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China is reforming at its own pace
By Nathan Novak 李漢聲
Tuesday, Sep 21, 2010, Page 8
An article published in the the Taiwan News on Sept. 17
titled “PRC political reform is a mere mirage,” was correct in its assessment
that it would be “impossible to avoid forever the task of political reform in
the wake of China’s torrid growth and massive social change in the wake of the
‘reform and opening’ symbolized by the Shenzhen SEZ [special economic zone]
without triggering potential social or political storms.”
In fact, political reform is already occurring in China, and has been for some
time. Therefore, the task of political reform is already under way and should be
treated in part as a historical event.
However, the article reveals a common misconception some Westerners and others
living in democratic societies have when it assumes that if political reform is
not democratic in nature, it is not reform. Although the political reforms which
have occurred, and are still occurring in China, may not resemble what liberal
democrats would consider reform, they nonetheless deserve examination and should
not be brushed aside as “a mirage.”
Moreover, the main quote from Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) that appears in
the Taiwan News article, which was made just prior to the 30th anniversary of
the establishment of the Shenzhen SEZ, does not mention democratic reforms.
“[W]ithout the safeguard of the reform of political institutions, the fruits of
the reform of economic institutions cannot be consolidated,” Wen was quoted as
saying.
These statements are not new for the premier, who in the past associated with
former Chinese general secretary and reformer Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and former
premier and reformer Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽). Both Hu and Zhao were, in turn, proteges
of Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平).
However, Wen’s association with these reformers certainly does not make him a
democrat. Hu was a long-time follower of Deng, who was no democrat himself,
while Zhao’s performance as governor of Sichuan Province, particularly his
successful economic reform policies there, won him Deng’s attention. Neither
reformer can be accurately defined as a liberal democrat.
In fact, Kenneth Liberthal, in his authoritative Governing China: From
Revolution through Reform, states that although Zhao early on “associated
himself with greater political democratization ... his followers had begun to
support the idea that the best path to successful reform would be to have a
strong, autocratic leader use his power to implement change. This view, called
‘neo-authoritarianism,’ was intended to lay the groundwork for Zhao to become an
autocratic leader in Deng’s wake.”
Wen was one of those Zhao followers.
In his China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, David Shambaugh wrestles
with not only Western misconceptions regarding the perceived “lack” of political
reform in China, but also with the forms of political reform occurring within
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Tracing both the ideological and organizational reforms the party has
undertaken, particularly since the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre and
the fall of the Soviet Union, Shambaugh concludes that although the CCP has
continued to lose aspects of its most intrusive and repressive grips on Chinese
society utilized especially prior to the Cultural Revolution, the party has also
been adapting to challenges it has faced to its hold on power, and has thus far
been relatively effective.
Shambaugh concludes that the CCP, at least for the short to medium-term, can
continue to keep its grasp on power. Shambaugh also addresses the arguments of
those who see otherwise.
The reality of the matter is that the CCP is not a democratic institution
insofar as it does not presently support a broad democratic movement outside of
the party. Another reality, this one far more evident, is that the CCP is
currently the only political “show in town” in China. Dealing with China, at
least for the time being, means dealing with the CCP.
However, democracy within the party has been a key aspect of political reforms
that have been occurring within China since the late 1970s, although this is
something the average China watcher probably misses. Part of this internal
democratic development has its roots in Lenin’s understanding of democratic
centralism, and it arguably existed within the CCP, at least in part, prior to
the Mao Zedong (毛澤東) years. It was then replaced with Mao Zedong Thought, but
was revived after Mao’s death and Deng’s rise to power.
Indeed, the resurrection of democratic centralism in the CCP can be linked to
the reformist policies undertaken during the Deng period; much of these reforms
served to decentralize both political power and economic initiative, albeit with
Deng still essentially possessing ultimate authority. This drive for inner-party
democracy has been strengthened periodically since the Deng period.
Four conclusions can be drawn from the present discussion and the analyses of
those experts mentioned here.
First, those who subscribe to political evolutionary theories will probably be
forced to accept the fact that China is currently not in a position to allow
greater democratization outside the party.
Second, those who subscribe to different theories of power politics or political
theories other than those which are evolutionary in nature will probably be
forced to accept that the CCP is simply not willing to loosen its overall hold
on power insofar as loosening threatens the party’s existence.
Third, political reforms are taking place within China, but most meaningful
democratic reforms are occurring within the party and are, therefore, limited;
this will for the time being frustrate most advocates of greater democratic
reform within China.
Finally, China policies should be focused on the current sociopolitical and
socioeconomic environment within China and not on some future, hoped-for,
free-and-democratic China.
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region with a
particular focus on cross-strait relations at National Sun Yat-sen University.
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