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Ma’s peace proposal
is empty talk
By Ball Chang 張光球
After President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office in 2008, his administration
eagerly began talks with China to a largely favorable response. On Oct. 18, when
Ma presented his “golden decade” vision for the nation’s development over the
next 10 years, he said Taiwan could negotiate a peace accord with China within
10 years if three preconditions were met: that there was strong domestic support
for such a pact, that it met the needs of the country and that there was
legislative overview. His announcement was greeted with approval by the pan-blue
camp and derision by the pan-green camp.
Ma said he brought up the issue because it was part of his plan for the nation,
but he should say what it is really for — his re-election bid. After all, it
would be nearly impossible to meet the three prerequisites for such an accord,
and Beijing’s definition of “one China” is not the same as Taiwan’s.
Naturally the content of a cross-strait peace agreement must be agreed upon by
both parties for it to work, and it must be explained to the public on both
sides. Ma’s three preconditions are there to serve as buffers. What does “strong
domestic support” mean? The total number of votes the president, the legislature
or the ruling party gets in an election? Or is he -talking about a referendum?
Even if he got more than half the votes he is seeking, public opinion is very
fluid. What could be done if public opinion were to change six months from now?
Furthermore, a nation needs sustainable development, but what Taiwan needs is
not necessarily what China needs or vice versa. What would Taiwan do in the
event of conflicting interests between the two sides?
It seems unlikely that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will win a
legislative majority in the foreseeable future, but it is certainly capable of
paralyzing the legislature, and without proper supervision, the legislature
would be in chaos. Moreover, without the pressure of a deadline, it might be
another 100 years before a peace deal gets signed.
As for China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it inherited the right
to rule over “all China,” and that Taiwan is only being temporarily managed by a
local government. China always shows how it feels about cross-strait sovereignty
when the US sells weapons to Taiwan, or when there is an argument about what
Taiwan is called in the international community.
From Beijing’s perspective, all the benign cross-strait interaction at present
is China taking care of its domestic affairs. However, seen from Taiwan’s
perspective, it is negotiations between two sovereign nations. Thus, every time
the topic of sovereignty is broached, it only makes sense that Beijing works to
diminish Taiwan’s international space to manifest its right to represent China.
If China agrees to sign a peace accord, it might give the international
community a mistaken sense of equality. Take the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA), for example — if Taiwan wanted to sign a free-trade agreement
with another nation based on the ECFA, it would still have to be done under the
so-called “one China” principle. However, the ECFA is the only free-trade
agreement the Ma administration has signed.
Furthermore, the main criteria deciding China’s attitude toward Taiwan is the
strength of pro-independence forces in this nation.
Even though the Ma administration and the Chinese government have similar
beliefs concerning national identity, Beijing still keeps a close eye on the
ideas and strength of independence activists. At the same time, China must make
concessions to support Ma and prevent another transfer of power in Taiwan.
Some of the nations that have diplomatic ties with Taiwan at present are willing
to establish diplomatic ties with China, and Beijing is currently unwilling to
accept them because it suspended the establishment of new diplomatic relations
with Taiwan’s allies to improve cross-strait ties.
However, as soon as a pro-independence party comes to power, China can steal
Taiwan’s allies. On the other hand, if Taiwan’s relations with other nations
improve, that will also increase cross-strait tensions concerning sovereignty.
A nation might last indefinitely, but a government is temporary, and the ability
of a government to extend its hold on power is a concrete expression of that
nation’s strength. The current smooth developments in cross-strait relations
have been based upon an implicit agreement between the Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT) and the CCP.
Therefore, Ma’s cross-strait proposals are pretty slogans with no real
substance, and that will give the DPP more ammunition to criticize and attack
Ma.
Ball Chang is an assistant professor at the Chihlee Institute of Technology’s
Department of Applied English.
Translated by Kyle Jeffcoat
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