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Taipower’s corruption
should be investigated
By Wu Ching-chin 吳景欽
Following the increase in oil prices, Taiwan Power Co (Taipower) announced it
would raise the cost of electricity to mitigate heavy losses and reflect actual
costs. This move has drawn focus to the company’s business practices, in
particular to the excessively high costs of Taipower’s electricity outsourcing,
which is not only wasteful, but may also be corrupt.
However, the Agency Against Corruption (AAC), established to eliminate
corruption in the civil service, has remained curiously indifferent to the issue
in press statements and in testimony to legislative committees. This inaction is
at odds with its raison d’etre.
The civil service and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have their own government
ethics units, but the officers staffing them lack judicial status. Even if they
suspect corruption, their options are limited to passing the information to the
Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau, making it difficult to strike while
the iron is hot. This is why the AAC was established, and Item 2, Article 2 of
the Organic Act for the Agency Against Corruption (廉政署組織法) regards officials
investigating corruption as judicial police officers as defined in the Code of
Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法).
Judicial police are supervised by prosecutors. Nevertheless, item 2 in both
Article 230 and 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “The judicial
police officer ... who suspects that an offense has been committed shall
initiate an investigation immediately.” This is because prosecutors work under
the sole judge system and themselves lack the equipment and training needed to
conduct criminal investigations. It is the judicial police who are the front
line against corruption. This is why the Criminal Code empowers judicial police
to initiate a criminal investigation on their own without waiting for permission
from prosecutors.
According to the Criminal Code, the term “public official” means those “serving
in an organization of the state or a local autonomous body.” In July 1, 2006,
this definition was further qualified as being those also “empowered with legal
function and power.” Consequently, individuals operating SOEs are no longer
considered public officials. However, they are considered public officials under
the Government Procurement Act (政府採購法) if they have been outsourcing energy
provision, and therefore corruption on their part is open to investigation under
the Criminal Code or the Anti-Corruption Act (貪污治罪條例).
Accusations that Taipower’s losses resulted from dubious procurements remain
unsubstantiated. However, since the Criminal Code states that judicial police,
meaning AAC officers, who suspect criminal activity can investigate without
prior directives from prosecutors, it is in the AAC’s power to do so.
When the AAC was established last year, statements were made about how it would
coordinate efforts to prevent and eliminate civil service corruption, about how
prosecutors would be stationed there to direct AAC officers in their
investigations and ensure the consolidation of resources and concentration of
effort against corruption.
However, since its inception, the AAC has clashed with the Investigation Bureau
and been noticeably lax in collecting information about the waste of public
funds by SOEs, such as CPC Corp, Taiwan and Taipower, and slow to pursue any
allegations against them. Its behavior is a far cry from the original intentions
under which it was established.
In the meantime, the public, already struggling with consumer price hikes, has
no alternative but to continue straining under these increases and paying for
the huge losses accrued by these SOEs.
Wu Ching-chin is an assistant professor in the Department of Financial and
Economic Law at Aletheia University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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