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2012 ELECTIONS:
INTERVIEW: Peace accord carries great risks: part two
Former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Chen Ming-tong said in an interview
with ‘Liberty Times’ (the sister newspaper of the ‘Taipei Times’) staff reporter
Tzou Jiing-wen that President Ma Ying-jeou’s proposal to sign a peace pact with
China under the so-called ‘1992 consensus’ would create at least eight major
risks, which would be beyond Ma’s ability to handle. This is the second part of
the interview
By Tzou Jiing-wen / Staff Reporter
Liberty Times: In practice, how would China use the peace accord to implement
“unification”?
Chen Ming-tong (陳明通): From my personal professional judgment, there would
be several factors that would be involved [in the implementation of
“unification.”]
The first is tying the issue with “conclusion of adversarial status.” China
would sign a cross-strait peace accord under the pretext of “concluding a status
of civil war.”
Under international law, this sort of accord is a “domestic accord” and is not
within the jurisdiction of international law. Beijing has been very careful to
use the term “peace accord” or “peace agreement” and not “peace treaty,” because
a “cross-strait peace accord” is a domestic agreement.
As such, the following are the risks Taiwan may face:
Declaring that “both sides of the Strait belong to one China.” The thing with
this is that the China the international community recognizes is the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), not the Republic of Chian (ROC). Taiwan declaring there
is “one China” is tantamount to giving in to the PRC.
The admission that the ROC in Taiwan is the one that lost in the Chinese Civil
War weakens our position on the bargaining table. In the past, when the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in power, their denial that the civil war
between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
had anything to do with them made it hard for Beijing to use such things to rope
Taiwan in.
However, now that the KMT is once more in power, even [Chinese President] Hu [Jintao
(胡錦濤)] said: “The situation in Taiwan has seen an active change, and the
cross-strait relationship is seeing a rare historical opportunity.”
If Taiwan takes its seat at the negotiation table under such circumstances, it
can only bargain with Beijing under its framework of “reuniting the homeland”
and cannot avoid being “reunified.”
Meanwhile, No. 329 of the ROC’s Council of Grand Justices’ Constitutional
Interpretation also states: “Accords signed between the Taiwan and Mainland
areas are not included within what this interpretation calls ‘international
written accords,’” and even added as an addendum on the issue of whether such
accords should be sent to be reviewed by the Legislative Yuan that “it was not
within the parameters of this interpretation.”
From this it can be seen that a cross-strait peace accord has neither the
protection of international law nor the oversight of the people, forming too
great a risk.
Furthermore, after signing a cross-strait peace accord, any armed conflict
between Taiwan and China would be defined as the continuation of a civil war,
making it a Chinese domestic affair, in which foreigners could not interfere.
In the face of the PRC winning the civil war and gaining legitimacy within the
international community as representing China, ROC armed forces would be defined
as “armed rebel forces” in China.
Second, in Beijing’s opinion, only by “unification” can war be averted and
“peace” obtained. Therefore, Beijing, when negotiating a cross-strait peace
accord between Taiwan and China, would insist on including such words as
“unification.” Because of this, Taiwan would face the risk that unification
[with China] would become the only option for Taiwan, breaking with the social
consensus when the DPP was in power in which, if all Taiwanese agreed, both
“unification” and “independence” were options.
Beijing’s [willingness to sign] a cross-strait peace accord is not only a means
to hasten unification, but also a method to suppress independence. Under such a
situation, even if Taiwan is governed by a pro-independence party, it could not
easily break the framework imposed by such an accord or it would pay heavy price
for it.
Third, a cross-strait peace accord would regulate cross-strait political
relations prior to unification. This would include: (a) the establishment of
clear rules that state “cross-strait political relationships prior to
unification” are only a “temporary political relationship” before unification.
Under such a rule, the eventual unification of Taiwan [with China] would become
an foregone conclusion. For Taiwanese who do not wish to see unification with
China, this is a very large risk; and (b) promising to make arrangements and
other gradual negotiations leading to unification. In other words, using the
method of “setting the topic” to control the pace of unification, sidestepping
the possibility of Taiwan using the “temporary political relationship” as an
excuse to delay unification.
Fourth, the signing of a cross-strait peace accord would regulate the political
stance of Taiwan’s government. This poses two risks for Taiwan: President Ma
Ying-jeou (馬英九) once proposed the “Taiwan area” and “Mainland area” concept, but
according to current international recognition of the “one China” principle,
“one China” refers to the PRC in the “Mainland area,” meaning that the “Taiwan
area” may still be mistaken for “a part of China,” and the government of Taiwan
runs the risk of being seen as a provincial government of China.
Fifth, the signing of the peace accords would hamper Taiwan’s international
activities. In China’s “Anti-Seccession” Law, passed in March 2005, it states
clearly that Taiwan is an “area,” and areas cannot be a country, therefore
Taiwan [under China] could not have any international status.
Hence after the signing of a peace accord, Taiwan runs the following risks on
the global arena:
1) The Ma administration’s unilateral proposal of a “diplomatic truce” policy
can practically be said to be a self-imposed freeze on establishing diplomatic
relationships between Taiwan and other nations.
The signing of a peace accord could take the situation one step further and
disable that power entirely, making Taiwan lose the status of a nation as
dictated by international law and become an area under Chinese rule.
2) In order to completely wipe out the ROC’s international presence, Beijing
would demand that Taiwan seek Beijing’s approval for any public sector economic
or cultural relationships, as well as a review of current relationships.
3) The need to ask Beijing for permission to attend international organizations.
The rules of the game could be seen in the example of the World Health Assembly
(WHA).
4) The denial of our [Taiwan’s] joining the UN or any other international
organizations requiring the status of a sovereign independent country. This has
always been one of the main points that Beijing insisted upon, because only by
taking away the ROC’s status as a country could they wipe out the ROC’s
international presence.
5) The demand that Taiwan is a part of China and the severe interdiction of any
sort of action that would give foreign countries the impression that there are
“two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
This is a very general rule, defined by Beijing, and more importantly, if we
were to sign a peace accord, Beijing would accuse us of violating the peace
accord and use that as grounds to punish us.
Sixth, the establishment of mutual trust over military matters. This is a system
[that could only be done] domestically, and Taiwan runs the risk of making
promises to decrease arms purchases.
The seventh risk is in what capacity the negotiation is conducted and the accord
signed: The capacity to which the negotiation is to be conducted would be
defined as an area within China.
The whole world knows the meaning of Beijing’s “one China” principle, and
because the peace accord would be signed under the pretext of ending a civil
war, the international community would then naturally read that as the losing
“rebel province” coming back to the bargaining table with Beijing.
In fact, under the “one China” principle, even using the status of the ROC,
there is still a great risk because the ROC has already lost many of its
diplomatic allies.
Unless the ROC could be like present-day South Korea or West Germany prior to
German unification, in that both were members of the UN and had a great number
of diplomatic allies, it could not negotiate with China as an equal.
It would turn into what one Chinese academic jokingly called: “The PRC’s Taiwan
area’s ROC government negotiating with the PRC government.”
One other risk is that the capacity in which a peace accord is signed would be
lowered to that of a provincial leader within China.
Finally, the signing of a cross-strait peace accord lacks the oversight of
third-party nations or international organizations.
Therefore, the contents of the peace accord would be in doubt, and Beijing could
easily use its status as a global power to ignore such an accord, or even
re-interpret its meaning to its advantage, such as interpreting the peace accord
as part of a unification accord.
At the same time, Beijing could also easily pick out what is advantageous to
Beijing to implement and put clauses that are advantageous to Taiwan “on ice.”
Translated by Jake Chung, Staff Writer
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