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Hong Kong could face
its own 228
By Lin Cho-shui 林濁水
The 228 Massacre is a source of resentment for Taiwanese and has been called the
root cause of the Taiwan independence movement. Such resentment and the
confrontation between unification and independence camps has resulted in intense
conflict between the government and the opposition, which came into focus during
the presidential election campaign.
However, when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was forced to say: “Taiwan is our
home, and it is also our country,” he effectively ended an era of intense
confrontation over the -unification-independence issue.
At the same time, ethnic conflict between mainland and Hong Kong Chinese is
intensifying in Hong Kong. That’s right: ethnic conflict. That is what Hong
Kongers themselves call it.
Hong Kongers say that the conflict began with the return of the territory to
China in 1997 and Beijing’s intense political, economic and cultural
manipulation ever since then aimed at promoting unification.
When Beijing tied Taiwan and Hong Kong together using the “one country, two
systems” approach, some Hong Kongers started to worry about Taiwan, and when
they learned about the 228 Incident, they started worrying that the same thing
could happen in Hong Kong after 1997. Such concerns still exist.
Although that may be an extreme position, increasingly intense 228-style ethnic
conflict is brewing in Hong Kong. Strangely, the ethnicity issue is not being
pushed by pro--democracy -politicians, whose loyalty to Beijing is doubtful, but
by CY Leung (梁振英), a pro--Beijing candidate for the position of chief executive.
He came up with the “double no” (雙非) slogan as a way to exploit the ethnicity
card.
The slogan describes a Chinese couple who are not legal Hong Kong residents, but
go to Hong Kong to have children and thereby obtain residency rights. This was
the issue that most upset Hong Kongers last year.
In 2001, such couples had 620 children, but as Hong Kong has continued to open
up to Chinese that figure has increased and in 2010, 32,653 such children were
born, 36.9 percent of all children born in Hong Kong.
As a result, maternity wards were booked to 140 percent of capacity and fears
began to spread among residents that they would not be able to find a bed in a
maternity ward when they needed one.
“Double no” couples have never paid taxes in Hong Kong, but their children will
enjoy Hong Kong welfare services far superior to anything offered in China, and
this has angered Hong Kong residents.
Those who are opposed to the acceptance of “double no” couples have been called
xenophobes opposed to the “true Hong Kong.”
This issue is of course not the only reason for the conflict between the two
groups. It can be traced back to China’s relaxation of rules on travel and
investment in Hong Kong after the 2003 SARS epidemic.
Friction quickly built up: Chinese invested huge sums in Hong Kong’s property
market, causing the real estate market to heat up and rents to increase, making
it difficult for local residents to find somewhere to live.
More recently there have been other issues, including frequent drownings of
Chinese in Hong Kong, visitors refusing to adhere to local regulations, the
hostage situation in Manila and incidents with people eating on the MTR system.
Neither side mince their words: Peking University professor Kong Qingdong (孔慶東)
called Hong Kongers “dogs” and Hong Kong residents call the Chinese visitors
“locusts.” The two sides are challenging each other on the Internet, criticizing
each other in the media and even organizing street demonstrations.
Hong Kong University recently issued a public opinion poll showing that 16.6
percent of respondents identified themselves as Chinese, while 44.4 percent said
the term was “not applicable.” Support for Taiwanese independence has increased
to 20 percent. In a 2007 poll, 25 percent of respondents said they would accept
Hong Kong independence if given the choice.
Hong Kong is not the only place with a highly integrated economy, a government
that stresses national identity and a split national consciousness. Another
example is Germany, where, in 1990, 61 percent of East Germans saw themselves as
Germans and 32 percent as East Germans. By 1992, 65 percent saw themselves as
East Germans and only 35 percent said they were Germans. By 2000, 77 percent
said they were East Germans.
An opinion poll by the German magazine Der Spiegel shows that almost 70 percent
of West Germans and 80 percent of East Germans felt they were different from
each other, and that the difference between East and West Germany was greater
than that between France and Germany.
A similar change has occurred in Taiwan. In the early 1990s, less then 10
percent of people in Taiwan identified themselves as Taiwanese. By the
mid-1990s, about 30 percent said they were Taiwanese, about the same as those
identifying themselves as Chinese, which led to intense conflict between the
pro--unification and pro-independence camps.
Interestingly, since 2010, less than 10 percent of people identify themselves as
Chinese and Taiwanese identity has become mainstream, while the domestic
political situation is moving toward greater integration.
Taiwan has moved from confrontation to integration. Will the same thing happen
in Hong Kong or in Germany? These three places are unlikely to move in the same
direction. No matter what, the changes in public opinion show one thing:
Unification and national integration is a highly complex process.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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