposed the DPP wouldn't dare go for it," Chen said. "But when it turned out that we had decided to endorse Chai's plebiscite bill and signed the endorsement for a final reading, they pulled back.

"It revealed their tongue-in-cheek attitude toward the whole referendum issue," Chen said.

Chen said the blue camp didn't really mean to support Chai's bill because their intention was to veto the part of the bill relating to sovereignty issues, including any change of national flag or to the nation's name.

Despite the discord between the ruling and opposition lawmakers, the DPP yesterday said it recognized and appreciated the work of legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng of the KMT to fairly moderate the session's agenda.

"We give the highest recognition to Wang for efficiently moderating the cross-party negotiations and endeavoring to pass the four financial bills," Chen said.

The DPP blamed PFP Chairman James Soong for leading his party in blocking bills designed to resolve the bad loans of banking units and establish cross-strait air links.

"It's ridiculous that PFP Legislator Feng Ting-kuo opposed a permission system required for cross-strait direct air links. Such unreasonable opposition was made because the PFP couldn't allow the DPP to make any progress in cross-strait interaction," DPP Legislator Chen Chung-hsin said yesterday.

The blue camp also boycotted the Statute Regarding the Establishment and Management of the Financial Reconstruction Fund, similar to the US Resolution Trust Corporation, designed to help banks with non-performing loans.

"The pan-blue camp simply doesn't want the economy to improve. It sees this strategy as dragging down the DPP's administrative performance so as to allow the KMT's Lien Chan and the PFP's James Soong to cash in on the DPP's deficiency in the presidential campaign," DPP Legislator Lin Cho-shui said.

Beijing should look at Corsican example

By Cheng Chieh-yi

`The people of Hong Kong must be very envious of Corsicans, who have the right to determine their own future.'

The people of Hong Kong must be very envious of Corsicans, who have the right to determine their own future.

On July 1, 500,000 people took to the streets of Hong Kong. This massive demonstration shocked the muddleheaded Hong Kong government and the Beijing authorities. The obtuse authoritarian administration has finally opened its eyes and realized that it must do something to address long-standing public rancor.

It was disappointing that ingrained totalitarian thinking still failed to appreciate the people's feelings. It only "delayed" the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.

On July 6, residents on the French-controlled island of Corsica rejected an offer of increased autonomy by a wafer-thin majority in a referendum, in which 50.98 percent voted "no" and 49.02 percent "yes."

What's interesting is that this referendum, which could eventually lead to Corsican independence or encourage secessionists, was promoted by the French government. Before the voting, the French president, prime minister and interior minister all encouraged Corsicans to vote in favor of the autonomy offer. This would allow the central government to grant a higher degree of autonomy to the island, thereby reconciling separatism with decentralization and resolving violence and conflicts by peaceful means.

Corsicans expect to have increased autonomy that will allow them to determine their own future. But since the island relies on France economically and there are concerns that violent separatists will control the new assembly, Corsicans decided to maintain the status quo through the direct exercise of civil rights.

A Corsican mayor said the significance of the referendum is that Corsicans have the right to decide how they relate to France. Therefore, even though the poll result was for maintaining the current relationship with France, it was a decision made by Corsicans, rather than an order from the Paris administration.

Although this referendum cannot immediately resolve the problem between central and local governments, it at least has created an atmosphere for peacefully resolving disputes. Corsicans finally have an opportunity to choose their own future.

Faced with the Beijing government's stepped-up offensive, the people of Hong Kong have no other choice but to take action to express their yearning for freedom and democracy. But Beijing has never understood that.

The French government offered greater autonomy to Corsica, but Corsicans decided to maintain the status quo and turned down the central government's good intentions.

Has Beijing, which is so eager to push its "one country, two systems" model, ever realized that what people want is the opportunity and right to determine their own future, rather than relying on the central government's mercy and generosity? Look at how Paris treats Corsica democratically. Hong Kong people must have some ideas. Has this caused authoritarian Beijing to do some soul-searching or feel ashamed?

Cheng Chieh-yi is a researcher of the New Taiwan Foundation.

The pitfalls of the US' China policy

By Li Thian-hok

The PRC insists on the "one China" principle as the foundation of its policy toward Taiwan. The principle is a syllogism which runs as follows: There is only one China. The PRC is the sole, legitimate government of all China, of which Taiwan is a part. Therefore, Taiwan is subject to the sovereignty of the PRC, under the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The US government, on the other hand, says it abides by the "one China" policy, often without explaining what is meant by the phrase. There are at least three substantive differences between the positions of Washington and Beijing.

First, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, based on flimsy legal and historical grounds. The US merely acknowledges (ie, takes note of) the fact that the "Chinese" on both sides of the Taiwan strait claim Taiwan is part of China. The US has never recognized (ie, accepted) the PRC's sovereignty claim. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Jim Kelly has reiterated this point, citing former president Ronald Reagan's "six assurances." House Majority Leader Tom DeLay also emphasized this fact in his June 2 speech at the American Enterprise Institute and added that US "recognition of Beijing's territorial claims over Taiwan ... never will exist."

Second, as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the US considers "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." The three communiques are also predicated on peaceful settlement. China, however, has reneged on this agreement, having won US recognition of the PRC and other concessions. China insists on its "right" to use force against Taiwan, in order to gratify its expansionist ambitions.

Finally, the US maintains that any determination of the future status of Taiwan must have the assent of the people of Taiwan. China's position is that Taiwan's status should be determined by the 1.3 billion Chinese living under the CCP's control. The 23 million Taiwanese do not have a say in the choice between freedom and servitude.

Chinese officials and Beijing's diplomats have cleverly tried to portray the US' "one China" policy as one and the same as Beijing's "one China" principle. By repeating the "one China" policy mantra without any elaboration, the US government and the media have misled the public and the international community, causing an erroneous perception that America has recognized China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and unwittingly served as Beijing's propaganda mouthpiece.

Taiwan's inability to shed the archaic Republic of China constitutional framework also makes it more difficult for the nation to assert its separate sovereignty. The result is dire damage to Taiwan's international standing and the nation's growing isolation in the global community.

If Taiwan were to fall into China's hands, there would be adverse consequences for US strategic, political and economic interests throughout Asia. With China's armed forces controlling the vital sea lanes and air space around Taiwan, Japan's security would be mortally threatened. The damage to America's credibility as a guarantor of peace in East Asia may be so severe that Japan will face the unpalatable choice of either going nuclear or becoming a protectorate of the PRC. In time, the US could well be forced to withdraw from the Western Pacific.

As DeLay has stated, the "one China" policy is merely the means to America's primary objective in Asia, which is "the preservation of democracy and the expansion of freedom." When the Shanghai communique was issued in 1972, Taiwan was under the White Terror rule of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT. The "Chinese" in Taiwan at that time referred to the authoritarian KMT regime, since the Taiwanese people were forbidden to express their views.

Since the late 1980s, the people of Taiwan have transformed the nation into a thriving democracy, after decades of struggle during which tens of thousands of people lost their lives or years of their youth languishing in prison. The Taiwanese have earned the right to decide their own future without any outside pressure.

The basic premise of the "one China" policy that both the Tai-wanese and Chinese agree that Taiwan is part of China is false. Opinion surveys show that some 80 percent of the Taiwanese reject CCP rule and prefer Taiwan's de facto status as an independent democracy.

Regarding the US' position on Taiwan independence, the following comments of Senator Jesse Helms, former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, are relevant: "The United States should neither support nor oppose independence for Taiwan. While a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be suicidal and must not be encouraged, Taiwan is, after all, a democracy; as a revolutionary nation ourselves, the US has little moral authority to foreclose that option to the 23 million free people who live in Taiwan."

The TRA affirms "the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan" as objectives of the US. The right of self determination is a basic human right which is enshrined in the UN Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

As a signatory to the covenant and a fellow democracy, it would be inappropriate for the US to oppose the Taiwanese people's right to freely determine Taiwan's future status, through a referendum or otherwise.

After the Sept. 11 attacks on the US, there has been a marked warming in US-China relations. However, the US must take care that such an improvement in relations is not based on excessive deference to PRC sensitivity on the Taiwan issue. After all, China's contribution to the global war on terror is minor. China's efforts in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff serve its own self-interest. There is no need for the US to make superfluous concessions to Bei-jing in return.

The "one China" policy no longer serves US interests in maintaining peace and stability of East Asia. By acquiescing in China's chauvinism, this policy invites Chinese military aggression against Taiwan and an eventual US-China military conflict.

It is high time the "one China" policy be discarded in favor of a proactive strategy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, at least until such time as the PRC gives up its policy of military aggrandizement and it ceases to threaten its neighbors. A policy of appeasing China could well lead to deadly dangers to the US homeland.

As the late US congressman Gerald Solomon declared: Taiwan's security is ultimately America's security as well.

Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.

Hong Kong fiasco leaves Beijing scratching its head

Huge protests in Hong Kong have officials in China wondering what went wrong with the `one country, two systems' formula

By Erik Eckholm

NY TIMES NEWS SERVICE , BEIJING

"This has been a big shock for China's leaders. They think China has done a lot for Hong Kong, but now they see that ... people don't like Tung, don't like the Hong Kong government and don't like the government in Beijing."－Chu Shulong, a political scientist at Qinghua University

As it seeks to contain the fallout from a political fiasco in its cherished "special administrative region" of Hong Kong, the Chinese government has been uncharacteristically tongue-tied.

A week ago, officials here were surprised by a huge public protest in Hong Kong over proposed subversion laws -- an event that drew an estimated half-million residents into the streets and was tinged with anti-Beijing sentiment.

Predictably, in a country obsessed with domestic stability, the Chinese news media were barred from mentioning what was the largest political demonstration in Hong Kong or the mainland since 1989. Yet in this Internet era, many Chinese intellectuals are well aware that Hong Kong's democracy activists have shown new strength, including a smaller demonstration on Wednesday night.

Early Monday, his support crumbling, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was forced to put off a long-scheduled vote on the proposals, which are widely seen on the island as antidemocratic and too reflective of the wishes of Beijing's Communist rulers. The mainland's major publications have left that setback virtually unreported too.

"This has been a big shock for China's leaders," said Chu Shulong, a political scientist at Qinghua University in Beijing. "They think China has done a lot for Hong Kong, but now they see that even after all these years a lot of the people don't like Tung, don't like the Hong Kong government and don't like the government in Beijing."

It is unclear just how hard Beijing pushed for these particular laws and for a vote on them right now. Security laws are required by Hong Kong's Basic Law, the nearest thing the island has to a constitution, but their details and the timing of their introduction to society was ostensibly left to the local lawmakers to decide.

It is equally unclear whether Chinese leaders played a direct role in Tung's sudden decision to postpone a vote that was to take place next Wednesday -- a vote, it had suddenly become clear, he would lose -- or how they now feel about Tung himself, a longtime favorite in Beijing.

One reason for this official silence is that Chinese leaders are anxious to sustain the notion that Hong Kong, since its formal return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, enjoys autonomy over its internal affairs.

The Chinese are having special difficulty articulating a policy now, political experts say, because the events have challenged some of their most hallowed political tenets.

The return of Hong Kong to the motherland is regarded in China as one of the great national victories of the modern era; that its residents will thrive and be contented under the promised "one country, two systems" formula is repeated on the mainland as an article of faith.

But the angry debate over the proposed security laws has exposed the inherent weakness of the formula -- what happens when vital interests, as perceived in Beijing and Hong Kong, conflict? No one pretends that in a crunch, Beijing's needs would not prevail.

If the anti-Tung movement gains enough force, Beijing's leaders may face an unpleasant choice between allowing a mass movement to usurp their plans for Hong Kong, or pulling strings on the island far more openly than they want to.

"One country, two systems" is also the principle under which China is pursuing its overriding foreign policy objective, bringing Taiwan under its sovereignty.

At a news conference on Tuesday, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan parried questions about the broader impact of events in Hong Kong.

"The majority of Hong Kong people love Hong Kong and love the country, and they will support Tung Chee-hwa in completing the legislation," he said.

Asked whether Beijing's support of Tung had been shaken by his clear lack of popularity, Kong said only that it would be inappropriate for the Foreign Ministry to comment on Hong Kong's internal affairs.

Chu said he believed that Beijing leaders might retain sympathy for Tung because they felt that years of poor economic conditions in Hong Kong, largely arising from factors beyond his control, were a major source of the public anger.

"If the economy were going well there wouldn't have been so many protesters," Chu said.

Anti-Beijing sentiment in Hong Kong, and fears about the proposed subversion laws, were also stoked by the SARS epidemic -- which many on the island say might have been largely averted if China had been more open about the disease when it first appeared in China.

"The SARS crisis made a huge difference to this debate," said Ding Xueliang, a mainland-born political scientist at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. "With SARS, people saw that the abstract, remote concept of state secrecy was directly linked to the welfare of their own families."

For now, however the battle over the security bill proceeds, the illusion of smooth relations between feisty Hong Kong and a benignly paternal mainland has been badly shaken.

"Now it's clear that on major issues the people of Hong Kong are afraid of mainland interference," a political reporter at a major Communist Party newspaper said in an interview. "The shared ground between the people and the government has shrunk."

"This is more than a passing setback," he added. "It means that Beijing must rethink how to deal with Hong Kong."