Listen to the voice

Cross-strait plans worry advisers
　

WRINGING HANDS: The Mainland Affairs Council said some advisers have warned against new economic policies and urged the government to explain them clearly
　

By Ko Shu-ling
STAFF REPORTER
Wednesday, Jul 23, 2008, Page 1

Some advisers to the Mainland Affairs­­ Council (MAC) have expressed concerns about the relaxation of cross-strait policy, including a fear that Taiwan would become part of China.

The council issued a statement yesterday saying that some council advisers attending a meeting on Monday warned about the potential danger of loosening cross-strait economic policies.

They urged the government to refrain from adjusting economic policy to the extent that it would lead the public to believe it was leaning toward China. If that happened, the public would be worried that closer economic ties would marginalize Taiwan’s economy, they said.

As many measures have come into force since the new government took office, some council advisers questioned whether these changes pose a threat or represent an opportunity. How the administration implements the measures would be key, they said.

They also said that the administration must ensure that the country’s technical advantages are maintained so that the status of the country’s technology industry is assured. The government must also make plans and help businesses keep their leverage in management, marketing, design, service and branding, they said.

Some advisers called on the administration to present a complete blueprint of its economic policy if it wanted to receive a more positive response from the public.

They said the government must explain its policies to the public in easy-to-understand language and assure the needs of the Taiwanese are met in terms of employment opportunities, income and commodity prices, they said.

To reassure the public about the change of policies, advisers said the administration was duty bound to explain the pros and cons of its cross-strait economic policies, their impact, prevention measures and risks involved. Some advisers urged government agencies to manage the process carefully and ensure that the adjusted policies bring opportunities to the business sector and benefit the economy as a whole.

With the deterioration of the investment environment in China, some advisers called on the administration to conduct a thorough study and map out a concrete plan. The government was obliged to create a better investment environment at home to lure Taiwanese businesspeople back to invest and help them upgrade or transform their businesses, they said.

In a related development, the council announced yesterday that the processing period for Chinese with technical skills applying for entry will be shortened from two months to one month.

Deputy MAC Chairman Liu Teh-hsun (劉德勳) said the measure will come into effect after it is approved by the Executive Yuan. The measure was proposed by the Ministry of the Interior at a monthly meeting yesterday.

Also, the central bank, which delivered a report at the meeting, said that as of last Tuesday, 19 banks and 1,570 of their branch offices had been authorized to exchange the yuan, while 108 exchange depots such as hotels or shops had also been authorized.

From June 30 to July 15, the central bank said financial institutions and exchange depots have bought 1.02 million yuan (US$149,300) and sold 2.38 million yuan.

Listen to the voice

Ma’s hidden agenda

An article on the Washington Post’s Web site on June 12 titled “Top US officials stalling Taiwan arms package” identified President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) as the culprits responsible for the US’ controversial “de facto freeze” in military sales to Taipei.

The past few years have seen top US officials, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, being “irritated by Taiwan’s protracted wrangling over the sale.” But the last straw might be a recent request from Ma’s government that US President George W. Bush’s administration “not send the [sale] notifications [to the US Congress] in the next few weeks as China and Taiwan complete negotiations on launching charter flights and expanding tourism between the two countries.”

It’s worth noting that the funding for the purchase of the military hardware in question has been blocked by the KMT-controlled legislature dozens of times in the last four years until shortly before the recent legislative and presidential elections.

The Washington Post report raised the possibility that Ma might be taking the first step to acquiesce to Beijing’s pressure to disarming Taiwan unilaterally, with an eye to partially fulfilling the prerequisite for a peace agreement with China.

The Ma government’s subsequent refuting of the Post’s account together with his unprecedented campaign to highlight Taiwan’s defense needs hardly stemmed that public perception. It appeared that Ma and company acted only as a result of Washington’s prodding — by way of toying with the KMT leaders’ US immigration records.

A green-card revelation on National Security Council head Su Chi (蘇起), on the heels of his rumored relay of Ma’s desire to delay the aforementioned arms package to Bush administration, didn’t seem coincidental.

What doesn’t bode well for the long term is the likelihood that, barring a fundamental shift in the dynamics, a temporary freeze of this nature could become permanent.

To begin with, it would require a great deal of impetus to restart a stalled arm supply program, especially one that has been unpopular among pro-China elements in the US and opposed fervently by Beijing. Compounding the difficulty would be Washington’s wariness at “irritating China [either] during the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear programs” or while engaging Chinese in other areas where Washington needs Beijing’s cooperation.

Hence, in this three-way tug of war on arming Taiwan, Beijing’s resolve is pitted against Washington’s ambivalence and Ma’s hidden agenda.

Should the disarmament of Taiwan come to pass, thereby removing one of Taiwan Relation Act’s main pillars, Washington would be forced to reevaluate the act. Implications to Taiwan’s security therefore couldn’t be overstated considering that the nation’s protector for more than half a century might be in the throes of shedding its guarantee.

Ma and the KMT in their haste to cozy up to Beijing might have — inadvertently at best and calculatedly at worst — committed a monumental national security blunder that could cost Taiwan all viable options.

That would be the case unless the Bush administration is willing to take Ma government’s new-found backbone at face value and proceed with weapons purchases, effectively foiling any sinister attempt at disarming the nation.

Huang Jei-hsuan
Los Angeles, California

Listen to the voice

How to encourage cross-strait trust
　

By Chang Teng-Chi 張登及
Wednesday, Jul 23, 2008, Page 8

‘Beijing’s campaign for educating Chinese about Taiwan is not only insufficient for teaching about Taiwan’s past, but is also inadequate for dealing with the future.’

In comparison with the arrival of Chinese tourists on direct flights earlier this month, a special travel guide tailor-made for Chinese tourists traveling to Taiwan does not seem to have attracted a lot of attention. However, by comparing the contents of the guide — produced by China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Shanghai City Government — with efforts in recent years to make the Chinese more familiar with Taiwan, one can see that Beijing has been consciously adjusting Chinese views toward Taiwan.

In the short term, these adjustments are aimed at preventing conflict between people from different sides of the Taiwan Strait during next month’s Olympic Games; in the long term, these adjustments are attempts to prepare for a larger strategic adjustment.

The Olympics are Beijing’s foremost event to affirm and strengthen its status as a super power — an event with as much significance as the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. Thus, since the second half of last year, China has been devoted to verifying and examining any possible factors that could lead to disturbances at the Olympics.

With only more than a month until the Games, Beijing allowed Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, breaking various taboos that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has held for decades. This move was not only aimed at consolidating relations between China and Taiwan, but also at avoiding clashes that could result from differences in Taiwan.

Beijing and Taipei have clashed many times because of different opinions on Taiwan. Taiwanese representatives have a fair amount of resentment toward China as they have often been subject to attacks from their Chinese counterparts at sporting events and other occasions over displaying Taiwan’s national flag or singing the national anthem.

With the Olympics just around the corner, China has been vexed by problems such as supporters cheering slogans and holding up signs for both the Chinese Taipei team and the China team, the titles used to refer to Taiwan by the Chinese Olympic Committee and media outlets, and putting appropriate safety measures in place.

If Taiwan missed the Olympics for political reasons, the situation would be simpler. Although cross-strait relations are starting to warm up, teams and spectators from Taiwan and China are obviously not as well trained as official negotiators. Emotions are likely to get out of control and result in conflict. It is almost impossible to expect that people from either side of the Strait will be ready for the event.

Additionally, with advanced communication technology and China’s tendency to “aggravate” things, news of any mishaps during the event will immediately spread to the entire world.

Beijing wants Chinese to familiarize themselves with Taiwan prior to the Olympics. Even though the Republic of China (ROC) flags were deleted from photographs of the statue of Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), the Presidential Office and Fort Santo Domingo in the travel guide, these places left a deep impression on the Chinese tourists who came to Taiwan and saw the sites for themselves. While the travel guide avoids references to the mausoleums of late dictator Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), it does mention the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, Kenting National Park and Chiang Kai-shek’s wife Soong Mayling (宋美齡).

Beijing adopted another preventive measure by urging Chinese tourists to practice “civilized etiquette” when visiting Taiwan, which included advice to avoid spitting and swearing, to dine quietly, to speak in a moderate tone and to avoid smoking in public places.

Chinese tourists are also banned from leaving their tour groups without permission. Such moves are aimed at preventing possible disputes over the conceptual differences of Taiwanese and Chinese.

Allowing more Chinese tourists to understand Taiwan — with guidance from official media outlets — is conducive to helping Chinese and Taiwanese become familiar with the various differences between the two sides of the Strait.

It has been a while since Beijing relaxed restrictions on many things involving the political differences between Taiwan and China. Books on the two Chiangs, the history of the ROC, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) performance during World War II and books by Chinese academics who moved to Taiwan from China have attracted Chinese readers tired of reading official government doctrines. ROC figures who appear on TV, state media outlets and state Web sites in China are no longer automatically portrayed as clowns. These factors have all helped ease the tension between Taiwan and China.

Although these belated moves are still somewhat authoritarian, Beijing is on the right track. However, it must be pointed out that Taiwan’s current situation is not adequately covered by early 20th century ROC history that the CCP is promoting to its people. Beijing’s campaign for educating Chinese about Taiwan is not only insufficient for teaching about Taiwan’s past, but is also inadequate for dealing with the future. It will be very difficult for China to prevent “inevitable conflicts” by telling its people to use “civilized language” and to “praise Sun Yat-sen.”

The Olympics could be a historic turning point. As Beijing is the host of this event, Taipei should not intervene too much. However, I believe that since one of the purposes of Beijing’s campaign to introduce Taiwan to the Chinese people is to allow them to get familiar with Taiwan’s current situation, the Chinese government should not spend too much time thinking about terms such as Zhonghua and Zhongguo (“Chinese” and “China,” 中華/中國) and “mainland” and “Taiwan.”

If Taiwanese have trouble accepting the “plum blossom” flag during the Olympics, then Beijing should seriously think about possibly allowing Taiwanese audiences to use the real ROC flag.

Before the Olympics begin, there is no way to avoid athletes and politicians from both sides of the Strait interacting with each other.

If mutual trust can be built among the Taiwanese and Chinese now, Beijing’s concerns about the Olympics would likely be resolved and Taiwanese would wholeheartedly welcome the influx of Chinese tourists.

Chang Teng-chi is an associate professor at the Institute of Strategic and International Affairs Studies at National Chung Cheng University.