Going slow is the right move

TAIPEI TIMES

During an interview with the Reuters news agency published on Friday, President Chen Shui-bian said that there was no need to rush cross-strait talks. Chen said he wanted to "strive for delays while not fearing talks " -- which was a clever turn of Beijing's earlier phrase about "striving for talks while not fearing delays."

This slight change in wording clearly shows how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait differ in terms of their priorities on cross-strait relations.

The "talks" which Beijing seeks come with a big precondition, namely Taiwan's acceptance of the "one China" principle and "one country, two systems" -- which translates into accepting eventual unification. What Beijing is really after is not just any "talks," but a "resolution" of the cross-strait issue on Beijing's terms.

This goal is so important to Beijing that it does not want any intermediate steps, such as holding talks with Taiwan simply for the sake of holding talks or establishing friendlier relations with Taipei. For this "sacred" goal, Beijing is willing to pay the price of time, or delay talks.

This is why Chen explained his unwillingness to rush into talks in terms of preserving Taiwan's sovereign status. After all, if Taipei accepted Beijing's preconditions for talks, then Taiwan would be relegated to a role as a "Chinese province."

From Taiwan's standpoint, if holding talks with Beijing is necessarily preceded by acceptance of the "one China" principle, then naturally Taipei prefers postponing such talks as long as possible.

The truth of the matter is Chen was simply being polite and tactful in his interview. What he should have done was cut through the word games and clearly say there would be no talks unless there were no strings attached.

During the interview, Chen did not forget to mention that the pan-blue camp's leaders -- specifically former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong -- had been defeated by Beijing in this battle of wills and determination, since their visits to China this spring were on Beijing's terms. Not a single pan-blue leader or official managed to escape having to perform a song and dance about "one China" while visiting the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

One reason Beijing prefers delaying talks with Taipei is that it believes and hopes that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will lose the 2008 presidential election. Beijing was shocked when Chen won in 2000 and then bitterly disappointed when he won re-election last year. Any hopes Beijing had that the pan-blues would be able to oust Chen through their ludicrous probe into the assassination attempt on Chen or lawsuits seeking to overturn last year's election have come to naught.

Many people see KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou as a leading contender for the presidency in 2008. He apparently does as well. While the next presidential election is still a few years away, the voters must keep their eyes and ears open and make sure that the next president of Taiwan will not roll over and beg to Beijing the way that Lien and Soong did.

Who is in control?

By Audrey Deng, Puli

Huang Jei-hsuan stresses the need for Taiwan to maintain a strong defense capability (Letter, Oct. 2, page 8). This is certainly an important consideration for Taiwan's future. However, he then continues by saying that, "The US warning that it might withhold its support if Taiwan does not better arm itself does not make sense and is unhelpful."

He strongly suggests that the US change its "one China" policy in order to encourage the Taiwanese people to strive for sufficient deterrent capability, so that the Taiwanese know that their investment in defense is going to result in them some day being recognized as an independent and sovereign nation. While I don't doubt that Huang is sincere in his analysis, and wants to help Taiwan, there are numerous misconceptions and logical flaws in his argument.

First, let's look at the "one China" policy. I believe that what this policy says is that, "There is one China, and Taiwan is to be a part of China" (this is based on the Shanghai Communique). But, as everyone in Taiwan knows, at the present time, Taiwan is not a part of China (the People's Republic of China or PRC).

Second, let's look at the "Republic of China" (ROC) on Taiwan. The ROC was refused admittance to the UN again this year for the 13th time. Is the ROC a legitimate government for Taiwan? The answer is clearly: No.

The ROC military troops came to Taiwan and accepted the Japanese surrender on Oct. 25, 1945, on the direction of US General Douglas MacArthur. Many researchers say that the ROC accepted the Japanese surrender on behalf of the Allied Powers, but that misses the point. The laws of war do not discuss who surrendered to whom, or who defeated whom -- what they do discuss is "the occupying power."

If you read General Order No. 1 of Sept. 2, 1945, what can you conclude about who is "the occupying power" as spoken of under the laws of war? "The occupying power" is clearly the US. Hence, the ROC is merely a subordinate occupying power under the US; it has the position of an "agent." Moreover, when the ROC fled China in December 1949, it became a government-in-exile.

In the post-war San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced the sovereignty of Taiwan, but it was not given to the ROC. Today, the ROC on Taiwan continues to act in the dual capacities of a "subordinate occupying power" and a "government in exile."

Looking at the "one China" policy from this standpoint, it is clear that there is no need for the US to revise it. To repeat the obvious: "The ROC is not a legitimate government for Taiwan." That was made abundantly clear when the US derecognized the ROC in 1978. The Taiwan Relations Act refers to the government structure in Taiwan as the "Taiwan governing authorities" and does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.

Third, as with many other authors who feature in the Taipei Times, there is the curious notion that "certain actions must be undertaken so that Taiwan can be a normal country." In other words, since many officials in the international arena have denied that Taiwan is a sovereign nation, it is seemingly necessary to do various things so that Taiwan's sovereignty can re-bloom, or mature in its growth, since it apparently has shrunk, died or otherwise disappeared.

When discussing such topics, we need to distinguish between "popular sovereignty" (ie, the right to vote) and "territorial sovereignty" (or "state sovereignty"). The Taiwanese people have "popular sovereignty" but they don't have "territorial sovereignty" because it was not ceded to the ROC, nor to the Taiwanese governing authorities in the peace treaty (the transfer of territorial sovereignty is always between governments.)

"Territorial sovereignty" simply means "title;" and it cannot shrink, die or disappear. If Taiwan's governing authorities don't have it, then some other governmental entity has it.

In conclusion, if the Taiwanese people want to strive for a safe and democratic future for Taiwan, then the first necessity is to determine where Taiwan's "territorial sovereignty" is at the present time.

If indeed (as US government officials have stated) Taiwan is not a sovereign country, then Taiwan is certainly not responsible for its own "national defense," any more than Oregon, North Carolina or Puerto Rico are responsible for their own "national defense." A close overview of the San Francisco treaty shows that while the sovereignty of Taiwan was not awarded to any country, the US is the "principal occupying power." Hence, the strong possibility exists that the US is holding Taiwan's sovereignty in the form of a fiduciary relationship, with the US Military Government as trustee, the people of Taiwan as beneficiaries and the territory of "Formosa and the Pescadores" as trust corpus.