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Populism does Taiwan no favors
By Ku Er-teh 顧爾德
Sunday, Jul 18, 2010, Page 8
At the height of summer 20 years ago, an important meeting
took place that has influenced Taiwan’s political development ever since. The
National Affairs Conference (NAC), which was held between June 28 and July 4,
1990, set the course for constitutional reform under then-president Lee Teng-hui
(李登輝) and wrote the agenda for Taiwan’s politics for the following two decades.
From February to March, 1990, a National Assembly meeting was held at Chungshan
Hall on Yangmingshan to select a new president and vice president.
Dissatisfaction with the anachronistic selection process inspired the Wild Lily
student movement, a six-day sit-in held in March, as well as protests from other
sectors, and it was these pressures for reform of the National Assembly that led
to the NAC being convened. This popular pressure started up the process of
democratic reform in Taiwan, and provided Lee with the basic conditions for the
golden decade of his political career.
The NAC produced a number of important consensuses, notably that the president
should be elected by direct popular vote and that a new election for delegates
to the National Assembly should be held earlier than originally scheduled.
Constitutional revisions were also called for to complement these two measures.
Nevertheless, there were still two competing proposals regarding the conduct of
presidential elections — one, represented by Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who was making
his way through the ranks of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), calling for an
electoral college, and the other, supported by the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), for the president to be elected directly by the
country’s citizens.
At the time, Lee still had doubts about direct elections, and the overall train
of thought in the KMT was still in favor of the electoral college option. In the
end, however, Lee’s sharp political insight led him to be increasingly confident
about his chances of passing the test of standing in a direct election. He knew
that if he could surmount this hurdle, being a directly elected president would
be an impregnable shield against any criticism or challenge directed against his
own political standpoints — including barbs fired at him from the other side of
the Taiwan Strait.
The NAC revealed Lee’s adeptness at manipulating populist politics. He used
consultations between the ruling and opposition parties to work toward winning
public support for the policy issues he would raise in the future. And having
established this base, no rival in the KMT could challenge him. Although at this
point he did not yet have the legitimacy gained by winning a direct election, he
had already established himself as the voice of the public through these
extra-establishment channels.
An Age of Tumult (秩序繽紛的年代), recently published by Rive Gauche Publishing House,
is a retrospective of Taiwan’s social, economic and political path over the past
two decades. In this book, distinguished columnist Wang Chien-chuang (王健壯)
describes how the 12 years of Lee’s presidency were marked by a hybrid political
culture in which there was an ebb and flow of authoritarianism and populism, and
how the six constitutional revisions implemented during those 12 years typified
this style of government. Although the content of these six revisions had the
support of the majority of the public, they also carry the mark of Lee’s
personal will, having overridden social consensus and even gone beyond the laws
of constitutional government.
Nevertheless, Lee’s strategy of wielding authoritarianism in his left hand and
populism in his right made a positive contribution to Taiwan’s democratic
politics.
As the author says: “Through the process of six non-revolutionary constitutional
revisions, authoritarian political structures were dismantled step by step, and
a system of constitutional government with electoral democracy as its theme was
built in their place.”
Over these 20 years, the populist element in Taiwan’s democracy has continued
through the presidencies of Lee and his successors, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Ma
Ying-jeou. A leader who wants to manipulate populist politics must have a
charismatic and inspiring political personality, as well as the ability to stir
up enmity and confrontation. Ma does not fit this mold, yet he has still chosen
to take the populist path, as typified by the notion of a “grassroots economy”
raised by his appointed premier, Wu Den-yih (吳敦義). In the sparring between
government and opposition over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,
Ma’s response to DPP calls for a referendum has been another kind of populist
line, using simplistic language to present the government’s expectations for
economic development.
According to Wang, because Ma does not have the features of a populist leader
and is not well versed in populist manipulation, and because he has been unable
to resolve the public’s crisis of confidence in himself and his administration,
his attempts at populism have proved ineffective. In Wang’s view, Ma has proved
not only to be incapable of democratic government, but also lacking the guts to
be an effective populist. This makes him a bogus populist, Wang says.
Twenty years ago, the NAC set Taiwan on a populist road. Lee used populism to
put an end to authoritarianism. Chen sought to use populism to overcome his
weakness when his party was a minority in the legislature. Ma, for his part, is
trying to use populism to divert attention from his ineffective government.
Populism is like the two-faced Roman god Janus in that it can develop in
entirely the opposite direction to that intended. Our political leaders have not
progressed beyond the bounds of populist democratic mobilization. As a result,
Taiwan’s path toward deepening and consolidating democracy has been a tortuous
one, with many impediments to progress.
Ku Er-teh is a freelance writer.
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