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Reasons for ECFA are red herrings
By Nathan Novak 李漢聲
Thursday, Jul 01, 2010, Page 8
Long ago ‑— 2004 to be exact — professor Samuel Kim edited a
book titled The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Chapter 10 of that
book, written by Lynn T. White III, is titled “Taiwan’s External Relations:
Identity versus Security.” There is a section of that chapter titled “Taiwan’s
Security as Mainly Economic.” The section lasts from page 316 to page 318, and
although it was written during the heightened cross-strait tensions of the Chen
Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency, its message remains clear today: Taiwan’s security
is mainly economic.
This is important because six years ago, academics were already quite clear in
their understanding that, as White writes, “Mines and missiles launched against
Taiwan’s economy, rather than ships and airplanes against [Taiwan’s] territory,
are the main armed threats to the island [to the extent that Taiwan’s economy is
not already centered in China].”
That’s an interesting assertion. Many mark Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency as
the beginning of cross-strait reconciliation. Few take into account that
cross-strait economic ties have been both strong and growing since the 1980s.
The economic detente since the 1980s is an interesting phenomenon as well.
During both the Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen presidencies — especially during
Chen’s era — economic ties grew despite political bickering and rhetoric.
Despite threats to Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, coercive acts such as
launching missiles and carrying out provocative military exercises during the
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, which involved a US fleet, and the
Tiananmen Square massacre, cross-strait economic ties have grown and
strengthened.
Also in Kim’s book is a chapter written by Thomas Moore and titled “China’s
International Relations: The Economic Dimension.” On page 112, Moore writes:
“[C]loser economic cooperation will enhance [Beijing’s] leverage vis-a-vis
Taipei ... by making [Taiwan] more reliant upon the mainland for its economic
well-being.” This is no secret, and has not been one since at least 2004, the
time of the book’s publication. In fact, it has been a well-known fact for more
than a decade.
For more than 10 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been trying to,
as White writes, “de-emphasiz[e], at least for now, the use of military force as
a means to achieve reunification.” The implication is that it is a well-known
fact that Beijing has been using economic means to “leverage” Taiwan into
“reunification.”
So why is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) so necessary? Is
the ECFA necessary to create a positive environment wherein Taiwan can sign
free-trade agreements (FTAs) with other economies and nations? In 2004, White
knew, as did many other academics, that “Beijing has issued a series of stern
warnings that other countries should not enter into FTAs with Taiwan.” In late
May and early last month, this was once again made clear to the world as Beijing
openly protested the possibility of Taiwan using the ECFA and stronger
cross-strait ties to sign FTAs with other countries.
How about the possibility that Taiwan will lose out in terms of regional
economic competitiveness if it didn’t sign the ECFA, especially since the FTA
between the PRC and ASEAN came into effect at the beginning of this year?
This is a doubtful reason for the necessity of an ECFA. Why? Because if China
were to allow Taiwan to be pushed, even slowly, out of the Chinese market, and
if cross-strait trade and investment began to wane, China’s influence over
Taiwan would also wane. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) policies
of flexibility and economic openness toward Taiwan would become a political
burden for him during the final years of his tenure and before his successor
takes over in 2012.
In conclusion, these two issues, which Ma has trumpeted as the major reasons for
signing the ECFA with China, are red herrings — Taiwan most likely will not gain
extra economic recognition from other countries through bilateral FTAs, because
the other parties involved will continue to bow to Chinese intimidation even
after the ECFA comes into effect, and the PRC will certainly not let Taiwan fall
from its gravitational pull, neither politically nor economically, ECFA or no
ECFA.
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region at
National Sun Yat-sen University.
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