這裏有篇Los Angeles Times的文件，它說台灣雖然得到布希承諾，要賣傳統潛艇給台灣以保護台灣海峽，但是美國並不生產這種落伍的潛艇，故請德國、荷蘭代為製造，可是德、荷兩國信守一個中國，即全世界只有中華人民共和國，沒有中華民國，更因為此兩國投資巨資在大陸，並與中共達成商業上的互惠，故無法答應美國的要求代為興建潛艇，美國退而求其次，請此兩個國家，提供設計圖則可，其結果是NO，因為中共施放的壓力太大。所以台灣人賺大錢有何用？還是不能確保台灣安全。中共正吸光台資，台灣人以為中共會放台灣一馬，事實上，中共無所不用其極的打壓台灣，中共視台灣為所轄，吸光台灣資源就是滅台一途。
WASHINGTON -- Barely three months after taking office, President
Bush reversed three decades of American foreign policy in Asia by
opening the way for Taiwan to buy eight diesel submarines.
It was an impressive action, the centerpiece of a huge package of
new arms supplies that appeared to make good on Bush's campaign promise
to help Taiwan defend itself.
There
was one catch: There are no submarines to sell Taiwan. When the White
House made the announcement, the Bush administration had little or
no idea how it could carry through on its promise. Some of the information
on which the administration relied turns out to have been wrong.
And
ever since then, U.S. officials have been struggling to figure out
where Taiwan's submarines will come from.
"I
don't get any sense at all that in making this decision the administration
gamed it out in advance," said Jonathan Pollack, chairman of
strategic research at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I.
At stake are not only billions of dollars in defense contracts but
also the military balance between China and Taiwan. If Taiwan doesn't
get new submarines, the United States may have to come up with some
other way of helping the island nation to offset China's growing naval
power--or else face the prospect that China might be able to impose
a blockade on Taiwan's ports.
"The Department of Defense is looking at several different options"
for helping Taiwan obtain its submarines, Mary Ellen Countryman, the
White House spokeswoman for national security affairs, said Friday.
The story behind the nonexistent submarines shows what can happen
when major foreign policy decisions are made in a crisis atmosphere
and without careful planning.
The
problem, in a nutshell, is this: The United States hasn't manufactured
diesel submarines for decades--not since the 1950s, when the Navy,
under the prodding of Adm. Hyman Rickover, decided to rely exclusively
on nuclear submarines.
The United States produces nuclear subs but doesn't export them;
the Navy doesn't want U.S. technology spread around the world.
But the two countries that are the world's principal exporters of
diesel submarines, Germany and the Netherlands, refuse to build submarines
or even sell sub designs that will go to Taiwan. They are unwilling
to offend China, which considers Taiwan part of its own territory.
The Bush administration did not check with either the Germans or
the Dutch before its decision.
"We read about it in the newspapers," said Henrik Schuwer,
deputy chief of mission at the Dutch Embassy in Washington. "We
went in [to the administration] and said, 'What is this?' "
Hans Dieter Lucas, a spokesman for the German Embassy in Washington,
confirms that his government was left in the dark too. "There
were no talks whatsoever."
In the weeks since Bush's decision, his administration has been exploring
several scenarios to get Taiwan submarines, all of them problematic:
．Persuade
the Europeans. In theory, at least, the German or Dutch government
might reverse course and allow Taiwan to obtain their submarines,
perhaps under pressure from the Bush administration. Yet that would
require a major diplomatic campaign by the United States, one with
a high risk of failure.
．All-American Sub. The United States might design and build a new
diesel sub for Taiwan. But an American-designed sub would be considerably
more expensive and take longer to build than obtaining the off-the-shelf
European versions. Taiwan may balk at this more costly option.
．No Questions Asked. The U.S. government might simply contract with
an American defense company to build the submarines and leave it up
to the private company to obtain German or Dutch designs under the
table. But doing that could be illegal if the European governments
don't want the designs to go to Taiwan.
"My
sense is that they [the Bush administration] thought that there was
a chance the Dutch or the Germans might go along," said former
U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley, who served in the first Bush
administration. "Or that maybe we could do it on our own. Or
if that didn't work, maybe the problem would disappear."
"I have my doubts those submarines will ever be delivered,"
said Damon Bristow, an Asian defense specialist at the Royal United
Services Institute in London.
The following account is based in part upon interviews with seven
U.S. government officials who participated in the Bush administration's
meetings regarding the submarines. The officials spoke to a reporter
on condition they would not be identified by name.
Clandestine Submarines
In January, Bush and his new foreign policy team took office knowing
that they confronted a major decision within months about arms sales
to Taiwan.
Once a year, Taiwan military officials come to Washington with a
shopping list of defense items, and each April, the U.S. government
decides which weapons Taiwan will be allowed to buy. The United States
is Taiwan's leading supporter and its most dependable arms supplier.
Taiwan's
shopping list has included submarines since the 1970s. Year after
year, the requests were rejected on grounds that submarines were offensive
weapons and could fuel an arms race between Taiwan and China.
But
after China launched military exercises and fired ballistic missiles
into the waters near Taiwan on the eve of Taiwan's 1996 presidential
election, the climate in Washington began to shift.
For the first time in decades, the Pentagon was forced to take seriously
the prospect that it might have to help protect Taiwan against Chinese
attack. Military leaders began to reexamine the old assumptions that
China had neither the intent nor the ability to invade Taiwan.
A year ago, the Pentagon sent a survey team to study Taiwan's maritime
defenses. The team concluded that Taiwan could use considerable help--including
submarines.
Early this year, Chinese leaders seemed obsessed with the possibility
that the new administration might sell destroyers equipped with the
sophisticated Aegis radar system to Taiwan, a possible first step
toward including Taiwan in an American missile defense system.
The issue of submarines largely escaped China's notice, to the relief
of some Pentagon officials, who were eager to arrange for the sale
of subs "in a clandestine manner, so as not to alert Beijing
that this was an option," a Pentagon source said.
Then on April 1, just weeks before a decision on Taiwan's annual
weapon request, China downed a U.S. reconnaissance plane, setting
off Bush's first foreign policy crisis.
Amid the furor over the spy plane, approving the Aegis radar for
Taiwan was sure to inflame America's tense relations with Beijing.
But the administration also needed to show it was not caving in to
China either. Increasingly, U.S. officials spoke of the need for a
"robust" package of arms for Taiwan.
And so the administration settled on submarines as a middle ground.
The Pentagon had said Taiwan needed them, and China hadn't raised
the red flag about the subs as it had with the Aegis.
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told reporters that Bush had
approved the submarines and other weapon systems because of "the
threat that is posed to Taiwan by China."
As it turned out, it would have been easier for the U.S. to deliver
on a promise to provide the high-tech Aegis systems than to provide
a handful of diesel submarines.
The
Aegis technology is owned by American companies. Not so with the diesel
submarines. How would the United States arrange for Taiwan to obtain
these eight submarines? The Bush administration didn't have a plan
when the arms offer was presented to Taiwan in April. And it has no
plan today.
Bad Information
The first and most obvious solution was to have Taiwan buy the submarines
from Germany or the Netherlands.
But that approach has a stormy history. In 1981, Taiwan purchased
two diesel submarines from the Netherlands. They remain, to this day,
the only modern submarines Taiwan owns.
Furious,
China retaliated by downgrading its diplomatic relations with the
Netherlands. In 1984, the Dutch relented and signed a communique in
which the government promised not to sell Taiwan any more weaponry.
Germany now has a similar policy in effect.
Nonetheless, Bush administration officials still harbored hopes.
They had been told by U.S. defense contractors that the German or
Dutch companies might be able to turn around their governments.
According to one account that circulated through the administration,
Dutch firms were claiming in Washington that the Dutch government
couldn't control what they did.
Such claims were questionable. Schuwer, a senior Dutch diplomat,
points out that RDM Holding Inc., Holland's main submarine builder,
is 50% owned by the Dutch government.
"We [the Dutch government] are part-owner of the plant,"
Schuwer asserted in a recent interview. "So RDM can never give
or sell the [submarine] plans to the United States because the Dutch
government would have to give its consent, and the government won't
do that."
Within days after Bush's decision, Germany and the Netherlands both
reaffirmed in public that they would not permit their companies to
build Taiwan's submarines.
Buy American
The second possible solution was to have Taiwan's submarines built
in the United States.
Such an approach has weighty political support--above all from Sens.
Trent Lott and Thad Cochran of Mississippi, both Republicans, whose
state includes the Litton Ingalls Shipbuilding yards in Pascagoula.
"Ingalls is one of the best [shipbuilding firms] in the country,"
Cochran said. ". . . I think we can build [submarines] for Taiwan
if they need them. I hope if they choose to buy some ships, I hope
they'll buy them from us."
However, this option faces two obstacles: the resistance of the U.S.
Navy and the lack of U.S. submarine blueprints.
In the past, the Navy has been a powerful adversary blocking any
attempt to produce diesel submarines in the United States, even for
export.
Navy representatives argued that if diesel subs were exported, important
secrets--such as the quieting technology that makes U.S. subs hard
to detect--might be leaked and become available around the world.
But critics say the Navy has historically been motivated by another
factor too: an unwillingness to let American leaders compare diesel
subs, which cost about $300 million apiece, with the nuclear submarines
the Navy buys for about $2 billion each.
Nuclear
submarines can travel farther and stay under water longer than diesel
subs. For that reason, diesel submarines are useful primarily for
coastal defense and other short-range tasks. The Navy no longer operates
any diesel submarines; its last one, stationed at Subic Bay in the
Philippines, was taken out of service two decades ago.
"Their [the Navy's] real fear is that a member of Congress will
go aboard one of these diesel submarines and say, 'Hey, this costs
only $300 million, we should have a couple of these' " instead
of a pricier nuclear vessel, said Norman Polmar, an independent submarine
analyst. "They are afraid Congress will force the Navy to buy
some diesel submarines and take the money out of the nuclear program."
Any attempt to build a new all-American diesel sub would mean either
pulling out old blueprints that date to the 1950s or, more probably,
coming up with a new U.S. design.
"It would be more costly," said retired Adm. Michael McDevitt
of the Center for Naval Analyses. "God knows, we know how to
build submarines. We just haven't built that kind."
An
American-designed submarine also would take much longer to produce.
By the administration's estimates, Taiwan would have to wait eight
to 10 years to get a submarine newly designed in the United States.
Taiwan could get submarines in as little as five years if existing
Dutch or German blueprints are used.
And so administration officials have increasingly concentrated on
this hybrid possibility: that a U.S. company could build Taiwan's
submarines with designs licensed from the Germans or Dutch.
Recently, the United States arranged for two diesel submarines to
be built at the Pascagoula shipyard using a Dutch design. But these
subs are for Egypt, a country that doesn't carry nearly as much diplomatic
baggage as Taiwan. Neither Germany nor the Netherlands will allow
its sub designs to be used to build vessels for Taiwan.
"Any
applications for issuing licenses to allow submarine sales to Taiwan
will be rejected based upon Holland's 'one China' policy," Dutch
Foreign Minister Jozias van Aartsen told the Dutch parliament May
29. Van Aartsen said this policy applies to either "direct or
indirect" submarine sales to Taiwan.
License to Steal?
That raises the third possible solution--that somehow an American
company can find a roundabout way to build a diesel submarine based
on the Dutch or German designs, even though these European governments
haven't licensed the plans for use in Taiwan.
In other words, the U.S. government might simply ask an American
company to build Taiwan a submarine and not ask any questions about
where the design came from.
Getting
Taiwan a submarine "is going to involve some sleight of hand,"
said Larry M. Wortzel, director of the Asian studies center at the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington.
This option has been under serious consideration within the U.S.
government.
"Maybe industry could just do this. We could leave it in their
hands, and Berlin and Amsterdam wouldn't be involved at all,"
said a U.S. official who has taken part in the intragovernment discussions.
Under this scenario, an American company might get blueprints from
a third country--that is, one of the many other nations that have
bought German or Dutch diesel submarines.
In such a transaction, whoever gives those designs to the United
States might not even know that the submarines would go to Taiwan.
That way, said one U.S. official, the Germans or Dutch and the third
country "would have plausible deniability."
Such an arrangement could prove to be of questionable legality.
In cases involving blueprints or other proprietary technology, "the
options are that you own it, you license it or you steal it--and we
have laws against stealing," noted Lucinda Low, a Washington
lawyer who is a former chairman of the American Bar Assn.'s section
on international law.
There are two U.S. companies likely to be involved in building submarines
for Taiwan.
One is Northrop Grumman Corp., which recently purchased the Litton
Ingalls shipyards in Pascagoula. The other is Lockheed Martin Corp.,
which sells advanced electronics systems used on submarines.
Both companies make clear they would be eager to work on submarines
for Taiwan. Spokesmen for both companies emphasize, though, that the
decision is in the hands of the Bush administration.
"Lockheed Martin would certainly welcome the opportunity to
be the systems integrator for any diesel-powered submarine the Taiwan
government may decide to buy," said Tom Jurkowsky, the company's
vice president for communications.
"We stand prepared to help in any way we can," said Randy
Belote, a spokesman for Northrop Grumman.
In a statement about the possibility of a Taiwan sale, Northrop Grumman
pointedly noted that its Litton Ingalls shipyard "has, in the
past, had business relationships with both the Dutch and German submarine
designers."
When
reminded that the Dutch and Germans have said again this year they
will not let their designs be used for Taiwan, Northrop Grumman's
Belote questioned whether the European opposition is the final word.
"They [the Dutch and Germans] have said that," Belote answered.
"But how serious is that?"
The Bush administration consulted with Northrop Grumman executives
in the weeks leading up to its submarine decision, Belote said.
Asked
whether Northrop Grumman might go along with a scenario in which the
Dutch or German designs might be used without any license, Belote
sidestepped the question: "I really don't know. . . . I can't
imagine the U.S. government would get involved in a situation where
it would bypass the will of another government."
Jurkowsky said this licensing issue won't arise with Lockheed Martin
because it won't serve as the prime American contractor for Taiwan's
submarines. It will merely supply the electronics systems put on submarines
that some other company will build.
Some within the U.S. government make it clear they would be eager
to help out American industry and to please Mississippi's two powerful
senators, if they can.
"Whatever option [for building Taiwan's submarines] is decided
upon, something's going to happen in Mississippi--I feel certain about
that," quipped a Pentagon official.
Slow Going
Bush's decision has so far had one tangible result.
Bowing
to the Bush administration's desire to help Taiwan and to the political
and commercial pressures, the Navy has shifted ground. In public statements,
the Navy now says it is willing to countenance the possibility that
diesel submarines will be made in this country for export.
"While the U.S. Navy does not have a requirement for diesel
submarines, we do not object to U.S. industry participation in the
diesel submarine market," said Lt. Cmdr. Cate Mueller, a Navy
spokeswoman.
The change is not just one of public relations. Inside the U.S. government
too, the Navy has changed its tune.
"The Navy is on board now," asserted one surprised U.S.
official a few weeks after Bush's announcement. "It seems a decision
has been made to be supportive."
During the nearly three months since Bush approved the submarine
sale, his administration has held a flurry of meetings to work out
where and how they will be produced. But there is no solution yet.
"This is going very slowly," admitted one administration
participant. "I can tell you the ball hasn't moved very far since
April."
Already, there are signs Taiwan and some of its Washington supporters
are becoming impatient.
"It seems apparent that while the offer [of submarines] was
made in April, there's been insufficient follow-through," said
Gerald Warburg, a lobbyist for Taiwan from Cassidy & Associates
Inc.
The
obstacles remain so formidable that some skeptics have wondered whether
Bush's April announcement was a political ploy--an action that would
dramatize American support for Taiwan but would never be put into
effect.
"I hope this was not a cynical operation [by the Bush administration].
It's not clear how this whole thing is going to happen," said
William S. Triplett, a conservative Republican Senate aide who identifies
himself as a member of a "blue team" of congressional staff
members who favor tougher policies toward China.
Those who favor a strong U.S. relationship with Beijing similarly
voice doubt about the prospects for Taiwan's submarines.
"I just right now don't see how that's going to occur,"
said former U.S. Ambassador to China Joseph Prueher, who resigned
in April.
"What we did was to please both Taipei and Beijing," asserted
Eric McVadon, a former U.S. military attache in China. "We promised
the submarines to Taipei, and Beijing knows they will never be built."
The Bush administration insists that such claims are off base--that
Taiwan's submarines will eventually be delivered.
"We didn't intend for this to be a cosmic joke," said one
State Department official. "We intend for this to happen--but
how, that hasn't been decided yet."
