|
A pressing need for
submarines
By Wang Jyh-perng ¤ý§ÓÄP
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) will apparently officially propose a plan
during the current legislative session to produce submarines domestically.
Unlike the 2001 Sea Star Project, under which Taiwan was to purchase eight
2,000-tonne submarines from the US, the new project aims to either develop a
1,000 to 1,500-tonne prototype through technology transfer or purchase
second-hand submarines to replace the old Guppy-class submarines and then
develop new submarines after obtaining sufficient capability to do so.
Either way, the project is likely to gain support from the governing and
opposition parties, as well as that of the defense industry. Whether it is
pushed through, subsequent to approval of the budget, depends entirely on
President Ma Ying-jeou (°¨^¤E).
The 2001 submarine purchase plan, originally the most important of the three
major arms procurement targets, has been dead in the water ever since the US
Navy¡¦s ¡§independent cost estimate¡¨ (ICE) of as much as NT$290 billion (US$9.8
billion) led to it being boycotted by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and
People First Party (PFP). At the time, the issue was exploited by political
parties wrangling over power in the legislature.
The Republic of China (ROC) Navy has previously always insisted on purchasing
submarines directly. By the time US President Barack Obama succeeded George W.
Bush in 2008, China was much more powerful, both economically and militarily.
Just as Beijing has been expanding its navy, the US has been gradually reducing
its military budget because of various internal and external issues. With the
Sino-US ¡§co-management¡¨ of Taiwan and better cross-strait relations, there has
been little chance of direct US submarine sales to Taiwan and the original
procurement project has been sidelined.
Over the past 10 years, Australia and South Korea have been the most successful
countries in terms of submarine development in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia plans to spend US$36 billion to build 12 new advanced submarines,
which are expected to be ready for testing by 2022 and in service by 2025.
However, a large-scale submarine project is also problematic, the biggest issues
being securing the funding and deciding whether the submarines should be built
domestically or purchased directly. Ultimately, the Australian government and
navy decided to build the submarines domestically.
South Korea, having previously built Type 209 submarines, continued by pursuing
German-made Type 214 submarines. According to a recent report, Indonesia plans
to spend US$1.1 billion to purchase three South Korean Type 209, 1,400-tonne
submarines, the first of which is to be delivered in 2018. This is a result of
the cooperation and efforts of the South Korean government, navy and industry
over the past 10 years.
In the face of China¡¦s military rise, Taiwan cannot and should not engage in an
arms race, yet it must inevitably make significant changes to its defense
strategy. According to the MND¡¦s March 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, priority
is now to be given to preventing enemies from making landfall.
The report said: ¡§The size of the ROC Armed Forces shall be adequately measured
by combat requirements, [the armed forces] should be large enough to safeguard
the country, but not so large that they cause a financial burden. The goal for
the ROC Armed Forces is to prevent enemies from landing and establishing a
beachhead. Defense resources, therefore, shall mainly be allocated to major
combat forces, and applied to develop basic and asymmetric forces in order to
ensure the sustainability of total combat capability.¡¨
In addition, according to the MND¡¦s 2011 National Defense Report, the ministry
should integrate the armed forces to disable the enemy¡¦s operational center of
gravity and execute joint interception, anchorage and beachhead attacks, so as
to achieve the strategic goal of preventing enemies from landing.
¡§Joint operations of the ROC Armed Forces are focused on building long-range
precision operations and synchronous joint engagement capabilities, and the
simultaneous application of precision strikes, multilayered interceptions,
anchorage and beachhead attacks, and asymmetrical operations,¡¨ the biannual
report states.
¡§When the enemy¡¦s intention to invade is apparent or the enemy has already taken
action, troops and fire support of the armed forces is deployed according to
their effective range to disable the enemy¡¦s operational center of gravity,
execute joint interception, anchorage and beachhead attack, and achieve the
militarily strategic goals of preventing enemies from landing and disembarking
on Taiwan,¡¨ the report adds.
All of this is true, but the key is to have an adequate number of submarines.
Taiwan¡¦s situation is different from that of either Australia or South Korea.
Still, it makes sense to produce our own submarine prototype, just as we
produced the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Despite the research and development,
as well as all obstacles it may face, it at least shows a degree of
determination to develop a defensive capability, not to mention the significant
strategic implications this would have for Taiwan-China-US relations. Although
the submarine project comes so late, the MND and navy deserve our praise for the
change, because they are aware of the situation and the need to push for it.
Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for
Managing Defense and Strategies.
Translated by Eddy Chang
|
