Taiwan trudges on despite lack of US ties

ANNIVERSARY: Analysts see the severing of official ties with the US 24 years ago today as a mixed blessing, leaving Taiwan isolated but forcing it to democratize

By Melody Chen

STAFF REPORTER

Tuesday, Dec 16, 2003,Page 3

"Since 1972, Taiwanese people have been worried the nation's destiny might be determined by big countries."

－Lai I-chung, director of foreign policy s

Today marks the 25th anniversary since the US switched recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. Reviewing the 25 years, analysts and officials said each major setback in Taiwan-US relations has prompted Taiwanese to seek deeper democracy.

The US dealt a major blow to Taiwan by "acknowledging" the Beijing government in 1971, after which most of the world followed suit. Taiwan withdrew from the UN that same year.

"Since 1972, Taiwanese people have been worried the nation's destiny might be determined by big countries," said Lai I-chung, director of foreign policy studies for Taiwan Thinktank.

Chiang Ching-kuo, who took power in 1978, sensed the urgent need to speed up Taiwan's democratization, but he did not want the democratization process to threaten the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) rule, Lai said.

On Dec. 16, 1978, Taiwan was shocked by the US announcement to sever ties with the country. It formally lost diplomatic ties with the US in 1979. Large-scale public demonstrations took place on campuses and in front of the US Embassy in Taipei.

Angry crowds threw eggs at the cars of an American delegation to Taipei led by then US deputy secretary of state Warren Christopher.

The KMT halted an election of people's representatives, saying the nation was in a state of crisis.

The aborted election triggered widespread discontent among pro-democracy groups, generally termed tang wai (outside the party) activists, and contributed to the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979.

Many of the tang wai activists persecuted during the incident are now heavyweights in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Vice President Annette Lu and former DPP chairman Lin Yi-hsiung were on the wanted list.

In a paper he wrote when serving as a lawmaker, DPP Deputy Secretary-General Lee Ying-yuan said Taiwan's most dangerous period spanned from 1970 to 1990, after the US normalized ties with China to contain Russia.

"Taiwan's economy was about to take off during that period and its democracy was still in poor shape. Taiwan's national strength and image were in a bad situation. If crises had taken place in Taiwan, perhaps no countries would have offered help," Lee said.

DPP Legislator Chang Chun-hung, who was jailed for eight years for his involvement in the Kaohsiung Incident, said that although the US once treated Taiwan cruelly, it has acted like an eagle pushing a fledgling Taiwan over the cliff to teach it to fly.

"We did not perish but have since grown stronger. We cannot always rely on the Americans," Chang said.

Taiwan has grown up by deepening democracy and freedom. Crises in Taiwan-US relations may isolate the country, but "they also give Taiwan opportunities to practice how to fly on its own," Chang said.

"Taiwan's democracy has grown faster than that of most Asian countries," Chang said, adding the US has played a role in this.

Current relations, which the KMT-People First Party (PFP) alliance described as being in their worst state since the US cut ties with Taiwan, is another chance for Taiwan to learn to stand up by itself, Chang said.

The pan-blue camp said US President George W. Bush's public reprimand of President Chen Shui-bian during his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Washington last week signalled the greatest crisis in Taiwan-US relations since 1979.

Su Chi, co-convener of the KMT-PFP alliance's defense task force, said there are concerns in the blue camp over Chen's strategy to arouse anti-American sentiment to gain votes in next year's presidential election.

Su said that Chen is portraying himself as a tragic hero oppressed by the US and China owing to his proposals to have a referendum alongside the presidential election.

"We don't want to see Taiwan's relations with the US keep deteriorating. Taiwan has been one of the most pro-US countries in the world. We hardly see anti-US protests in Taiwan," Su said.

US won't dare to tell Taiwan 'no'

By Chin Heng-wei

Tuesday, Dec 16, 2003,Page 8

After Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met US President George W. Bush in the White House on Dec. 9, Bush publicly said, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo, and the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose."

For Taiwan, his statement is serious.

But before he said that, Bush emphasized that US policy is based on the "three communiques" and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Apparently, the US' Taiwan Strait policy remains unchanged, and Bush did not, as some people in the media had predicted he would, repeat his predecessor Bill Clinton's "three noes" policy.

During a press conference after their talks, Wen, in Bush's name, made a heap of statements that conform to China's interests. Bush only nodded and did not speak. At best, this means he "heard" China's discourse; it does not mean he agreed with it.

The point is that Washington's real attitude will only be revealed after Wen returns home. We only have to look at the high-profile reception President Chen Shui-bian received during his stop in New York to see that the US is playing a two-pronged strategy.

Wen proudly quoted Bush's statement, believing that the US president had publicly expressed his opposition to Taiwanese independence.

He misquoted Bush, and, furthermore, showed that China must take its cue from the US when dealing with Taiwan. Given that the Taiwan Relations Act is a US law, China must face the US before making military threats against Taiwan.

From the point of view of the US, it doesn't want any change -- what Bush termed a "unilateral attempt" -- by either Taiwan or China to the cross-strait status quo. Therefore, the US uses the "three communiques" to restrain Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act to restrain China.

But the problem is Taiwan is an independent democracy, and the sovereignty of a democracy lies in the hands of its people.

If Taiwanese people seek to express their opinions through democratic procedures, will the US really dare to tell them not to do so?

Former president Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state relations" dictum met with a strong response from the US. And now the US is able to understand and accept Chen's "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait platform.

Similarly, Washington may have found it hard to accept the newly passed Referendum Law, but Chen has announced that he will not ditch his plan to hold a referendum. The US might have to open its mind and listen to what the Taiwanese people have to say and spend time learning about it.

Chin Heng-wei is editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.

Dual agendas in the Taiwan Strait

By Trung Latieule

Tuesday, Dec 16, 2003,Page 8

In politics, hypocrisy is not a flaw. It is a strategy that helps a country hide its goals. One problem with this sort of hypocrisy, however, is that a hidden agenda can create miscalculations.

And that is what is happening in the Taiwan Strait, as all the players involved -- Taipei, Beijing and Washington -- have dual policies.

President Chen Shui-bian has been saying since the beginning of his presidential campaign that referendums and constitutional reforms have nothing to do with independence or reunification, and are only aimed at consolidating Taiwan's democracy.

But ever since the Legislative Yuan passed the Referendum Law, Chen has been pushing for a popular vote calling on China to withdraw the missiles targeting Taiwan and to renounce the use of force.

The contradiction concealed within Chen's statements is that there would be no obstacle to Taiwanese independence if China were to remove those missiles, since they are the main factor deterring the nation from declaring independence.

At first glance, Chen's rhetoric looks like a part of a strategy to garner more votes.

In reality, however, it is also part of his strategy of creeping toward independence.

Chen's intentions are clearly betrayed by the issues he has so far suggested be put on the referendum ballot: they are all related to cross-strait relations. Chen has left aside issues such as the reduction of the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan or the fate of the fourth nuclear plant, both of which are purely domestic issues.

Any referendum on issues depicting China as an enemy would create an atmosphere of hostile coexistence, as opposed to the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence that might be created through the establishment of direct links. An atmosphere of hostile coexistence will make reunification with China more difficult.

China, of course, has also employed a dual policy in the Taiwan Strait.

It still considers military intervention an option but it has not flexed its muscles recently as it has in the past.

Top Chinese leaders have been moderate in their statements, allowing officials who have less visibility on the international stage to make the harshest criticisms.

Wang Zaixi, vice minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of China's State Council, was quoted as saying in China Daily that "the use of force may become unavoidable" if Taiwanese authorities were to openly engage into pro-independence activities. "Taiwan independence means war," he said.

Similarly, Major General Peng Guangqian said in Outlook Weekly that China would not hesitate to attack if Taiwan sought a formal split, even if it meant a boycott of the 2008 Olympics, economic recession and casualties. In contrast, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao did not explicitly mention the use of force in his interview with The Washington Post, though he warned that China would "pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland."

There are two main reasons for China's dual policy.

First, it is aware that rattling its sabers would only contribute to boosting Chen's popularity and his re-election chances. Second, China does not want to jeopardize the charm offensive it has launched in order to assert its status as a cooperative and responsible power. Beijing's self-restraint, to a certain extent, has encouraged Chen to take bolder steps.

Had Beijing taken a firmer stand before Chen's visit to New York and Alaska, Washington might not have given him as much leeway during his trip as it did.

But of all the players in the Taiwan Strait, the US is the most ambivalent one.

Washington says it does not support Taiwanese independence and is "opposed to any referendum that would change Taiwan's status."

Yet it also claims that the use of referendums and rewriting the constitution are domestic Taiwanese politics, even though they might mention Taiwan's sovereignty.

The US is ambivalent not just on the Taiwan issue. It is also not clear in its ties with Beijing and Taipei.

Washington currently carries out a policy of constructive diplomatic engagement with China, which is an official US ally. President George W. Bush, however, recently sent a personal letter to Chen pledging support for Taiwan's bid to become an observer at the World Health Organization.

How is it that Bush has communicated directly with Chen if Washington does not have formal ties with Taipei?

The US' dual policy played an important role in letting Chen think that he had room to push the envelope, which he went on doing as long as Washington did not openly say that it opposed Taiwanese independence.

China, in the past, assumed that pressuring Washington was the best way to influence Taiwan on sensitive issues. Now it perceives the US' two-faced policy as more favorable to Taipei than to Beijing. China feels betrayed because it has cooperated with the US on Iraq and North Korea.

The worst scenario imaginable would be to have China draw the conclusion that the US wants to thwart its rise as a regional power and that Taiwan is a stumbling block that the US has set up for it in Southeast Asia.

The situation in the Taiwan Strait is more volatile now than before, not just because Taiwan, China and the US have hidden agendas, but also because the position of all the players on the chessboard is changing.

In military terms, the balance of power is gradually shifting in China's favor as it is continuing its missile buildup, while Taiwan is still delaying purchases of US weapons.

But ironically China's leverage in the Taiwan Strait has weakened as a result of the more aggressive policies implemented by the Chen administration and the emergence of a Taiwanese identity.

Washington is the player in the least enviable position. In the past, it has successfully managed the contradictory task of backing Taiwan's democracy while letting an alliance with an authoritarian China prevail. Now Washington is under pressure from both China and Taiwan to alter its cross-strait policy.

Chen has built his career on dividing his opponents. He won the 1994 Taipei mayoral election and the 2000 presidential election in large part because of divisions within the KMT. Chen's recent initiatives tacitly aim at splitting the US and China in the hope that Washington will side with Taipei.

On the other hand, China's influence on the cross-strait outcome is declining as it realizes that rhetoric will only strengthen the Taiwanese pro-independence movement.

That's why Beijing is trying to regain leverage by asking Washington to state that it opposes Taiwanese independence.

Washington is facing what increasingly looks like a major foreign policy crisis, with officials from the National Security Council and the State Department currently fighting behind the scenes.

The US will have tough decisions to make, as neither Taiwan nor China seem willing to back down.

The US is the country that has everything to lose from a change in the status quo.

Trung Latieule is a freelance reporter based in Taipei.

Online TV channel launched

FREE SPEECH: The Web-based channel, F4, will give the public the opportunity to voice their opinion by submitting digital video clips, which will be published online

By Cody Yiu

STAFF REPORTER

Tuesday, Dec 16, 2003,Page 2

"If you don't know how digital video works, just ask your children or grandchildren."

－Lin Kuei-you, co-founder of F4

An online television channel was launched by a group of four experienced media figuers yesterday to provide a forum for members of the public to voice their opinions.

"This online TV channel allows the public to send in their DV [digital video] clips, and we will publish these clips online and even on the TV shows that we host," said Lin Kuei-you, who is widely known as Yu-fu.

The other three founders of the channel, called F4, are actress Chiang Hsia, writer Wu Jin-fa and Soochow University professor Shieh Jhy-wey. All four have been wrongly accused of staffing the behind-the-scenes production team of the Special Report VCD series.

Lin, Wu and Hsieh currently host their own TV talk shows on current affairs.

"The clips should be entertaining, funny and creative. Of course, the contents of all clips should be legal and ethical. If you don't know how digital video works, just ask your children or grandchildren -- they will know all about it," Lin said.

Chiang said the name F4 re-presents the four ethnic groups in Taiwan that are represented by the four founders.

"Lin has Aboriginal heritage, Shieh is a Mainlander, Wu is Hakka and I am Taiwanese," Chiang said.

The logo of F4 TV is four connected rings.

"This represents the unification of all four ethnic groups," Chiang said.

Wu said capitalism has infiltrated the Taiwanese media in recent years.

"Since the turn of the century, the media has been invaded by rich investors. As a result, the news that is represented to the public has become biased and prejudiced, and represents the personal opinions of these investors. Therefore, in establishing this online television channel, we hope to promote public opinions being voiced in a public space," Wu said.

According to Shieh, "it used to be that the media observed the public, but now it is the public who is keeping an eye on the media."

Lin said F4 planned to raise NT$6 million to support the technical needs of the Web site.

"NT$100 per person from 60,000 people will be enough to send F4 into full operation. Before then, outstanding digital clips will be shown on our TV shows," Lin said.

F4 TV has a team of four attorneys to protect the rights of individuals whose clips have been published in case of litigation.

The Web site for the F4 TV channel is: http://www.f4tv.tv.