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US¡¦ two-pronged policy on Nov 29, 2004

US continues two-pronged policy

By Yu Pen-li M

Following the recent resignation of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, US President George W. Bush appointed National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as Powell's successor. Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, will be replacing Rice. All signs point to members of the "Vulcans," Bush's foreign policy team during the 2000 presidential election campaign, directing foreign policy in his new cabinet. Yet decisionmakers such as conservative hawks Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld still seem to view China as a strategic competitor. This looks positive for Taiwan. But are things really as they seem?

The most interesting thing is Hadley's appointment. Hadley was a lawyer, and during the 1970s he was a policy analyst in the defense department. He was later assistant secretary of defense during Bush senior's term in office, specializing in nuclear and conventional arms control issues.

In George W. Bush's first term, he made Hadley his deputy national security adviser hoping that Hadley, with his experience in arms control issues, would be able to explain the US missile defense plan to concerned countries. China is the greatest obstacle to the implementation of the US missile defense plan in the Asia-Pacific region, so Hadley should understand the strategic importance of Taiwan's geopolitical position. As a result, the new Bush government's strategic evaluation can be expected to lead to a deepening of security cooperation between Taiwan and the US, rather than to the abandonment of Taiwan.

There are possible compromises that could be made by realist members of the Vulcan group, based on consideration of actual international political benefits and interests. One example: although they are hoping for changes in the Pyongyang government, tough behavior might induce a Chinese reaction. This could seriously affect the region's strategic balance, so they might then take a softer, multilateral approach to handling the North Korean nuclear issue.

In the future, the new US government will face several new diplomatic challenges, such as the reconstruction of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestine situation following the death of Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and the North Korean nuclear issue. Doubtless they would be glad to see stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region so that they can concentrate on these other issues.

In particular, the US worries that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist organizations and lead to terrorist attacks on US soil. Opposition to nuclear arms proliferation, therefore, is at the top of the US foreign policy agenda. Following this logic, China will become its most important partner when it comes to global non-terrorism and anti-proliferation efforts. Based on a realistic appraisal of the international political situation, the members of the Vulcan group will expand cooperation with China and downplay differences of opinion.

In other words, if the Vulcans want to see China as a diplomatic partner in the 21st century, it would be impossible for them to oppose Beijing over the question of Taiwan.

Based on Washington's objective of strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region, stability in the Taiwan Strait will be an important pillar of US security, and Taiwan will be key in supporting this strategic balance. From this perspective, Bush's new team will not rashly abandon Taiwan, and the US is unwilling to tie any other issue to its arms sales to Taiwan.

But this support for Taiwan is not a blank check for Taiwan to use any which way. Although Bush didn't repeat the statements Powell made at a press conference in Beijing while meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit in Chile, this doesn't mean that the Powell effect has dissipated. The US leaders' emphasis on a consistent cross-strait policy seems to mean that the US will continue its clear, two-pronged policy: China should not take armed action, and Taiwan should not declare independence.

In other words, the most important goal of US cross-strait policy is still to maintain the status quo, as defined by the US. If Taiwan's government continues to misjudge the international situation, and US statements lead them to believe that the storm following Powell's statement has blown over, it may continue to move toward independence by, for example, holding a Taiwan independence referendum, or amending the law to allow changing the national emblem. This may cause the situation in the Taiwan Strait to deteriorate and maybe even give rise to a fourth cross-strait crisis.

In future, it is possible that Washington will issue a fourth communique with Beijing, to avert a crisis and guarantee stability in the Taiwan Strait and in East Asia. A fourth communique could clearly state that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty and that the US opposes Taiwan's independence, and even change the tactic of "pushing for dialogue" to "pushing for unification" in order to restrain Taiwan's actions. This could be even more harmful to Taiwan.

For the sake of its national interest, the most urgent task for Taiwan's government is to show restraint, strive for cross-strait stability, rebuild mutual trust between Taiwan and the US and put the US-Taiwan relationship back on track. This is the only way that the nation can continue to exist and develop.

Yu Pen-li is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of American Studies, Tamkang University.

China's subs coming into play

By Richard Halloran

The incursion of a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese territorial waters this month has illuminated a mounting competition under the surface of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and their adjacent seas.

The chief rivals for submarine supremacy in this region are China, which has given priority to submarines as it acquires a blue-water or deep-sea navy, and the US, which is rebuilding submarine capabilities that had atrophied after the Cold War.

China and the US are not alone. North Korea has a sizeable coastal submarine force and South Korea has begun to counter it. Japan has a modest but proficient fleet.

Taiwan is pondering the procurement of eight boats that would triple the size of its force. The city-state of Singapore has three submarines and is acquiring a fourth. Australia has six modern submarines, based on a Swedish design, for surveillance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In South Asia, India has been acquiring a submarine fleet with Russian help. A specialist on South Asia, Donald Berlin of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, has written that India will also build six to twelve French-designed submarines and is working on a nuclear-powered boat that will go to sea in 2006.

Pakistan has launched two submarines and is constructing a third. Berlin says "Pakistan will likely want a submarine-based nuclear weapons delivery system" to deter India. Iran has several submarines.

Even Israel, usually considered a Mediterranean nation, is believed to have sent submarines armed with cruise missiles through the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean to deter a potential nuclear attack by Iran.

In contrast, Russia, which once deployed 90 submarines into the Pacific, has laid up all but 20 boats because of that nation's financial distress.

"They've held onto their more capable boats," said a US official with access to intelligence reports, but their operations are constricted.

The Chinese submarine in Japanese waters was one of five Han class boats, the first of China's nuclear-powered submarines. After she left port at Ningbo, she was detected by Taiwan as she steamed east, then by the US near Guam in the central Pacific, and finally by Japan after she turned north to steam near Okinawa.

After a Japanese protest, Chinese spokesmen expressed regrets and blamed the mistake on unexplained "technical difficulties," raising questions about Chinese seamanship; the Chinese have long had problems operating submarines.

China is acquiring submarines to "patrol the littorals, blockade the Taiwan Strait, and stalk [US] aircraft carriers," say two researchers, Lyle Goldstein and Bill Murray, at the Naval War College in Rhode Island.

China, which has 50 submarines in two older classes, began expanding 10 years ago when it bought four Russian "Kilo" submarines, then ordered eight more in 2002 for delivery starting next year.

The Chinese are producing the "Song" class of attack boats armed with cruise missiles. Training has been intensified throughout the fleet.

It is in the Taiwan Strait that Chinese and US submarines would most likely clash if China seeks to blockade or invade Taiwan, the country over which it claims sovereignty but whose people prefer to remain separate.

US submarines would go into action because Taiwan lacks sufficient anti-submarine weapons to break a blockade or stop an invasion. The US policy is to help defend Taiwan from an unprovoked assault by China.

In the US, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Walter Doran, has made the revival of submarine warfare his top priority and has set up a special staff to oversee that resurgence. The Navy has recently established an anti-submarine warfare center in San Diego to improve training and readiness.

The US has moved two submarines from Hawaii to Guam and will add a third to base them closer to operating areas. Where 60 percent of US submarines operated in the Atlantic during the Cold War and 40 percent in the Pacific, the Navy is planning to reverse that ratio.

Attack submarines whose mission after the Cold War was to launch cruise missiles at land and sea targets and to gather intelligence have been assigned anew the task of fighting other submarines since the best anti-submarine weapon is another submarine.

Six "SURTASS" ships (Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System) that use powerful sonar to detect submarines in vast areas of deep water have now been assigned to the Pacific. Four ballistic missile submarines are being converted to carry 150 cruise missiles each and to infiltrate 100 commandos onto hostile beaches.

Concluded a US official: "Once again, the value of stealth is being recognized."

Richard Halloran is a freelance journalist based in Hawaii.

Editorial: Missing: two policy platforms

We are thinking of running the following classified ad: "Missing: two policy platforms, one blue one green, last seen ...". That's the problem, because it's been so long since there's been any serious policy debate that we can't remember when it was last seen.

We are well aware that President Chen Shui-bian has been saying something new every Saturday and Sunday for the last three weeks, but look at what he has been saying. Chen wants to abolish "Taiwan Province," reform the Constitution, draw a clear line between party and state, vest Republic of China (ROC) sovereignty with the people, perhaps hold a referendum if pushed to it and pass the weapons bill if he can. All the while he is talking about -- but providing no evidence for -- a "soft coup" in March.

You have to go back a month to hear the kind of policy pledge familiar in legislative elections elsewhere -- implementation of a senior citizens' pension plan. All the rest is fluff; rousing fluff for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) faithful, but fluff all the same. Because while this newspaper agrees with and has long advocated most of what Chen has proposed, we also note that these are mostly symbolic issues. They have a lot to do with national identity, but have little to do with the day-to-day business of making Taiwan a better place to live.

Elsewhere in this newspaper, we report on the frustration felt by both environmental and women's groups. Issues close to their heart are not being addressed, and we share that frustration. Taiwan has one of the most degraded environments of any newly industrialized country, thanks to the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) shortsightedness. What can be done to rectify this? Gender equality in the workplace, too, is still far from being a reality here, despite numerous laws mandating it. There's been no talk of solving Taiwan's dire fiscal problems, no mention of industrial hollowing out, no discussion of the possibility that the "Taiwan model" of economic growth is exhausted and urgently needs a rethink.

Compared with the pan-blues, however, the DPP look like policy wonks. The only thing we have heard at any time from the blues is that a blue majority is needed in the legislature to prevent the greens from doing anything. Perhaps that is not exactly what they say, but it is certainly what their message means: "Elect us so we can prevent Chen's hotheads from getting anything done." Of course we know the blues have more pressing concerns than policy, such as how to cope with KMT Chairman Lien Chan's delusional psychosis, and how to steal as much from KMT coffers as possible before the greens can make good on their threat to get the stolen assets back.

So the election campaign runs on, in a total vacuum of real policies. Perhaps that is simply because there is a broad consensus on the way the big things -- the economy, for example -- should be handled, so that all that is left to quibble about is the symbols.

There's certainly room for debate. Does Taiwan want a small government, low-tax, low-benefit kind of society, as it traditionally has had? Or does it want a high-tax, high-benefit, European-style welfare state? This cleavage is not reflected in the two camps at the moment, and more's the pity. Perhaps we simply have to wait for the defeated KMT to reinvent itself before the body politic becomes more sensible. Hopefully that day will not be too long delayed.
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