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Legislative oversight is a required
safety valve
By Ku Chung-hwa 顧忠華
Wednesday, Mar 03, 2010, Page 8
Here’s a hypothetical question: Let’s assume that Taiwan and China sign an
economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) in May and then carry out
cross-strait peace negotiations without ruling out the possibility of a
timetable for unification. If this happened, could Taiwanese feel confident that
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration would secure the best deal during
the process to unification?
Hong Kong provides a useful contrast. Before retrocession in 1997, when they
were getting down to the details of the transfer of power with the Chinese, the
British government made every attempt to cover every practical aspect possible.
It even made provisions so that Hong Kong residents who refused to live under
communist rule could emigrate. As the talks were conducted by two parties of
equal standing, Beijing was obliged to give assurances that the region would
“remain unchanged for 50 years.”
Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that the government’s cross-strait
policy leads to its natural conclusion of “eventual unification.” Would
Taiwanese be offered an initial grace period similar to that offered to Hong
Kong prior to the handover? Or would the government do a repeat performance of
former National Security Council (NSC) secretary-general Su Chi’s (蘇起) handling
of the US beef deal, forcing the public to accept it after an agreement has
already been signed? What if Ma has already overseen the handover before
Taiwanese woke up and smelled the coffee, finding themselves under a Chinese
government that is warning countries like the US and Japan not to interfere in
its “internal” affairs? Can we trust that an effective mechanism would be in
place to monitor the conditions for unification, ensuring that the rights of
Taiwanese are protected and Taiwan’s autonomy respected?
These are all assumptions and the intention here is not to put the fright into
anyone. Rather, the object is to highlight the reality that, given the current
political situation, the legislature is the only institution that can restrain
the executive branch’s China policy. The government is keeping the goings-on of
a number of negotiations under wraps and the public has no idea what is
happening. We also have no way of knowing how cross-strait economic and
political integration is going to affect the “status quo.” At least the US beef
fiasco has taught us that our elected representatives must listen to what we say
and not simply serve as rubber stamps for the whims of the Cabinet.
Of course, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Secretary-General King Pu-tsung’s
(金溥聰) hawkish moves — such as making internal rules to strictly regulate the
performance of legislators-at-large — are attempts to strengthen the party’s
authority and make sure that Ma gets what he wants.
Cross-strait policies, however, are a sensitive topic. Data Systems Consulting
Co serves as an example. Facing pressure from the legislature, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs canceled a contract with the firm after it was taken over by
Chinese capital. This proves that the legislative branch must keep an eye on
things and the government on its toes when it comes to risk management, to make
sure that it is not being manipulated. This is precisely what democracy is for.
In other words, it is hopeful that the legislature can serve as a more active
“safety valve” on cross-strait policies and that Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s
(王金平) proposal of a “cross-strait affairs monitoring task force” is a step in
the right direction. If the legislature relinquishes its power, there will be no
monitoring mechanism for cross-strait affairs. The cross-strait policy is just
too risky for us to trust it blindly.
Ku Chung-hwa is the chairman of Citizens’
Congress Watch.
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