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Reflecting on Ma’s two lost years
By Liu Shih-chung 劉世忠
Tuesday, May 18, 2010, Page 8
In the run up to the second anniversary of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九)
inauguration, it’s time to reflect, in the realm of cross-strait relations, on
his achievements, what sort of leadership he has built, what political tools he
has used to implement his policies, as well as the risks associated with his
policy implementation.
To promote the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA)
with China, Ma characterized the period of governance under the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) as “eight lost years” in his recent debate with DPP
Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Such an allegation, together with the accusation
of the DPP’s “closed-door” policy toward China, was invalid and politically
misleading.
While the DPP government cemented the notion of “Taiwan identity” on the
domestic front, substantial cross-strait economic and functional exchanges
nevertheless continued. Taiwan’s reliance on trade with China even reached 40
percent, exceeding Japan and South Korea. Most of the negotiations and
groundwork on direct cross-strait charter flights and tourism were conducted by
the DPP government.
The average economic growth rate during the DPP’s eight years of governance
reached 4.44 percent, while Ma’s first two years has seen minus 0.91 percent
“growth.” The average unemployment rate under the DPP administration was 4.28
percent; that number goes up to 5.35 percent in Ma’s first two years.
Since taking office, Ma has placed priority on cross-strait policy above
diplomatic policy and international trade policy. He has resorted to a rapid
China-centric course that plays down Taiwan’s sovereignty or tentatively
broaches “the sovereignty of the Republic of China,” while lacking a hedging
policy toward China.
His administration has also been characterized by a lack of transparency in its
decision-making. He has revived the so-called “1992 consensus,” proposed that
Taiwan and China observe a policy of mutual non-denial, called for a diplomatic
“truce” and defined cross-strait relations as “region-to-region” relations under
the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China.
On the premise of maintaining the “status quo,” Ma has pledged a “three noes”
policy of “no independence, no unification and no use of force.” However, it
cannot be denied that cross-strait tension has eased and that dialogue has
resumed. So far, 12 agreements have been signed following negotiations between
the Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait. Negotiations for an ECFA are also under way with Ma declaring
that the pact will be signed next month.
These developments fulfill the international community’s hope for continued
peaceful dialogue across the Strait, but at the same time they have widened
domestic dispute on Ma’s China policy.
Ma could and should have used the 58 percent of popular votes he garnered in the
2008 presidential election, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) control of the
administration and its legislative majority to forge a consensus in Taiwan on
cross-strait policy. Unfortunately, he has neither had the intention nor the
ability to do so. Instead, he has deliberately fast-tracked his China-centric
policy.
If it wasn’t for continued pressure from the opposition parties and civic groups
during the past year, the KMT’s setbacks in local elections over the last six
months and Ma’s plummeting approval ratings, we would still be waiting on him to
explain his policy on an ECFA and to willingly participate in a debate with the
opposition. Even though the Ma administration only recently pro forma opened
dialogue with the public, it relies more on a top-down approach, packaging
public support for an ECFA with a propaganda campaign.
Beijing is fully aware that Ma is eager to build a track record of cross-strait
achievements as the basis for a re-election bid in 2012. Based on the six points
that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) proposed on Dec. 31, 2008, Beijing thus
uses the “one China” principle and reunification to set the tone for cooperation
with the Ma government to promote the following objectives: Ending political
confrontation between the two sides; signing a comprehensive economic
cooperation agreement; establishing military confidence-building mechanisms; and
allowing Taiwan to participate in events by international organizations, so long
as such activities do not create “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan”
scenario.
As a result, Taiwan has gained observer status for two straight years in the
World Health Assembly pending Beijing’s approval, which virtually amounts to an
annual review system.
Under his “China first” policy, Ma has constantly played down Taiwan’s
sovereignty, a term he used to repeat like a mantra during his election
campaign. By remaining mum on China’s military expansion, human rights
violations in Tibet, the suppression of press freedom and Beijing’s
international propaganda campaign which claims that “Taiwan is a part of China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Ma has reinforced the impression in
international public opinion that the two sides of the Strait are marching down
the road to unification.
He has not kept his “6-3-3” election pledge, putting the blame entirely on the
worsening global economic environment and even once stated that his plan would
only be implemented by 2016. The image of the Ma government suffered in the
aftermath of Typhoon Morakot in August last year, as well as subsequently
relaxing a ban on US beef imports despite public protests.
Ma’s “two lost years” illustrates a dilemma: How can a president with approval
ratings of less than 30 percent and such low levels of trust afford to overlook
the public’s will or just go through the motions of listening to the people
while persistently promoting an ECFA that largely lacks popular support and is
politically highly sensitive?
So, President Ma, before offering the Taiwanese people another illusion of “10
golden years,” please tell us why you messed up in your first “two lost years.”
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taiwan Brain
Trust in Taipei.
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