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Beijing miffed over US on July 20, 2004

Beijing miffed over US `interference' with TRA resolution

REUTERS , BEIJING
 

China has condemned a US Congressional resolution reaffirming America's commitment to supply weapons to Taiwan.

The US House of Representatives passed a resolution last week reaffirming its commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, the law that requires Washington to arm Taipei, as the cornerstone of US relations with Taipei.

The resolution said China's military modernisation and weapons procurement programmes were matters of grave concern, particularly the recent deployment of about 500 missiles directed toward Taiwan.

"We express our strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to this," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said in a statement seen on the ministry's Web site yesterday.

"[This] brazenly violates Chinese sovereignty and grossly interferes in China's internal affairs," she said, adding that the Bush administration should oppose the resolution.

"Splittist activities by `Taiwan independence' forces are the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," Zhang said.

China has made solemn representations with the US side, Zhang said, adding that US arms sales to Taiwan would sabotage China-US relations and undermine American interests.

But analysts said the tone of the protest was relatively mild and unlikely to sour ties with the US. Bilateral trade and investment are booming, and China has backed the US-led war on terror and taken a leading role in trying to resolve a crisis over North Korea's nuclear programmes.

The resolution said US President George W. Bush should encourage further dialogue between Beijing and Taipei and should not discourage Taiwanese officials from visiting the US.

Bush and Congress should determine whether China's arms build-up required that additional defense articles and services be made available to Taiwan, the resolution said.

 

 

Beneficial unification brings peace

By Chien Hsi-chieh
 

China is viewing the next 20 years as an opportunity for peaceful development. It is viewing these 20 years, the second stage of reforms and deregulation, as "a period of strategic opportunity" for raising the country to new levels.

China, however, views Taiwan's gradual move toward independence as the greatest threat to this period of "peaceful" development. In particular, with the planned amendment of the Constitution (or the writing of a new one) in 2006 and the promulgation of that Constitution in 2008, Taiwan will cross over China's "red line," and there is a definite possibility that this will be seen as a provocation for war.

The movement to rectify Taiwan's national title is not only a matter of the Taiwan Solidarity Union trying to impose concrete demands for the writing of a new Constitution, it is also an attempt by the independence-minded party to take the initiative in the nation's "big issue." The use of Taiwan's democratic process to write a new and appropriate Constitution and the attempt to define the status quo in the Taiwan Strait from the perspective of "Taiwan, Republic of China" are certain to cause much distain for the US and China, and will be the defining issue on which China bases its decision whether to invade.

If China responds to this situation by speeding up the promulgation of a national unification law, it will touch a sensitive nerve among Taiwan's independence proponents and cause a wave of "anti-China" protests. If that happens, cross-strait peace will deteriorate.

China is hoping for 20 years of strategic opportunity, during which time it can keep a lower profile and stop pressing "peaceful unification" and "one country, two systems" on Taiwan in favor of maintaining the status quo.

A Beijing-based think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has said that the next six to eight years are a crucial period in the cross-strait relationship, and also the most dangerous period.

Many analysts hold that the greatest obstacle to cross-strait negotiations is China's insistence on the "one China" principle, as well as its use of military intimidation. This issue is not only an obstacle to cross-strait negotiations, it is also a catalyst for the Taiwan independence movement. As long as Taiwan holds national elections, the nationalism inherent in such independence slogans as "love Taiwan or sell out Taiwan" and "protect Taiwan and oppose China" is the most effective way to mobilize the public against the idea of reunification. Who, then, cares about political ideology or administrative achievements?

The leader who most fiercely opposes China will be the one who gets the vote. Accordingly, Taiwan's future political leaders must become tougher and more hawkish. But if China finds it difficult to tolerate such a leadership, its own hawks are certain to rear their ugly head. And if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait move toward more hawkish positions, nationalism and attempts at vilifying each other will make war inescapable.

China must change its idea of what Taiwan's independence is. How, for example, should it be defined? Could a clearly-defining recognition of de facto indepen-dence but not formal independence satisfy the Chinese government? If that were possible, China would not have to worry about provocations or a gradual push for formal independence. Dialogue must be built on recognition of the status quo.

The People's Republic of China has never ruled Taiwan. Asking that Taiwan enter into negotiations based on the "one China" principle will be seen by the people of Taiwan as a request to surrender their country. No political leader will want to play the role of Li Hongzhang, the viceroy of the Qing dynasty who signed the Shimonoseki Treaty with Japan. They are even more afraid of being labelled traitors. China's leaders often say that they pin their hopes on the people of Taiwan, but they do not understand them. The reconciliation between East and West Germany began with a mutual respect for the status quo, not a "one Germany" principle.

Furthermore, West Germany understood how to treat a weaker entity, and this is why German reunification succeeded. East Germany did not feel pressured or as though it was being annexed, and that allowed peaceful unification.

One of the biggest obstacles in the present cross-strait relationship is the "crisis of trust." China believes that giving up the military option will result in Taiwan declaring independence and the US changing its view of what "one China" means. Taiwan, on the other hand, constantly changes its rhetoric; one day talking about the "five noes" pledge, another day about "one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait."

Given China's consistent use of military pressure, such ever-changing rhetoric will never succeed in building mutual trust.

Peace does not, in fact, equal surrender and submission. Only through justice and fairness will true peace be achieved. The best chance for achieving peace is to follow these three steps:

First, respect for the status quo is necessary to maintain the status quo, build a foundation of trust and create a situation where it is possible to discuss a mid-term agreement for the Taiwan Strait.

Second, talk of the peaceful rise of China should center on cross-strait peace and do away with any strategy of resorting to military force against Taiwan.

Third, China must give up its strategy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically and economically and replace it with closer economic and diplomatic cooperation, and mutual exchanges to create a win-win relationship.

Through these measures, China would get its 20 years of peaceful development, and in 2050 the two sides could agree on "mutually beneficial unification."

Given the cross-strait stand-off, Taiwan should allow visits from Chinese workers in the private sector -- in particular from China's gradually maturing nonprofit organizations. Think tanks and nongovernmental organizations should engage in exchanges with Chinese think tanks to let them gain a better understanding of Taiwan.

Chien Hsi-chieh is the executive director of the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan.

 

 

China's HK policies fail

Chinese officials, such as Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, use every opportunity to point out that there is more democracy in Hong Kong now, under Chinese rule, than when it was a British colony. They say that, since the people of Hong Kong did not complain under British rule, it is hypocritical of Western powers to accuse China of suppressing their human rights ("China snorts at Western concern for human rights," July 16, page 1).

At first blush, the rationale may seem reasonable. However, what Chinese officials are really saying is that if Western powers thought it was okay for the British to deny the people of Hong Kong a say in their future, then China should not be criticized for doing the same. In addition, the people of Hong Kong have no cause for complaint. After all, they have never had a say in their future so it should not matter to them if their oppressors are British or Chinese.

But the Chinese comparison of its rule with British rule is incomplete. During the past century, the British have de-colonized. Beginning with Canada in the mid-1800s, the British allowed their far-flung colonies to gain independence. The 53 members of the Commonwealth are former British territories who now govern themselves. If that practice continues, it is likely that when Hong Kong develops the desire for self-government, the British will also help coordinate its independence and membership of the Commonwealth.

On the other hand, I can think of no territory that China has let go of. To the contrary, in the past century, China has been absorbing territories that may once have paid tribute to the Chinese empire, but were actually self-governing. Its desire for Taiwan is yet another example of China's appetite.

To complete the comparison of the human right records of British and Chinese rule over Hong Kong, British de-colonization and Chinese expansionism must be considered. At that point, perhaps Chinese officials will find other arguments to justify their disregard for the concerns of Hong Kong's people.

Kenneth Choy   Hong Kong


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