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Is removing missiles in Taiwan’s
interests?
BY WANG JYH-PERNG 王志鵬
Ever since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected, demands that China remove
the missiles it has aimed at Taiwan have been a hot topic. Most people know that
in a military sense, removing the missiles is meaningless, but far fewer people
have considered the real implication of this question: Would it hurt Taiwan’s
security?
On July 9, Xiamen University’s Center for Taiwan Studies held a symposium on new
breakthroughs in Taiwan studies giving special attention to mutual military
trust. This was also the first time Chinese scholars proposed concrete ideas and
conditions for an agreement on military safety and mutual trust between China
and Taiwan, issuing eight articles and 43 clauses.
On July 30, Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng (耿雁生)
said China might consider removing the missiles along the Fujian Province coast
to spur the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. However, the basic
premise of Geng’s comments was that Taiwan must first agree to the “one China”
principle.
At that time, I looked into the situation in more detail and found that things
are not as black and white as they may first appear.
Given that China could go even further in its soft approach of engaging in
strategic talks while also intensifying its military approach, there are at
least three possibilities in regards to removing the missiles.
The best approach would be for China to agree to remove the missiles and openly
announce to the international community that it would not resort to military
force to solve the Taiwan issue as long as Taiwan does not pursue independence.
The second-best approach would involve removing the missiles and negotiating a
mechanism for building mutual military trust based on the so-called “1992
consensus,” while the worst approach would be to remove the missiles and end
cross-strait hostilities on the condition that Taiwan recognizes the “one China”
principle.
Less than three months later, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) said in New York
on Sept. 22 that now that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement has been
signed and that cross-strait relations are increasingly close, the two sides can
take steps in promoting mutual political and military trust. In his responses to
questions from reporters, Wen said the missiles eventually would be removed.
Noticeably, Wen did not insist on the “one China” principle.
Now, the non-issue of removing the missiles has become a real bargaining chip
for China as it gives senior Chinese officials a lot of wiggle room when making
political strategy.
At the same time, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has become weak
and marginalized in the process. Because Taiwan’s military strategy
traditionally follows the government’s political strategy, even when senior
members of the MND have different opinions or are unwilling to do something, it
seems they have little choice but to passively follow along.
Recently, Mei Fu-hsing (梅復興), director of the US-based Taiwan Strait Security
Research and Analysis Center, revealed that the US originally wanted to invite
Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Kao Hua-chu (高華柱) to the US to take part
in a US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference and hold talks with senior US
officials. This never happened because it was not supported by Taiwan’s US-based
diplomats. The MND thus had to forgo the opportunity.
While officials deny this, it is clearly not just a rumor and offers proof of
the extent to which the MND has been weakened and marginalized. In the future, I
am afraid our last line of defense will be the will of Taiwan’s citizens.
Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the
Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.
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