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Political elite are
blind to fine line
By Yang Tai-shuenn 楊泰順
After the corruption scandal involving former Executive Yuan secretary-general
Lin Yi-shih (林益世) surfaced, there has been widespread criticism of President Ma
Ying-jeou (馬英九) for his lack of judgement in choosing officials. Apart from
expressing deep regret, Ma also said that he would learn from this lesson and
would be “more careful” when choosing officials in the future. However, not only
must government officials be chosen from a broader source to avoid complaints of
favoritism, government efficiency and future election strategies must also be
taken into consideration. Even if Ma is more careful, it will probably be
difficult to keep similar scandals from happening again.
In addition to Ma having taken notice of Lin’s performance, it is a well known
fact that another reason Lin was gifted such a high position after failing to
win a legislative seat was that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) wanted him
in a senior Cabinet post in the hope that he would be able to help the party
regain the Greater Kaohsiung mayoralty.
Maybe the expectation of further elections made Lin, holding the third-highest
position in the Cabinet, worry about campaign funding, and this lead to his
alleged misdeeds. Someone unable to maintain their moral integrity has only
themselves to blame, but the responsibility for this outcome also lies squarely
at the feet of the governing party, which uses official positions as part of its
re-election strategies.
Elections are a key component of a democratic system and since the allocation of
national resources must be managed by bureaucrats and political appointees, the
ability to stop them from using that power to manipulate elections determines
the quality of a democracy. A look at successful democracies shows that a thin
red line exists in an attempt to separate those in charge of election or party
duties from administrative officials on the other.
US democracy is notorious for its spoils sharing system, but the US constitution
prohibits members of Congress from taking on administrative office, which is
also better paid. In addition, Congress takes part in the government’s
decision-making and members of Congress have a high percentage of re-election.
These factors mean that politicians with established campaign experience seldom
choose to enter the administrative system. Among the few that do, hardly any
choose to once again take part in local elections. This separation ensures that
the administrative system gradually develops a system for appraising government
performance and enforcing administrative neutrality to diminish spoil sharing.
The UK Cabinet system merges administrative and legislative affairs, so anyone
who wants to become a Cabinet minister must first be elected to parliament. It
is hard to differentiate between election and administrative affairs, but after
many years of democratic experience, the main political parties have devised
strategies for separating party duties from administrative duties when it comes
to people’s promotions. When members of parliament are first elected, they are
supposed to choose a political direction based on their aspirations and
personality. Those who like making friends and forming close working
relationships with others normally choose to enter the party side of things and
establish themselves within their party, while those fond of researching and
writing laws and are good debaters normally choose to get into the
administrative side of things in the hope of entering the Cabinet in the future.
Once a choice has been made, there is very little contact between the two
groups.
The latter choice seems to be a position full of glory and honor, but ruling
political parties often change and a career in politics is a lonely and hard
path to negotiate. The former choice seems to involve working primarily for
other people’s advancement, but such people do not need to take responsibility
for policy making and they get to lead exciting lives, so both sides manage to
attract willing candidates.
Before the 1990s, the same division between electoral and administrative duties
existed in Taiwan. Because there were not full elections, most campaign experts
were concentrated in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. To satisfy local
operations, a large part of construction expenditures were delegated to the
provincial governments. This turned local provincial councilors nationwide into
faction leaders and legitimated the KMT’s rule. Having separated local election
pressures, the central government could promote experts and focus on policy
issues. Anyone elected to the legislature in a by-election either respected the
party line or was a high official who had changed tracks. This made it difficult
for them to affect policy and lowered the risk of policy manipulation. From a
democratic perspective this approach had some negative aspects, but it also
helped maintain policy quality.
The scrapping of Taiwan Province and the introduction of full legislative
elections eliminated this firewall. Unfortunately, a system for separating the
promotion of people into party or administrative affairs has failed to develop.
Due to intensified party competition, leaders from both main political parties
have tried to consolidate their hold on power by using the administrative system
as a platform for cultivating future election candidates. One wonders if the
worrying rise of local faction leaders to the halls of national government is
something Ma can solve simply by being “more careful.”
Yang Tai-shuenn is professor and chairperson of the Department of Political
Science at Chinese Culture University.
Translated by Drew Cameron
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