20100911 On China’s dreams of hegemony
Prev Up Next

 

 

On China’s dreams of hegemony

By Lin Cho-shui 林濁水
Saturday, Sep 11, 2010, Page 8


‘We see that China’s impractical dreams of becoming a rising superpower involve it secretly using its somewhat hidden hegemonic attitude to test the waters in the region. This is increasing tensions in the already jumpy East Asian region, and this will definitely put increasing pressure on Taiwan.’

It is inevitable that new rising hegemons and older hegemons that are losing their power will constantly have conflicts and may even wage war until a definitive victory is achieved and a new unipolar order is established.

This idea can pretty much explain all the recent military exercises in East Asia by China and the US, and why the two nations have been at loggerheads with each other.

The fact that this idea is so widespread in China has of course emboldened bellicose people in China. Members of China’s military have also been making some astounding comments recently, increasing the size of the national defense budget and the scale of military exercises to prove their point.

This idea has gained even wider acceptance after several Chinese academics started to lend it their support. For example, Chu Shulong (楚樹龍), a professor in international politics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, said that China’s military aircraft and ships would only keep increasing in number. He also said that it is necessary for China to become a huge military power in Asia and that its military must become the strongest in the West Pacific and surpass that of the US to be able to deal with the US’ strong military presence in the region.

If this is the attitude China holds toward the US, then it is easy to imagine what China thinks of Taiwan.

Chu said that after China’s economy took off, Taiwan lost its influence in East Asia, and Japan and South Korea rely on China. Economic growth in the region, he said, depends on Chinese exports and Taiwan should come to terms with the way things really are.

Chu even went so far as to say that under these circumstances, China does not have its missiles aimed at Taiwan. This implies that China views Taiwan as something that already belongs to it and it’s therefore no wonder that some members of the Chinese military want Taiwan to basically surrender. To this end, they expect us to give up on the procurement of arms from the US, while also establishing a cross-strait mutual confidence-building mechanism on military matters in the South China Sea.

This overbearing attitude is certainly not unique to Chu, nor is it limited to China’s military. According to reports, a closed-door meeting was held by Chinese and Taiwanese academics at the scenic area of Jiuzhaigou, China, and the Taiwanese guests noticed a very hard, militaristic tone from both Chinese officials and academics. Another case in point is the way in which Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Vice President Li Yafei (李亞飛) gave President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) a sermon in front of everyone when he visited Taiwan.

So does China already believe it has reached the stage where it has the ability to “conceal its capabilities and bide its time” — the principle of taoguangyanghui (韜光養晦) adopted by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平)?

Will China keep its head down and plow away in the name of development?

Recently, a well-known Chinese academic, Chen Zhiwu (陳志武), now teaching economics at Yale University, warned that China should not mistakenly believe that the “China model” was some sort of secret formula responsible for the high levels of economic growth China has experienced the last few years. Chen said that there is no such thing as the China model.

In his new Chinese-language book, Chen says that he believes that the high levels of growth experienced by China over the years has resulted from the US being in charge of a unipolar global order that China has managed to benefit and profit from. Therefore, while Chen does not approve of the US as a hegemonic power, he does not believe that China should use its surreptitious hegemonic status to challenge the current unipolar order either. Such behavior, he believes, would result in total disaster.

Similar views to this are common within academic circles in China, and I have met more than one person who has expressed such thoughts. Opinions like these can be voiced at Yale, but they are never openly expressed in China.

We see that China’s impractical dreams of becoming a rising superpower involve it secretly using its somewhat hidden hegemonic attitude to test the waters in the region. This is increasing tensions in the already jumpy East Asian region, and this will definitely put increasing pressure on Taiwan.

To be precise, China’s growth is not only based on the US-led unipolar order; it is also inextricably linked to Taiwan.

Corporate strategist Kenichi Ohmae has come up with many examples that prove China is very dependent on Taiwan. For example, 14 of China’s biggest exporters are Taiwanese companies. China also lacks people skilled in business administration and Chinese companies rely heavily on Taiwanese businesspeople to help them in this area. There are currently 2 million Taiwanese nationals serving as senior business managers in China, and more than 90,000 Taiwanese companies lying at the heart of China’s economy.

Therefore, with regard to China’s impractical attitude about becoming a hegemonic power, Chen suggests that it is extremely important to revisit and think about the diplomatic policy of “concealing its capabilities and biding its time.”

However, if China really is confident it can do this, there should be no need for all the talk from these well-known academics. The way things are developing seems to be at odds with Beijing’s claims of a “peaceful rise.” One can only wonder what is going on in Beijing.

Many people are excited about China’s moves toward becoming a hegemon, and the strangest thing about this is that some people in Taiwan are echoing this view. Furthermore, there are people coming out and trying to calm things down by saying that it does not matter because things will not fall apart even if the parties involved do struggle against each other.

However, the very idea of these struggles causes a lot of anxiety, and it is hard to calculate just how many resources this anxiety wastes and how much this gets in the way of development.

Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.

 

 Prev Next