20051101

US official urges Taiwan to do more on FTA

During his visit to Taipei last week to attend a conference hosted by the Taiwan Thinktank, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, sat down with `Taipei Times' staff reporter Shih Hsiu-chuan to share his views on the triangular economic and security relations between the US, Taiwan and China

"It's not enough simply to say that we want an FTA. Taiwan must build a compelling argument."－Rupert Hammond-Chambers

Taipei Times: You told "Taipei Times" in April 2003 that you [saw] a migration of business from Taiwan to China. Taiwan's government recently said that more and more China-based Taiwanese businesspeople have decided to return to invest in Taiwan. Do you see any changes over the past two years?

Rupert Hammond-Chambers: I think how I would answer that question today is to say that the migration of business has slowed down.

It's clear that a lot of Taiwan manufacturing that was going to move to China has moved. Now there's a new face in the Taiwan-China economic relationship. I think here Taiwan has some distinct advantages.

The Taiwanese government has improved its enforcement of Taiwanese law in prohibiting certain industries from going into China. The second is that Taiwan has improved a lot in intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. This is the perception and it's also the reality.

China is terrible. China's task in improving IPR perception is huge. I think that will ensure that at least in the medium term of the next three, four or five years, and maybe a few more years than that, Taiwanese businesses operating at the highest technology level will stay in Taiwan.

Hammond-Chambers: No, I think the foreign direct investment flow is still pretty significant into China. But not all US companies have decided that China is the right place for them to be. Increasingly we will hear more about India as an alternative to China, particularly in technology areas for US companies with IP concerns.

TT: Taiwan has expressed its hope that a US-Taiwan FTA can be signed as soon as possible, but it seems that this isn't a US priority.

Hammond-Chambers: I believe that the Bush Administration has been very careful in not saying "yes" and not saying "no" to a Taiwan FTA, and it should be commended for that.

We only realistically have 20 months for Taiwan to secure [an FTA] with the US as the Trade Promotional Authority will end in June 2007. There's lots of pressure now ... to create a more compelling argument for why a US-Taiwan FTA should happen now.

TT: Can you foresee that happening before June 2007? What are the principle obstacles?

Hammond-Chambers: It's possible. I hope it happens. I would argue that really the ball is in Taiwan's court. It's not enough simply to say that we want an FTA. Taiwan must build a compelling argument not just at the strategic level but at the business level, and gain the support of US industries and demonstrate to US industries that the market access that will come from the FTA is in their interest. Those are the decisions that the Taiwanese government needs to make and articulate.

And, yes, progress has been made after [talks] last year and that is encouraging. But have we reached the agreement that they have gone far enough? No. It's an ongoing process. But I think more significantly, Taiwan has demonstrated its willingness to compromise and to improve what it is offering in the context of those talks.

The progress on intellectual property rights protection has improved the environment for the possibility of an FTA. A new issue is beef. I hope that the Taiwanese government will return to importing US beef in the next two to three months.

TT: Are there any political obstacles to an FTA, such as China's objections?

Hammond-Chambers: When America offers to sell arms to Taiwan, it incurs considerable anger from China. And yet we do it anyway. We do it because we believe it is in our interest. And we do it because we believe our interests include a commitment to assist Taiwan in providing for its own defense.

The Taiwan Relations Act also talks about economic security. The US has a well-developed policy to help Taiwan, supporting Taiwan in an important way, including economically. And as a consequence, the concern regarding China will not be an insurmountable barrier -- even if China objects, which I am sure they will. If America decided that it is in American interests, I believe that America would do it.

TT: Your organization has been enthusiastic about Taiwan's national defense. What do you think of the arms package the Bush Administration offered Taiwan in 2001?

Hammond-Chambers: I am not very optimistic. I think it's going to be very difficult in the next two to three years for Taiwan to pursue a strong defense policy that allows it to at least maintain a steady pace of defense reform and mobilization, because of the clear split between the views of the pan-blue and pan-green camps.

It is unfortunate that the pan-blues have taken their position. The issue is blocked in the procedure committee. Your country hasn't even been allowed to have a debate about the choices. I believe that at the very least Taiwanese politicians owe that to the people. Because of that lack of debate, I don't believe that Taiwanese people have been informed about the choices in front of them.

America is not arguing that Taiwan should compete with China. What we are asking Taiwan to do is to do the best it can to show an intention to provide for its own self-defense. Taiwan is our ally in the region, and it's more than likely that we will be there to help as long as Taiwan shows an intention of self-defense. I really hope there is a debate, [that Taiwanese will] discuss it, and then move on. It is important now for the decision to be made.

I would like to take issue with the AP news dispatch published in your newspaper "China-based Taiwanese split over identity," Oct 27, page 2).

The article contains the following statement: "Conversations with Taiwanese in China suggest that 56 years of separation have taken a toll on whatever once existed of a common identity."

I wonder where the AP journalist got that 56 years (of separation) from and what historical facts did he or she use to claim that before 1949 there "once existed a common identity"?

Before 1895, Taiwan was a "savage land" where "birds don't bother singing, flowers wear no fragrance, women have no sense of emotion and men have no sense of responsibility," in the words of a Chinese mandarin. Taiwan was a territory of Japan between 1895 and 1945. In 1947, the Taiwanese were randomly massacred by the Chinese government. Where was the so-called "common identity?"

It appears that nowadays any Joe or Jane can claim expertise on Taiwanese history based on Chinese propaganda, without checking with the Taiwanese.

The above-quoted statement or similar brainless interjections such as "Taiwan, which was separated from China in 1949," seem to be a pre-programmed automatic insertion whenever AP and other news agencies dispatch a line mentioning Taiwan.

Can these news agencies please make their software more intelligent, and try to provide readers with knowledge and facts -- not false and useless recitations based on hearsay or propaganda?

"Advances in China's strategic strike capacity raise questions, particularly when there's imperfect understanding of such developments on the part of others." －Donald Rumsfeld, US secretary of defense

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's recent China visit was an exploratory exercise to assess first hand Beijing's strategic ambitions in view of its rapidly increasing defense expenditure. The wooly Chinese concept of a "peaceful rise" lacks transparency and clarity. Rumsfeld, therefore, sought to persuade Beijing to open up both its political and military systems. Without it, there will be uncertainties and anxieties about China's role on the world stage.

It is interesting that Rumsfeld dwelt both on political and military aspects of China's closed system. Beijing cannot compartmentalize its system into separate boxes labeled economic, military, political (party's monopoly on power) and so on. A nation is an organic entity and unless it grows as a whole, it is bound to develop all kinds of distortions and disasters, dangerous both for China and the world.

Rumsfeld made this point when addressing cadres at Beijing's Central Party School. He said, "China's future prosperity -- and to some degree the future of other nations' attitudes -- may well depend on internal political events here [in China]," thus cautioning against a closed political system.

He went on to say that every society had "to be vigilant against another type of Great Wall that can be a burden on man's talents ... a wall that limits speech, information or choices."

Political pluralism (democracy) also tends to exercise some moderation or restraint on unbridled nationalism. Without it, the Chinese Communist Party might go berserk with its military ambitions. Based on official figures, China's military spending this year will go up by 12.6 percent to US$30 billion. The unofficial estimates put it around US$90 billion. And that kind of money buys a lot of dough (and military stuff) in Chinese currency. With its space program, nuclear warheads and missiles, it is time China came out with a clear enunciation of its strategic doctrine and how it is going to keep everything rising peacefully.

Rumsfeld showed particular concern about China's nuclear and missile capability. In a speech to the Academy of Military Sciences, he said, "China ... is expanding its missile forces and enabling those forces to reach many areas of the world well beyond the Pacific region."

And he added, "Those advances in China's strategic strike capacity raise questions, particularly when there's imperfect understanding of such developments on the part of others."

Hence, the need for China to come clean on why it is going into this headlong expansion of its military arsenal?

But there are no clear answers. The threat from China's missiles, though, is clearly understood in Taiwan. And Japan too has come to regard China's military expansion as a security threat. And both have security ties with the US.

Besides, China's expanding missile forces are becoming a threat beyond the Pacific region, which should make the US worried about its own security. More so, when a Chinese general, only a while ago, threatened to rain nuclear weapons on the US if it got involved in a military conflict over Taiwan.

It is reported, though, that General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of China's nuclear-missile forces, has reaffirmed China's official commitment of no first use of nuclear weapons by his country. But one wonders how this commitment fits into China's expanding military machine!

It is not just China's military expansion that is worrying the US. Washington sees it as part of a coordinated overall strategy to ease out the US from the Asia-Pacific region. When talking of the rapid upgrading of China's 2.5 million strong military as alarming, he also dwelt on Beijing's attempt to exclude the US from the Pacific region forums, an obvious reference to the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December.

He said, "It raises some questions about whether China will make the right choices, choices that will serve the world's interests in regional peace and stability."

China is already looming large in the Asia-Pacific region. Most countries in the region, even those contesting China's sovereignty over South China Sea islands, are not keen to make an issue of these and other matters. They are already accommodating themselves to China's great power role in the region. According to former US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, until recently US deputy secretary of state, his country is involved in "very active competition" with China for influence in the region, and that "we're not doing well."

And Beijing is pushing its advantage all the time. The regional press is averse to publishing anything critical of China. On the other hand, Japan is pilloried for complicating things in the region by provoking China, for instance, on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni shrine.

There is a valid case that Koizumi should show greater sensitivity on this issue in view of the history of Japanese wartime crimes. But to suggest that Japan should somehow become invisible to let China dominate the regional show is unlikely to happen. Beijing seeks to exercise a veto on Japan's foreign and defense policies by focusing only on its wartime crimes. For instance, it has scrapped a planned visit by Japan's foreign minister to China for talks on issues plaguing their relations. Beijing's attempt to bludgeon Japan might prove counter-productive.

China's ambitions are not simply regional but global. And the present is an opportune time to steadily expand its influence. The US is still mired in Iraq and obsessed with terrorism. It is overstretched and is losing political capital in the Islamic world.

China is systematically working to secure energy supplies for its industrial development in the medium and long term. It is springing up everywhere in the world in a scramble for dwindling energy supplies. Whether it is Africa, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, South America, Russia, the Middle East or Australia (the US' close ally), China is popping up everywhere to corner energy resources. Because energy security is very important for its superpower role.

Even though the US is becoming increasingly aware of the China danger, it is greatly distracted. And China is making the most of it.