No good can come from Chinese nationalism on Aug 13, 2004

No good can come from Chinese nationalism

Cao Chang-ching
 

Not only did Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party Chairman James Soong not accept their defeat in this year's presidential election, but they also deliberately sought to whip up their disgruntled supporters' emotions to create a riot. Their behavior not only damaged the country, it also hurt the two men's public approval ratings, which plunged more than 20 percent. In short, their antics nearly destroyed their political careers.

Why wasn't Lien capable of admitting defeat? We perhaps could have predicted that beha-vior from his "pure Chinese" stance -- emphasized during his visit to the US -- which makes him believe in a culture with zero tolerance for defeat.

The barbarity of the Chinese soccer fans at the end of the recent 2004 Asian Cup final in Beijing displays a similar belief. After China lost to Japan, Chinese soccer fans burned Japanese flags, besieged the Japanese team buses, and shouted for the extermination of all Japanese devils.

In both sports competitions and democratic elections, there are three fundamental principles: to abide by the rules of the game, compete peacefully and accept defeat gracefully. Both the behavior of Lien and Soong and the riot of Chinese soccer fans in Beijing were the result of ignoring these foundations of civilized sport and society. Whenever they encounter an unfavorable situation, such people invariably throw a tantrum. For them, whether it's in sports or elections, it's not a competition of skills or popularity, but a chance to see who has the best dirty tricks.

We have witnessed the inability of Chinese soccer fans to accept defeat before. In the summer of 1985 in Beijing, after the Chinese soccer team lost to Hong Kong in the World Cup qualifier, Beijing's soccer fans became violent -- looting shops, damaging cars and injuring foreigners.

This inability to tolerate defeat originates chiefly from feelings of inferiority and arrogance. The arrogance comes from China's long history, its rich territory and its soaring economic development in recent years. There is a self-inflated mindset which cherishes the illusion that the 21st century is a century for Chinese people. But at the same time, many Chinese people think their country isn't superior enough to be truly respected by international society -- and therein lies their inferiority complex.

Not being able to accept losing means having no confidence in winning again. Only by resorting to emotional behavior can these sore losers soothe the feelings of inferiority brought by defeat.

Permitting such irrational display of feelings in an individual can lead to tragedy. In a nation it can bring calamity. If the Chinese government continues to support and incite the fanatic sentiment of nationalism, it will one day bring catastrophe on itself.

Cao Chang-ching is a writer based in the US.

TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI

Taiwan needs nuclear deterrent

Is it six days or two weeks? This is the range of speculation over how long Taiwan will be able to hold out should China decide to launch a full-scale attack. A recent computer simulation suggested six days. No sooner had this been reported than "authoritative military sources" -- whatever those are -- rushed to tell some local media outlets that, in fact, Taiwan could hold out for a whole two weeks.

That anyone should find the possibility of a war lasting twice as long reassuring is symptomatic of the air of unreality which tends to surround this gravest of topics. The logic behind this view is essentially that Taiwan has to hold out until the US comes to its aid and, given the tortoise-like speed of US military deployment, the longer the better.

This is assuming that the US will come to Taiwan's aid, and there are people in the US who ask, "Why should we?" Because the US has a strategic interest in denying China control of the Western Pacific and the sea lanes to Japan, the conquest of Taiwan would effectively mean the end of the US' "hyperpower" status.

Some people in Taiwan think this means that Taiwan can hitch a free ride on the back of US strategic interests. One of the more foolish, and distressingly widespread, follies we have heard from the pan-green camp is that Taiwan does not need to spend money on upgrading its military effectiveness because the US is compelled to defend it, come what may. This is utter rubbish. But is it any more idiotic than the nature of the debate about the kind of weapons Taiwan needs?

The major threat from China comes from its missiles -- 500 of them at the moment and at least 600 by the end of next year. Taiwan is obviously interested in defense against missiles, but in a curiously myopic way. It is obsessed with high-tech solutions of extremely doubtful value while eschewing more basic, albeit less showy, measures. For example, a cornerstone of Taiwan's defense strategy is acquiring the Patriot III anti-missile system, despite this system's highly questionable effectiveness. Instead of putting its faith in a magic umbrella full of holes, Taiwan might more usefully upgrade its facilities to make sure they can withstand being struck by China's missiles. Pouring concrete lacks the glamor of high-tech gadgetry, but might be more effective in the long run -- and certainly cheaper.

But the myopia extends beyond this. The chief problem is the "reactive" interpretation of what constitutes defense. Taiwan wants to stop China if it indeed tries anything, which means finding weapons to counter the weapons that China has. What Taiwan needs is the ability to stop Beijing from trying anything in the first place. That does not just mean the ability to inflict big losses on an attacking force, but the ability to raise the cost of attacking Taiwan far beyond China's willingness to pay. In the end this comes down to Taiwan's need for nuclear weapons. The ability to obliterate China's 10 largest cities and the Three Gorges Dam would be a powerful deterrent to China's adventurism. Some might find this horrible to contemplate, but if China leaves Taiwan in peace it is something that would never have to be faced. It would be up to China.

It is current US policy to prevent nuclear proliferation, or so Washington says. The irony is that in preventing Taiwan many years ago from working on its own nuclear deterrent, the US may one day risk a nuclear exchange with China because of Taiwan. To avoid this, it might be useful to think about how Taiwan might acquire the means to stop China even thinking about an attack.

Political split paves way for reform

By Zhang Weiguo
 

The "balance of powers" and media freedom have long been a bottleneck in the process of China's political reform. The "centralist" party culture bequeathed by Mao Zedong still remains influential and Deng Xiaoping has also left a legacy which explicitly rejects a three-branch government.

In addition, reform since 1989 has been hampered by hesitancy in dealing with these problems. For this reason, China's media law has been discussed for the last 20 years but has always ended up as one of the first victims of any political struggle. But now there is a slim chance that things may change.

In the transfer of power that should have been effected by the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin, who was supposedly retiring, retained control of the military, creating two centers of power. On the one side is Jiang, who tries to emulate Deng in exercising influence through his control of the military, even while claiming to be nothing more than an ordinary party member. On the other side are the new leaders who have recently taken office and are also following Deng's example in seeking to force Jiang to release his hold on the military and retire -- both in name and in fact.

But Deng's experience was unique to himself and the power that he wielded at the end of his career is not something that Jiang can easily acquire. In addition, there are the lessons of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square Massacre, which have made party members more sensitive to Jiang's ambitions to become a "supreme emperor."

All this has meant that there is an unprecedented degree of equality between the two power centers, with the new leaders representing the mainstream. This balance of power within the political structure is rarely seen, but it will probably persist for some time. The situation is likely to remain stable until there is a change in the senior leadership, so it will probably remain until one of the two power centers disappears.

Although the existence of these two centers of power might be a fluke, it has created something akin to a separation of powers. Although both sides are constantly making moves to attack each other, they are also unwilling to give their opponent any advantage and are therefore extremely careful to avoid political mistakes. They can not afford to be arrogant and domineering.

At the moment both sides are mapping out strategy while keeping an eye on the adversary, waiting for the other side to make a misstep that they can take advantage of. They keep their comments to a minimum on most sensitive issues, watching their adversary perform, putting them to the test.

The case of Dr. Jiang Yanyong -- the surgeon who blew the whistle on SARS and publicly condemned the 1989 crackdown on democracy protesters -- and the cross-strait issue are both dealt with in this manner.

Premier Wen Jiabao's macroeconomic reforms have come under attack from Jiang and his Shanghai clique and President Hu Jintao had to personally visit Shanghai to smooth things over. When Hong Kong's Wen Wei Po reported that the Central Military Commission meeting had proposed an invasion of Taiwan prior to 2020, this was interpreted as an attempt by Jiang to retain a hold on power until that time, a suggestion that infuriated Hu.

When Hu and Wen used the 100th anniversary of Deng's birth to force Jiang to retire, it was widely discussed in party publications. The prominent characteristic of these struggles between Hu and Wen and their adversary Jiang is the diligent avoidance of direct confrontation.

The debate has generally been conducted through a third party, so that there is always room for an about-face if necessary. This high-level maneuvering has provided the private sector with more creative space to comment, and people such as Jiang Yanyong, Jiao Guobiao, a deputy professor of media and communications studies who attacked propaganda officials for "suppressing everything in the name of stability," and Lu Yaogang, deputy director of the China Youth Daily news center, who wrote an open letter protesting government restrictions on press freedom, have gradually emerged.

Although this is a far cry from possessing a free press, in comparison to the level of ideological control once exercised by the government, it is a very significant breakthrough.

But this balance of powers is an abnormal situation. It creates a high level of risk, as we saw from the incarceration of Jiang Yanyong. Traditional Chinese political culture has never allowed for "one mountain to have two tigers," so it is only a matter of time and opportunity before one side or the other shows their hand.

When victory has been decided, the winner will become the paramount power within the government, and those who have used the limited freedom of expression that has been achieved will be prosecuted and removed from their official positions. Their leaders are likely to lose their voice altogether if they don't accept amnesty in return for acceding to the official line. At this point China will enter a new cycle of authoritarianism.

This situation gives rise to an appealing fantasy -- as there is now a de facto balance of power, could this situation not be institutionalized and maintained? Maybe there will be a realization of the myth that democratization will happen first within the party. Or for that matter, the political section of the party might simply act independently.

Basically, the current bifurcation of China's political establishment should be used as a means of pushing through the bottleneck in reform, breaking away from the cycle of dictatorial government and shifting from a paradigm of "if I live, you must die" to peaceful coexistence and mutual restraint. If this were to happen, then the CCP could become a modern political party and China could be set on the road toward becoming a constitutional democracy that would be part of modern civilization.

If this were the case, the existence of two centers of power, or even multiple centers of power, would provide opportunities for political development. But this is just the view of an academic, and it remains to be seen whether our wise politicians are able to take advantage of this opportunity. On this score, Taiwan's development of constitutional democracy over recent years can provide valuable lessons for China's leaders.

Zhang Weiguo is a freelance writer.