20101001 The dangers of economic dependence on China
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The dangers of economic dependence on China

By Lin Kien-tsu 林健次

In what many consider a loss of face, Japan finally caved in to pressure from China and released, without charge, a Chinese fishing boat captain it had held for more than two weeks after a collision in disputed territorial waters around the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台).

China’s unrelenting pressure over the past two weeks included a threat to ban Chinese exports of rare earth metals to Japan, restrictions on tourist groups traveling to Japan, harassment such as fines on Toyota and other Japanese companies in China, the arrest of four Japanese citizens and cancelation of the two countries’ ministerial-level meetings and talks on the East China Sea oil fields, as well as other economic sanctions and threats.

The possibility of economic weapons or sanctions is an inevitable consequence of the establishment of economic relations. Without economic exchanges, there would be no economic weapons or sanctions at all. Since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had no contact with each other when Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) were in power, economic sanctions were not available. As a result, China was unable to impose economic sanctions against Taiwan.

President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration claims that the cross-strait economies are interdependent. This is a big lie. It is wrong to equate economic transactions with economic interdependence, as the two parties of a transaction are not necessarily interdependent.

Economic interdependence only exists between countries with economies equivalent in size. This corresponding scale means that sanctions may be mutually damaging. Sanctions are therefore rarely seen in this kind of situation. A significant difference in the size of the respective economies, however, leads to one being more dominant and the other more dependent.

It is very similar to the relationship between employer and employee. Of course, an economic relationship exists between the two parties, but that does not mean they are actually interdependent, as the employer is more dominant and the employee is more dependent. If the employee fails to satisfy the boss’ expectations, he or she can be replaced at any time. The worker can hardly replace the boss.

Japan and China are not economically interdependent. And it is certainly the case that neither are China and Taiwan.

What can we learn from China’s brazen economic sanctions on, and intimidation of, Japan?

First, Beijing is apparently brave enough to use economic policy to achieve political ends.

Second, because China is a dictatorship, the ruling party, politics and commerce are all inextricably linked, and China can move quite quickly and efficiently to achieve these ends. This is one of the main reasons that China seems to have gotten the upper hand over Japan in this particular diplomatic spat.

China’s ability to manipulate economic policy in this way has implications for Japan’s — and even Taiwan’s — territorial claims over the Diaoyutais. If China can take this tack against Japan over the Diaoyutais, it is going to be just as willing, more so in fact, when it comes to Taiwan, which it considers to be part of its territory. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) reinforces Taiwan’s economic dependence on China and, correspondingly, dilutes Taiwan’s economic relations with other countries.

Signing the ECFA was tantamount to arming China with more economic instruments with which to control Taiwan, making it easier for China to achieve its political goals through economic means. Is this why Ma and his government were so willing to sign the agreement?

Lin Kien-tsu is a member of the Taiwan Association of University Professors.

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