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Peace accord an
electoral gamble
By Liu Shih-chung 劉世忠
In the run-up to the January elections, President Ma Ying-jeou(馬英九) on Monday
made a new campaign move by promising voters that, if elected, he would
seriously consider pushing forward the signing of a peace accord with the
People’s Republic of China within the next decade. Along with this, he stressed
three “preconditions,” namely strong domestic support, a clear national need and
legislative approval.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) criticized
Ma’s new statements as “reckless, simplistic and inconsistent” and said they
would jeopardize Taiwan’s sovereignty, change the “status quo” across the Taiwan
Strait, endanger Taiwan’s democracy and undermine regional and strategic
balance.
Facing huge doubts, even from his own camp, Ma further pledged that the
government would obtain public approval through a referendum or evaluate the
results of public polls before pushing for such a pact with China.
Ma’s new elaboration should be seen as more of an electoral scheme and political
gamble than a well-calculated and well-prepared policy initiative to forge a
peace accord.
First, Ma intends to frame the election debate and set the agenda in the next
three months on cross-strait relations in a way that favors him over Tsai, who
is the DPP’s presidential candidate. Ma’s camp understands that Tsai has focused
her campaign on social justice and equality by highlighting his poor
performance, economic backwardness and the widening gap between the rich and
poor. Therefore, Ma needs to shift voter attention to cross-strait affairs,
while at the same time continuing his smear campaign against Tsai and her
running mate, Su Jia-chyuan (蘇嘉全).
However, as indicated by the way Ma and his administration single-handedly
pushed forward the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
with Beijing, he took advantage of his mandate from the 2008 victory, as well as
his party’s absolute control of the legislative branch, to negotiate the
agreement with his Chinese counterpart.
The “three preconditions” Ma attached to the potential peace accord talk are
merely the same justifications that were used in the ECFA campaign. If Ma is
re-elected and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) continues to control the
majority in the Legislative Yuan, his new government would be able to manipulate
public polls or justify its action for negotiation on a peace accord.
Second, the idea of embracing a referendum is a huge political gamble by Ma.
When the DPP was in power, then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) introduced three
referendums in 2004 and 2008. All met with a strong backlash from the KMT,
including Ma, the administration of then-US president George W. Bush and
Beijing.
Not only has the KMT long been characterizing referendums as a “political
taboo,” but Ma also opposed public calls for a referendum on the ECFA after he
came to office. This about-face displayed Ma’s election-driven mentality and
does not represent sincere respect for democratic mechanisms such as
referendums.
Third, what is even riskier is that Ma’s discussion of a peace accord did not go
through extensive evaluation on the possible impact it might have on Taiwan’s
national interests. No details have been provided in terms of who would play the
arbitrator if one side broke the deal. No requests have been made for Beijing to
renounce its policy of using force against Taiwan or to dismantle its missiles
targeting Taiwan and the region. Not to mention that Beijing has no interest in
a peace accord.
During Ma’s first year in power, his government sent signals regarding
negotiations on political issues, including a peace accord, especially when
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)
first visited Taipei in late 2008. Ma gave Beijing the impression he was
interested in touching upon some political issues. Academics and think tanks
close to the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party have jointly conducted research
on the content of a peace accord.
However, Ma changed his original intention and adjusted the strategy toward
“economics first, politics later” and “easier things first, hard issues later”
after his administration suffered from the poor management in the aftermath of
Typhoon Morakot in August 2009. Profound differences and mistrust appeared
between Ma and China’s leaders.
Beijing has yet to respond to Ma’s new elaboration of a peace accord for several
reasons. For one thing, it believes Ma is not trustworthy and his new stance is
simply driven by electoral calculations.
The proposal for a referendum also crosses China’s “red line,” regardless of
whether Ma was serious about it. Moreover, since China will have its own power
succession late next year, negotiations on a peace accord with Ma are not at the
top of its national agenda. For potential new Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平),
maintaining economic growth and social stability are top priorities, not Ma’s
hidden agenda.
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based Taiwan Brain
Trust.
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