Chapter 21
 
 
美國的台海政策有譜


 

  美國以執行台灣關係法做為底線,在台灣統派人士亦對此稍無意見,獨派人士則以為有所不足。

  可是因應大環境的需要,如何讓台灣於大中國民族勢力的威嚇中,能夠生存,只有採彈性的兩面政策,美國如此,台灣亦如此。

  對彈性外交的阿扁政府,我勸急統急獨人士皆不必太激動,彼此發洩情緒,交互打罵,點到為止,亦是某些疏解身心的方式。

  美國之音有篇報導,大家可以參考。

90.04.05/中央社記者鍾行憲華盛頓五日專電

  美國之音電台今天報導,美國對台灣安全的關切以本月稍後美國出售先進武器給台灣的可能性,或許導致美國海軍偵察機與一架中共戰鬥機相撞事件引起的緊張氣氛。  

  這家表達美國政府政策的電台指出,為了評估台灣的防衛需求,美國一直在台灣海峽靠近中國大陸的一邊嚴密監視中國大陸的軍事情況。

  報導說,美國偵察機一直在監視人民解放軍在台灣對岸的大陸沿海地區加強軍備的情況。國防分析家表示,中共最近因而以更具侵略性的作法跟蹤美國的偵察機。

  保守派研究團體詹姆斯城基金會中國軍事問題專家費雪表示,中共殲八戰鬥機與美國EP-3偵察機擦撞,是美國關切台灣安全的直接結果,因為當時這架偵察機正在監視中共的一項海軍演習。

  費雪指出,此一監視的目標是要確定人民解放軍整合海、空軍與指揮管制系統的能力。「我們研究人民解放軍的人辯論的一點是,如果他們取得硬體,他們是否也獲得軟體來有效運用並且整合硬體。根據我的消息來源,EP-3偵察機集中注意的是軟體方面。」

  美國之音表示,費雪是在喬治城大學有關美國武器銷售台灣問題的一項會議中提出前述說法。

  另一位演講人,退役美國海軍少將麥利凱指出,中共當然希望阻止美國有效的蒐集它軍事作業的情報。

  這位前任駐北京武官認為,中共方面至少是間接認為,如果美國決定干預台海危機,這些偵察飛行會增加美國更有效採取行動的能力。

  因此,他說:「正如我們經常發現的,無論我們的想法如何,可能北京至少大部分人的想法是台灣在此是一個因素。」

  麥利凱表示,中共不可能故意挑起此一事件來影響美國即將作成的武器銷售台灣決定。但是他說,北京也許會試圖利用目前的情況來敦促華府拒絕將引起爭論最多的武器,特別是精密的神盾雷達系統賣給台灣。

  美國之音又說,中共駐華府武官龔祥福 (譯音) 少將原定在此一會議中講話,但是中共大使館表示目前的情況讓他無法出席或是另派代表參加此一會議。



  

  於紐約時報的報導中,亦透露一些真實的訊息,是好是壞,請大家以平常心待之。

90.04.08/中央社記者黃貞貞紐約八日專電

  紐約時報今天報導,不論撞機事件最後如何落幕,美國與中共正積極爭取對亞太地區的控制權,特別是對台灣前途的控制權;軍事專家認為中共的飛彈威脅對台灣民眾的心理影響至鉅。  

  報導指出,過去幾年中共仗恃經濟發展,大量擴增飛彈、戰機、潛艇及驅逐艦,其目的就是針對台灣,四月一日在海南島附近發生的撞機事件,就是北京提高在台灣海峽附近海空的軍事戰備而美國加強監控中共軍事設施的意外插曲。

  台灣空軍對中共軍力擴張的體會更為深刻,F十六戰機在巡防台灣海峽時,可能明顯感受到大陸蘇愷戰機和其它向俄羅斯採購的戰機的飛行架次最近增加許多。

  這篇發自台灣的報導說,中共不斷在台灣對岸沿海擴張軍力主要有二個目的,首先也是最重要的是施加政治壓力要台灣接受北京主權,同時想藉由增加美國軍事人員可能遭受的損傷,威脅美國不得協防台灣。

  中共從波斯灣戰爭得到的教訓是,如果北京認為需要動武,目的將是使用長程武器威嚇台灣投降,以低成本贏得決定性勝利,而且必須在華盛頓決定是否要冒險軍事干預前就迅速贏得勝利。

  台灣民進黨立法委員張旭成說,為了不破壞台灣的經濟或屠殺台灣民眾,中共不太可能對台灣發動全面武力攻擊,取而代之的是消滅台灣對抗的意志,然後再要求談判。

  根據美國官員的情報,中共在福建沿海的三個軍事基地佈署了約三百枚射程足以涵蓋台灣的CSS六型及CSS七型飛彈,台灣軍方的估計則至少有四百枚,飛彈瞄準的目標主要是台灣的雷達站、指揮所、加油站及電廠。中共已開始改進導航系統,增加武器的準確性。

  除了飛彈,中共有至少四千架戰機,機種多較為老舊,中共已自俄羅斯購買約五十架蘇愷二十七戰機,並計劃再買進二百架,目前已經部署十架蘇愷三十攻擊型戰機,計劃至少部署五十架。不過與台灣的飛行員相比,中共飛行員的素質明顯差許多。

  紐約時報認為,以中共目前的軍力,很難對台灣發動全面攻擊,即使是要實施嚴密的封鎖也不太可能,因為中共只有兩艘能夠載運油料與水的補給艦,也只有一艘艦艇能夠運送軍火,而要封鎖台灣的準備時間愈長,美國就有更多的時間干預。

  不過台灣的軍事專家擔心,中共的飛彈攻擊可能威脅台灣民眾,國防大學戰略研究所所長扶台興說,中共人民解放軍最擅長找敵人的弱點攻擊。

  他說,中共了解台灣缺乏有效的飛彈防禦能力,因此提高對台灣的飛彈威脅,「大陸飛彈對台灣的心理威脅高於軍事上的威脅,但是有時候,心理的威脅比軍事威脅威力更大」。

  為了延後美國可能派遣驅逐艦馳援台灣,中共向俄羅斯購買四艘基洛級潛艇,他們能以柴油引擎或電力發動,這使得他們行進時安靜無聲更難被偵測到。

  大陸並已買進俄羅斯製的現代級驅逐艦,艦上配有海面反艦飛彈,對台灣和美國是一大隱憂。不過中共在海面尋找長程目標的能力仍不足,現代級驅逐艦也無法防禦來自潛艇的攻擊。

  紐約時報說,事實上在亞洲地區,沒有人樂見發生戰爭,尤其是滿足於經濟成長的中國大陸。美國智庫蘭德研究中心研究員莫威倫說,中共解放軍最好的選擇就是不戰而勝,次好的選擇是以較少的軍事行動贏得勝仗,再次之的選擇是全面發動戰爭而能戰勝,最糟的是全面發動戰爭但卻無法打勝仗。這將代表台灣獨立,及北京政權的終止。

 

  在報導的最後提到最圓滿解決方法,在於中共的民主化,這種民主化只有在台灣足以抗衡中共軍事威脅的前題下,才能達成此一使命。茲登錄紐約時報的原文:

 

China Buildup Has Taiwan on Edge

April 8, 2001
By MICHAEL R.GORDON


  CHIAYI AIR BASE, Taiwan-The collision between an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet has focused attention on China's military buildup. But none of the pilots at this air base in southern Taiwan need any reminders.

  With the Chinese mainland just 100 miles away, Taiwan's F-16 fighter aircraft roar into the air to patrol the uneasy Taiwan Strait. Their Chinese counterparts, in turn, take to the air in SU-27's and other Russian-designed fighters.

  "We have a fuzzy peace," said the deputy commander of the F-16 squadron here, who asked to be identified only by his pilot's call sign, "Benson" Kao. "Recently, they have been flying a lot."

  China has steadily expanded its arsenal of missiles, aircraft, submarines and destroyers over the last several years as its economy has grown. Much of that buildup is aimed squarely at Taiwan. In fact, the midair collision near Hainan island arose in the context of Beijing's efforts to extend its reach in the air and seas around the Taiwan Strait and beyond, and the intensified American efforts to monitor the Chinese buildup.

  Whatever the outcome of the dispute over the collision, China and the United States are increasingly likely to jostle for dominance in the region, and in particular over Taiwan's fate.

  China has objected vociferously to the United States' sale of sophisticated weapons to Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province. The Bush administration is scheduled to decide on a package of arms sales later this month.

  President Bush, in his campaign for the White House, put Beijing on notice that the United States would come to Taiwan's assistance if it was attacked, going far beyond the ambiguous assurances made by previous presidents. "It's important for the Chinese to understand that if there's a military action, we will help Taiwan defend itself," Mr. Bush said.

  China's strategy behind its buildup along the Taiwan Strait is two-fold. First and foremost, it is a form of political pressure to compel Taiwan to accept Beijing's sovereignty. And it is also a way to frighten the United States from coming to Taiwan's aid by raising the specter of American casualties.

  But there is also a military strategy that draws on lessons China absorbed from the United States' success in the Persian Gulf war. If Beijing decided force was needed, the aim would be to use long-range weapons to shock Taiwan into submission and win decisively at a low cost. The victory also has to come quickly ?before Washington can decide whether it wants to take the risk of intervening militarily.

  "China would not try to destroy the economy or kill the population, and it is unlikely they would launch an all- out amphibious attack," said Parris H. Chang, a defense specialist and legislator in President Chen Shui- bian's Democratic Progressive Party. "They would try to destroy our will to resist and then call for negotiations."

  The centerpiece of China's new arsenal is its force of short-range ballistic missiles, which are at three bases in or near Fujian province along the Taiwan Strait: Yongan, Leping and the newest at Xianyou.

  American intelligence officials estimate that there are about 300 CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles, which have the range to blanket the island. Taiwanese military officials put the number of missiles higher, at 400 or more. The main targets would be Taiwan's radars, command posts, airfields, ports, fuel depots and power plants.

  The weapons, however, are very inaccurate and would do well to land 300 to 600 meters from their target. Still, the Chinese are beginning to incorporate improved guidance systems that rely on information from satellites.

  According to American intelligence, China only has about 50 mobile launchers, which limits the size of each salvo and could leave an hour or more between each. That could be enough time for Taiwan to repair its runways and keep its air force flying, assuming its military made the necessary but unglamorous investments in such maintenance programs.

  In addition to missiles, China has more than 4,000 warplanes. But few are modern fighters. China has acquired about 50 SU-27 fighters from the Russians and is planning to buy almost 200 more. It has also deployed about 10 SU-30 Russian-made attack planes and is expected to deploy as many as 50.

  But Chinese pilots have never practiced flying in formations greater than 20 planes, and in general China's pilots receive far less training than those in Taiwan, which also has a greater number of top-line fighters.

  Other military options are more problematic. China does not have a convincing capability to conduct an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's coastline is unsuitable for such a landing, and China has only enough military craft to move about 10,000 troops, far too few to seize the island.

  Nor would it be easy to mount an airtight blockade. China has only two supply vessels that can carry fuel and water to the ships that would be enforcing the quarantine, and only one ship that can transport munitions. And the longer a blockade takes to put in place, the more time the United States has to intervene.

  Still, Taiwan's military experts worry that a missile attack could frighten and demoralize the population while China's submarines and ships placed added pressure on the island by mining harbors.

  Tyson G. Fu, the director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Taiwan, said the Chinese People's Liberation Army was "good at finding its enemies' weak points and exploiting them."

  Aware that Taiwan lacks an effective missile defense, the Chinese are brandishing their missile threat. "China's missiles may be more of a psychological threat than a military one," Mr. Fu said, "but sometimes psychological threats can be more powerful."

  A senior Taiwanese official said the island's best hope would be to defend against China's first blows and hold out until the United States had time enough to decide to intervene ?perhaps several weeks.   

  Much of China's buildup, then, has been acquired with the intention of making the United States at least think twice about getting involved in a fight over Taiwan.

  To deter Washington from dispatching carrier battle groups to the region, China has bought four Russian Kilo-class submarines. The submarines can operate using their diesel engines or batteries, which makes them quiet and hard to detect.

  China has also bought two Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers. The ships are equipped with a sea-skimming antiship missile, a major worry for both Taiwan and the United States. But China has little capability to find targets at sea at long-range, and the Sovremenny destroyers have no real way to defend against submarines.

  While most analysts believe the United States Navy could decisively defeat the Chinese fleet, Beijing is calculating that the prospect of American casualties would temper Washington's commitment to Taiwan's security.

  Nobody in the region is eager for a war, least of all the Chinese, who are intent on developing their economy, absorbed with internal political struggles and hopeful of winning international acceptance by hosting the 2008 Olympics.

  "China has a political strategy toward Taiwan with a military component, not vice versa," said James Mulvenon of the Rand Corporation. "The best option for the Chinese military is to win without fighting. The second best is to win by brandishing the swords or with low levels of military activity. The next to worst option is to fight an all-out war and win, and the absolute worst is to fight a war and lose. That would mean de facto independence for Taiwan and the end of the regime in Beijing."

  Still, Beijing has not hesitated to rattle its sabers to press Taiwan to accept that it is part of China. During Taiwan's 1996 presidential election campaign, when China believed that the island was beginning to drift away politically, China fired missiles close to Taiwan's two major ports: the northern port of Keelung and the southern port of Kao-hsiung, where most of Taiwan's fleet is based. And many analysts believe that Beijing is prepared to attack Taiwan should it declare its independence.

  Taiwan's leaders say the island needs to have a credible military force and close ties to the United States to stand up to Beijing's pressure. An acceptable political arrangement leading to greater integration between the two sides may eventually be possible, they say, but not at the point of a gun and only if Beijing moves toward democracy.

  The result has been a slow-motion arms race as China buys arms from Russia and Taiwan seeks to counter by buying weapons from the United States. And as the United States' commitment to Taiwan's defense has become less unambiguous, Taiwan's leaders have begun to argue that Washington's credibility in the region is linked to Taiwan security.

  "There is no one-shot solution," said Pi-chao Chen, Taiwan's vice defense minister, of Taiwan's relations with China. "There is only an evolutionary process with an open-ended outcome. If we can succeed in deterring China from ever taking a punch, that will not only serve our interests. It will also serve the interest of China, Japan and America."