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Much to do as the
chief opposition party now
By Lee Cheng-hung 李政鴻
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot avoid the issue of relations
across the Taiwan Strait. Following its loss in the Jan. 14 presidential
election, the party needs to consult widely and try to find a balance between
globalization, cross-strait issues and upholding Taiwan’s identity, and go on to
formulate arguments that most people can accept.
During her election campaign, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)
proposed what she called a “Taiwan consensus,” the main point of which was that
Taiwan’s future should be decided by all its people, in the spirit of democracy
and self-determination.
The DPP lost the presidential race, but it made substantial gains in the
legislature and as the main opposition party it should play the role of
overseeing the government.
Beyond that, the DPP should follow the British model by forming a shadow Cabinet
whose role would be to put forward realistic views on major national policy
issues, thereby showing itself to be capable of taking back the reins of
government at any time. If the DPP can use the period between now and the next
election to refine and reform itself, starting out with a fresh approach to
cross-strait issues, that ought to be a positive step for the development of
party politics in Taiwan.
Coming up with a set of standpoints on cross-strait relations that reflect
changes in Taiwan’s geopolitical situation and can be accepted by the public is
a key task that the DPP must tackle if it wants to hold the presidency again.
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) re-election should not be seen as merely a
referendum on the so-called “1992 consensus,” nor does it mean that people don’t
support the “Taiwan consensus” proposed by Tsai. The election result showed that
both sides have a considerable degree of public support.
What complicates matters is that there is no way of knowing how many people cast
their votes defensively, on the one hand fearing that an excessive reliance on
China could whittle away Taiwan’s ability to decide its own future, while on the
other hand worrying that moves toward independence would threaten cross-strait
peace. Many voters wanted to avoid instability and the possible worst-case
scenarios that might have resulted from it. This psychological factor can hardly
be interpreted as an adherence to party ideologies, and such people can’t simply
be categorized as swing voters. All you can say is that Taiwanese do not want to
be “Finlandized.”
Taiwan does not want to provoke China militarily and it does not want to be
marginalized in the global division of the manufacturing industry. The DPP sees
how globalization is leading to an increasingly unequal “M-shaped society,” so
it has called for measures to change this trend, such as care for the
disadvantaged and innovation in local industry. In its election strategy, the
party intentionally steered clear of issues related to China, but its opponents
successfully hit back and gave the DPP a rough ride by labeling it as
anti-China, anti-business and incapable of maintaining stability and growth.
The Ma administration and the Chinese government have an unspoken agreement to
blur the issues of “one China” and national sovereignty. During his second term
as president, Ma will face heavy pressure from China to engage in political
negotiations. Will the two governments keep giving top priority to the economy,
or will the economy become a means of promoting unification? The answer will
become clear during the next four years. It is a key moment, and the DPP must
not be absent from the process.
Lee Cheng-hung holds a doctorate in social science from National Sun Yat-sen
University.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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