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Taiwan’s key role in the South China Sea
By Nat Bellocchi 白樂崎
Wednesday, Aug 11, 2010, Page 8
During the past few weeks, China has significantly increased
tension in East Asia by claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China
Sea. While claims and counterclaims by China and other nations in the region —
in particular Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan — have existed for several
decades, China’s recent aggressiveness and belligerence have put other countries
on edge.
The most significant pushback came during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in
Hanoi from July 22 to July 24, when 11 Asian nations plus the US expressed
concern about China’s moves. In her statement, US Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton called freedom of navigation on the sea a US “national interest,”
and urged “a collaborative diplomatic process” by all claimants to resolve “the
various territorial disputes without coercion.”
The emphasis on a multilateral mechanism is essential here: In a multilateral
forum, China faces a group of like-minded countries, while in bilateral
negotiations, China can play off countries against each other.
This development has significant implications for Taiwan. During the past two
years, the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has followed a policy
of accommodation toward China to reduce tension and — through signing the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) — enhance economic relations and
broaden ties with East and Southeast Asian countries. China’s belligerence on
the South China Sea — as well as its refusal to rein in North Korea — raises
doubts about its long-term intentions. Is it really for peace and stability in
the region, or is it intent on domination? If it is the latter, what does that
say about its intentions toward Taiwan?
As I have said earlier (“Taiwan needs to stand by its Allies,” Taipei Times,
June 1, page 8), there are no indications that Beijing has changed its
intentions in any fundamental way. Chinese rulers are still intent on absorbing
Taiwan. Their tactics have only changed slightly — in addition to military
threats and intimidation, they are now using economic means to entice Taiwan.
What would be the best approach from Taiwan’s side? Is it going to follow the
approach of accommodation, or does it clearly take the side of its democratic
allies — the US, Japan and South Korea — and others in the region whose key
interests are threatened by China’s expansion.
Simply reiterating its claims to the Pratas (Tungsha) islets and Taiping Island
in the Spratlys is not enough. Taiwan needs to take a more principled stance on
freedom of navigation. The discussions at the ASEAN Regional Forum show that
there is growing solidarity among the nations of East and Southeast Asia to
counter Chinese moves.
Is Taiwan joining this newfound solidarity, or is it going to be the
odd-man-out? For China, “recovering” Taiwan is not only a symbolic conclusion of
the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese
Communist Party of many decades ago, it is also perceived by the People’s
Liberation Army as a strategic asset in dominating the East Asia region. Without
control of Taiwan, it will be difficult for China to move toward a full-fledged
“blue water” navy and exert its influence as a Pacific sea power.
Taiwan, on the other hand, can only maintain its freedom and democracy if it
remains in the democratic camp and is able to build fair and equitable relations
with other like-minded states. That would be the best long-term guarantee for
peace and stability in the region.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute
in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed
in this article are his own.
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