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China's
leaders on June 21, 2004 China's
leaders need reality check By
Lai I-chung The 2004 annual report
submitted on June 15th by the Congress-mandated bipartisan committee, the
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, has recommended that the
"Congress and the administration should conduct a fresh assessment of the
one-China policy." Also in the State Department's written testimony to
Congress on April 21, it seems that the US has adjusted its Taiwan policy in
order to adhere to its "one-China policy." It is generally believed
that the reassessment of this policy was triggered by the re-election victory of
President Chen Shui-bian . This move is long overdue. I believe a reality check on this policy is
urgently needed now, given that all the geo-strategic, political and social
conditions have changed since its enactment thirty years ago. The US' "one-China policy" can be traced back to the 1972
Shanghai Communique. At that time, the US-China rapprochement vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union benefited both Washington and Beijing, and implicit understanding
on the Taiwan issue was necessary to avoid letting this problem distract
US-China strategic cooperation. It was crafted by taking advantage of the ROC
government's positions then, as reflected in the following sentence: "The
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one-China and that Taiwan is a part of that China." In 1972, Taiwan was still under the Chiang Kai-Shek regime's authoritarian
rule. China unification was the regime's sacred mission, and Chinese identity
was imposed on the native Taiwanese people. Adhering to the Taiwanese identity
was viewed as equivalent to subversion of the state. And people who questioned
the validity of China unification were risking capital punishment. Today, the collapse of the Soviet Union has taken away the necessity for
US-China strategic cooperation. Governments in both capitals need to deal with
each other on their own merits. Though both the US and China are concerned about
terrorism and nuclear development in North Korea, these two issues can hardly
serve as a strategic common bond, as the threat of the Soviet Union did during
the Cold War era. The democratization process in Taiwan also dramatically changed the
political landscape. According to one opinion survey publicized by National
Chengchi University last December, people who identify themselves as
"Chinese only" account for only about 10 percent of respondents; the
remainder identify themselves as pure Taiwanese (50 percent) and
Taiwanese-Chinese (40 percent). This shows the reverse of the situation in 1992,
when the poll was first conducted and Taiwan started to accelerate its
democratization. Chen's re-election also means that the "unification with China"
option receives no backing in today's society. Despite the widely perceived
shortcomings of Chen's first term in office, he still managed to increase his
share of the vote by 12 percent. The core reason for this shift is that both
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party
Chairman James Soong were unable to assuage people's doubts about their
determination to prevent Taiwan from being swallowed by China. Thus the three pillars of the one-China policy are either nonexistent or
marginalized: the need for US-China strategic cooperation against a global
competitor, the Taiwan government's goal for the unification with China, and the
omnipresence of Chinese identity. Thus to demand Taiwan to reach a deal with
Beijing on "one China" can be expected to meet strong resistance by
the Taiwanese people. Moreover, since the current practice of the one-China
policy has severely limited Taiwan's international participation in the
globalization era, Taiwan's democracy is now being put to the test. This is
because participation for rule-making and trend awareness are essential for the
nation's sustained political, economic and social development. We often heard the argument that the one-China policy has nurtured Taiwan's
democracy because it has provided a stable external environment necessary for
the democratization to take place in Taiwan. But this argument is contradictory
to the widely shared perception that Taiwan was expected to fold soon after the
Sino-US normalization in 1979, even with the enactment of the Taiwan Relations
Act. The fact that China proposed in 1981 the "one country, two
systems" formula to absorb Taiwan seems to be another testament to this
perception. If Taiwan was expected to be absorbed by China then, how could the
goal of nurturing Taiwan democracy can be said to be part of the one-China
policy? We can all leave the question whether or not the one-China policy has
nurtured democracy in Taiwan to historians' judgment. However, there is no
denial that the practice of the current form of the one-China policy is seen to
be on a collision course with Taiwanese democracy. Many pundits tell us that
only democracy compatible with the one-China policy can be viewed as responsible
democracy; otherwise it should be discarded as populism. Trying to separate
"bad democracies" from "good democracies" could rescue
people from the moral dilemma, but it does not yet deal with the facts on the
ground. The Taiwanese democracy exists, whether you label it good or bad. Any
sustainable management scheme for cross-strait issues needs to accept this fact.
Taiwan's democracy has to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. Today, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is entering a
period of reordering. China is resurging as major power, Japan is fast moving
toward being a normal nation from a national defense standpoint, and South Korea
is reassessing its position on the Korean Peninsula and its relationships with
both the US and China. The regional implication of Taiwanese democratization is
just part of this changing mix. It is doubtful whether the current form of the
one-China policy, which has been unchanged for decades, is compatible with the
fast-evolving strategic environment. A reality check on the one-China policy is
indeed needed now. Lai
I-chung directs foreign policy studies at the Taiwan Thinktank Constitution
reform to get push CONCERTED
EFFORT: A number of groups held a press conference to announce that they'll be
pushing hard for a revision to the charter document The Northern Taiwan
Society yesterday held a press conference to urge the public to support
rewriting the Constitution by 2006. "The existing Constitution does not
match up with reality," said Senior Presidential Advisor Koo Kuan-min. "The 23 million people of Taiwan must ratify the Constitution for it
to have any sort of meaning." "In my estimation, 80 to 90 percent of the population agrees with
implementing major Constitutional reforms," Koo said. "The problem arises when we discuss changing the name of the country.
My suggestion is to hold a two-stage referendum. The first referendum would deal
strictly with a new constitution. After that is accomplished, we can hold a
second referendum on the question of the country's name. "Consensus is most important," he said, citing the 228
Hand-in-Hand Rally as an example of Taiwanese unity. "Rewriting the Constitution is not equal to Taiwan's
independence," said Chen I-Shen , the society's deputy chairman and a
research fellow at the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica.
÷ "Even China has altered its Constitution. And because [Chinese
Nationalist Party Chairman (KMT)] Lien [Chan] advocated rewriting the
Constitution during this year's presidential election, I believe we have a
consensus across party lines. "We must see past pan-blue and pan-green divisions to discuss the
content of the reform, because that is the more important question," he
said. "But the question of our national name cannot be ignored," Chen
said. The `Republic of China' cannot reach out into the international community.
For instance, if we succeed in changing the Constitution, would we claim to have
changed the Chinese Constitution? "By keeping the name `Republic of China,' we make ourselves
illegitimate," he said. "We must deal as soon as possible with the
issue of our `illegality.' "Independent commentator Yang Hsien-Hong called Constitutional reform
a right and a duty of each Taiwanese citizen. "The tracks of history have been laid," he said. "When
[former president] Lee Tung-hui became the first elected president in 1996, he
was more legitimate than the Constitution, as was our newly elected legislature,
because the current constitution hasn't been voted on. "In truth, we already enjoy a modified, more democratic form of
government than before," Yang said, "but there is no document to make
it legitimate. We've paid in advance with our credit cards, but we owe it to
future generations to pay the bill and give life to a new Constitution." Yang urged all citizens to stand up to pressure from the US and China and
push for a 2006 Constitutional referendum. "At this point in time, silence
is a crime. Recall the Europeans during World War II who remained silent as
their Jewish countrymen and neighbors were taken by the Nazis. Will we also wait
until it is too late, until we ourselves are arrested? "We can only win if we make noise," he said. Koo expressed disappointment with President Chen Shui-bian for putting the
brakes on the Constitutional reform movement, which he promised to push during
the presidential election. "The US warned us to slow down because they were afraid we were
rushing the process," Koo said, "but they never told us to go
backwards." To promote the ratification of a new constitution by 2006, the North Taiwan
Society will initiate what it calls a "Popular Constitutional Rewriting
Movement" on June 26 on the third anniversary of its founding. At a
fundraiser that evening, the group will announce an manifesto for the effort and
establish a nationwide "Constitutional Rewriting Seed Army" . Former
president Lee Tung-hui will attend the event. China's
democratic hopes Carl
Gershman, president of the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy,
joined the first anniversary celebrations of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
(TFD) last monday. Gershman was a member of the US delegation to President Chen
Shui-bian's inauguration ceremony in 2000. He shared the idea of establishing
the foundation with Chen. Another member in the US delegation was Michael Kau, a
professor at Brown University. Kau, later appointed as vice minister of foreign
affairs, helped establish the foundation last June and is now president of the
TFD. Gershman talked to `Taipei Times' reporter Melody Chen about how democratic
development in China would influence its relationship with Taiwan Taipei
Times: How will China's democratic development influence cross-strait relations?
Carl Gershman: If you have more
democracy on the mainland, it would be much easier to work out a proper relation
between Taiwan and China. It is not for me to say how those things should be worked out, but I do
suggest that there are various ways in which you can work out federal or
confederal relationships, like the Europe today. Look at the difference with democracy in Europe today and the way it was in
the 19th century. Look at the relations between France and Germany. These
countries remain independent and sovereign but they also have a growing federal
relationship through the EU. Democracy allows these forms of political relationship to develop with the
independence of the different parts not challenged. They can find ways of living
and working together and being part of a common political unit. It is only
possible for democracies. One of the preconditions to become a part of the EU today is democracy.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Baltic countries could become part of
the EU because they are democratic. I could imagine that as China becomes more democratic, it would be possible
to work out some appropriate federal or confederal relationship that would deal
with the political problem that we should allow people to have their own sense
of sovereignty and independence. TT: Fifteen years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese
government has managed to quieten dissenting voices, partly through giving them
wealth. Are the Chinese people forgetting the event? Gershman: It is inevitable that an authoritarian
government would seek to use prosperity as a means of containing political
differences. But I don't think, in the long run, this can be a successful strategy
because prosperity ultimately involves the development of a stronger middle
class, a stronger intellectual class. As you develop these new social and class formations, inevitably people are
going to want to speak, express themselves and help influence the direction of
the country. This ultimately will involve some forms of freedom and democracy. What happened in Tiananmen Square cannot in the long term be forgotten. It
is embedded in the consciousness and it will just come back. There is no way
that it can be eliminated. It has to be dealt with. My hope is that what happened in Tiananmen Square will be integrated in the
way that helps to reconcile the differences in China. TT: You said Taiwan's democratic experience can help China develop its
democracy. Given the current cross-strait tensions, how much can the Chinese
people, who widely regard Chen's government as a separatist regime, accept
lessons from Taiwan's democracy? Gershman: First of all, I don't think this can be done
alone. It's a matter of dialogue and exchange of views. Simply starting a
discussion about democracy is very important to China. They made progress in
China in the past. While China develops economically, many people feel that it
needs to develop politically as well. Political discussion is going on now in
China. If China can discuss that question, there can also be the involvement of
people in Taiwan in that discussion. People from the US and all over the world
are talking about democracy in China. TT: Can you suggest some practical ways for Taiwan to help China's
democracy? Gershman: I think it is something this foundation [TFD]
is going to help develop. Taiwan has made a very important and difficult
transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Yet it was a peaceful
transition. People who are associated with the old authoritarian government are now
involved in the new democracy. That is an interesting experience. That should be
a great interest to people on the mainland as to how it can be done. TT: Has China's control of its media affected its people's perception of
democracy in Taiwan? Gershman: The relationship of democracy to the future
of China is an essential subject. We should be discussing how the development of
democracy in China will affect the future of the relationship between China,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and so forth. As democracy develops, there could be discussions as to how to the
development of democracy on the mainland could have affected the relations
between China and Taiwan. Maybe it is possible to have a closer relationship between China and Taiwan
as democracy develops on the mainland. I don't see democracy being a problem for
relations between China and Taiwan. I think it is an opportunity because as
China becomes more democratic, the possibility is of a new relationship between
China and Taiwan. TT: But after the March presidential election here, the Chinese media spent
much of its coverage on the chaos caused by the election results. It seems they
wanted to portray democracy as a potential origin of instability. Gershman: You have the rule of law. As [late US]
President Ronald Reagan said in his Westminster Address, democracy is a way to
resolve conflicts peacefully. That is what democracy is. Democracy does not mean there won't be conflict. There will be conflict.
But the whole purpose of democracy is to be able to resolve conflicts through
the rule of law peacefully. That's what happened in Taiwan. Obviously there could be disagreement, but that disagreement is not chaos.
Disagreement is natural. We have sharp disagreement in the US, but we don't have
chaos. TT: The Chinese media's focus on Taiwanese society's conflicts put Taiwan's
democracy on a very negative light. Will that affect the Chinese people's
pursuit for democracy? Gershman: It probably can be the case that the people
who preside over an authoritarian order will try to make the case that it is
better than democracy and that it is more orderly. There are some authoritarian rulers who warn democracy will bring chaos.
This is quite normal. But it [China] cannot stop change. China is a changing
country. China is becoming increasingly diversified economically. As it develops economically, there are now a developing middle class and
business class. They are even being invited to join the Communist Party. As you
develop and diversify, you have to find new institutions to be able to
accommodate the differences. There is no way to do it other than democracy and
to try to have orderly political population. TT: You lauded Taiwan as a beacon for Asia's democracy. However, when
Taiwan held its first ever national referendum in March, it encountered enormous
international pressure, including that from Asian countries, as a result of
China's diplomatic efforts. Gershman: The referendum is not the essence of
democracy. It is simply one expression. Taiwan has very practical problems to
deal with in terms of relations with the mainland. It's going to have worked out
this relationship. This is a practical question, not a fundamental question. The prospect for the long term is the development of democracy on the mainland. That is going to happen over time. The challenge is to maintain peace as democracy develops.
DPP
plan shows trend to mature democracy By
Chin Heng-wei The Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) has proposed an amendment to its charter, revising the
rule that requires the president to automatically take the post of the incumbent
party's chairperson. The newly introduced amendment states that the party's
chairperson could be the president or one of its three vice chairpersons, both
appointed by the president and approved by the DPP Central Standing Committee. The move is surely part of the DPP's structural rise from its opposition
status to the seat of power. The significance of the amendment lies in the fact
that it shows the DPP on its way to the separation of party and state: after
making DPP officials drop out of the intra-party factions, the amendment also
empowers the president to handpick the DPP's chairperson. Since the amendment
was proposed by the Presidential Office, it was taken as part of the reforms
throughout the party. Upon hearing the news, both DPP members and non-DPP personalities saw it as
a sign of President Chen Shui-bian's expansion of personal power. Nonetheless,
since Chen has concurrently served as president and DPP chairman, and holds both
the state and party in his hand, it could be said that his power has already
reached its peak. None can rival Chen. That said, where is the room for the
expansion of his power?
Second, even if Chen did not hold the post of DPP chairperson, he would
still be the biggest name within the party. Whether Chen takes the party post is
irrelevant to the scope of his power. Third, the rule that requires the president to handpick the chairperson
actually means the president's relinquishment of the highest rank within his
party. The act is more a shrinkage of authority rather than expansion of power. The point is Chen still has the utmost power in his grip in the DPP,
regardless of whether he assigns another person or serves as chairman himself.
What is open to speculation is how the DPP's institutional change will impact on
its party character and constitution. Take the party-state relation in the US for example; the opposition party
has no leader until the new presidential hopeful is elected in the primaries and
serves as the party's chairman. On the other hand, the US president can appoint
the ruling party's chairperson as the president has the power to designate and
discharge administrative officers. Chen's scope of authority resembles that of the US president: Chen can
concurrently serves as the party chairman, assign the vice chairpersons, or
appoint one among the vice chairpersons as its chairperson. Yet Chen's power is
more limited than that of the US president's: our president can only select but
not confirm the party chairman. Another approval needs to be sought from the DPP
Central Standing Committee. Such an exercise of power cannot be said to be
simply modeled on the US's. The change of the rule might be related to the transfer of power within the
DPP. Yet there is not a well-established link between these two. Since Chen was
recently re-elected, there is still a long time before he becomes a lame
duck.The point is how the amendment affects the party. Chin
Heng-wei is editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly. |
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