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EDITORIAL: The
pre-World War I era and Taiwan
The economic, diplomatic and military world of East Asia these days has a lot in
common with pre-World War I Europe, minus the colonial drive.
Economically, the rapid rise of China is creating challenges throughout the
Asia-Pacific region, with older established economic powerhouses such as Taiwan,
South Korea and Japan scrambling to find a market niche that can take advantage
of China¡¦s economic might, while protecting themselves from over-reliance on the
juggernaut.
Diplomatically, there is a heavy reliance on secret regional agreements that are
either meant to constrain the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or create secret
alliances against the hegemonic power ¡X the US ¡X just as secret agreements
before World War I created alliances against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.
Militarily, East Asia is beset by a balance-of-power dynamic devoid of any
regional multinational alliances meant to stop conflict, such as the League of
Nations, UN or EU, just as Europe had no mechanisms to stop a war from breaking
out prior to 1914.
Academics have described the 20th century as a long, drawn-out attempt to
constrain the economic might of Germany. After Germany¡¦s unification in the late
1800s, it experienced World War I, the reparations regime in the inter-war
period, World War II and division during the Cold War, before melding itself to
the EU. All these upheavals were in effect a painful means of integrating the
German economy into the wider European sphere.
China is about 30 years into a similarly rapid economic expansion, although it
was sparked not by unification, but by the end of the Cultural Revolution and
the ascension of economic reformers into leadership roles. The countries around
China still have not figured out how best to benefit from this opportunity
without being absorbed.
Taiwan jumped in earliest, but perhaps due to its history, it is not faring that
well ¡X the nation risks being absorbed economically by China. South Korea seems
to have figured out how to protect itself while still increasing trade, but
Japan is in the doldrums, from which it cannot seem to extricate itself. And
this is only the beginning.
The secret agreements taking place are best represented by the closed-door
meetings between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the CCP, which began in
2005 and were promptly followed by the election of President Ma Ying-jeou (°¨^¤E),
his signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with China and more
recent talk of a cross-strait peace pact. It seems obvious the KMT and CCP came
to an agreement on all these issues in secret.
Another example is what appears to be US consultations with Beijing before
selling arms to Taiwan, a move that would be against US law.
The effect of these secret agreements is that people have no way of knowing
where their governments¡¦ loyalties actually lie and where they would stand if
conflict broke out.
As to the military sphere in East Asia, might makes right, which is why
countries employ balance of power strategies, hoping this will prevent a war,
just as the Europeans did before World War I. However, these strategies only
work as long as the regional powers are actually balanced. US power is waning,
China¡¦s is expanding, Taiwan is almost defenseless, the Koreas are at a
stalemate and Japan is trying to quietly build up its military in a way that
does not alarm its neighbors.
Moreover, the lack of a regional security mechanism increases the chance of
conflict ¡X China defines the Taiwan Strait problem as a domestic issue and the
Koreas are basically in a state of civil war.
East Asia has a lot in common with pre-World War I Europe. Let¡¦s hope Asian
leaders can steer clear of the mistakes the Europeans made.
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