Pakistani Taliban
supporters hold posters of Osama bin Laden at an anti-U.S. rally
in Peshawar on Oct. 29
The Age Of Muslim Wars
Battlegrounds:
An outburst of violence is sweeping across the world. What are
its root causes—and will they erupt into a full-scale global
conflict? The makings of a possible ‘clash of civilizations’
are present
By
Samuel P. Huntington
NEWSWEEK
Jan. 2002 — Contemporary global
politics is the age of Muslim wars. Muslims fight each other
and fight non-Muslims far more often than do peoples of other
civilizations. Muslim wars have replaced the cold war as the
principal form of international conflict. These wars include
wars of terrorism, guerrilla wars, civil wars and interstate
conflicts. These instances of Muslim violence could congeal
into one major clash of civilizations between Islam and the
West or between Islam and the Rest. That, however, is not inevitable,
and it is more likely that violence involving Muslims will remain
dispersed, varied and frequent.
THE AGE OF Muslim wars began as
the cold war was winding down in the 1980s. In 1980 Iraq invaded
Iran, and the ensuing war produced at least 500,000 deaths and
hundreds of thousands of wounded. At the same time, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan generated vigorous Afghan resistance,
which by 1989 compelled the Soviets to withdraw. This victory
was made possible by American technology, Saudi and American
money, Pakistani support and training, and the participation
of thousands of fighters from other, mostly Arab, Muslim countries.
Then in 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait,
and the United States organized an international coalition,
including several Muslim countries, to defeat him.
Muslims fight each other and fight non-Muslims far more often
than do peoples of other civilizations.
In the 1990s violence occurred between Muslims and non-Muslims
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Kashmir, India, the Phil-ippines, Indonesia, the Middle East,
Sudan and Nigeria. Mujahedin fighters from the Afghanistan war
were central participants in many of these conflicts as well
as in Muslim terrorist organizations in countries throughout
the world. In the mid-1990s, roughly half the ethnic conflicts
in the world involved Muslims fighting each other or non-Muslims.
In one inventory by The Economist, Muslims were responsible
for 11 and possibly 12 of 16 major acts of international terrorism
between 1983 and 2000. Five of the seven states listed by the
U.S. State Department as supporting terrorism are Muslim, as
are a majority of foreign organizations listed as engaged in
terrorism. In counteractions between 1980 and 1995, the U.S.
armed forces engaged in 17 military operations against Muslims.
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
32 armed conflicts were underway in 2000; more than two thirds
involved Muslims. Yet Muslims are only about one fifth of the
world’s population.
MUSLIMS AGINST THE U.S.
The “new war,” as administration officials termed the violence
that began September 11, is thus not so new. It is a continuation
and escalation of previous patterns of violence involving Muslims.
Earlier Muslim terrorism had, however, been sporadic and in
comparison relatively limited: 299 people killed in the 1983
attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, 270 on Pan Am
Flight 103 in 1988, 224 in the 1998 attacks on U.S. African
embassies. Different Muslim groups and states were involved
in these incidents. Beginning in 1993, however, the principal
attacks on Americans and American facilities all appear to have
originated with Osama bin Laden. September 11 revealed the existence
of his sizable global terrorist network with cells in perhaps
40 countries and with the expertise and resources to attempt
well-planned simultaneous attacks. Also for the first time,
the network struck with devastating effect within the United
States, its actions highlighting the likelihood of chemical
and biological attacks, with the more distant possibility of
nuclear weapons. The age of Muslim wars had come home to America.
Responsibility for particular wars undoubtedly varies, with
the Sudanese government responsible for its ongoing war against
Christians and the Israeli government provoking the second intifada
with its settlements and ongoing military presence in the West
Bank and Gaza. Overall, however, the age of Muslim wars has
its roots in more general causes. These do not include the inherent
nature of Islamic doctrine and beliefs, which, like those of
Christianity, adherents can use to justify peace or war as they
wish. The causes of contemporary Muslim wars lie in politics,
not seventh-century religious doctrines.
THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CONSCIOUSNESS
First, one of
the most significant social, cultural and political developments
in the past several decades has been the resurgence of Islamic
consciousness, movements and identity among Muslim peoples almost
everywhere. This Islamic resurgence is in large part a response
to modernization and globalization and is highly constructive
in many ways. Islamist organizations have
moved in to meet the needs of the growing numbers of urban Muslims
by providing social support, moral guidance, welfare, health
services, education, unemployment relief—all services that Muslim
governments often do not provide. In addition, in many Muslim
societies, Islamists are the principal op-position to highly
repressive governments. The Islamic resurgence has also spawned
a small number of extremists who supply the recruits for terrorism
and guerrilla wars against non-Muslims.
Second, throughout the Muslim world,
and particularly among Arabs, there exists a great sense of
grievance, resentment, envy and hostility toward the West and
its wealth, power and culture. This is in part a
result of Western imperialism and domination of the Muslim world
for much of the 20th century. It is also in part the result
of particular Western policies, including American action against
Iraq since 1991 and the continuing close relationship between
the United States and Israel. It is, more broadly, a reaction
of Muslim peoples to their own corrupt, ineffective and repressive
governments and the Western governments they see supporting
those regimes.
Third, tribal, religious, ethnic, political
and cultural divisions within the Muslim world stimulate violence
between Muslims. They also promote violence between
Muslims and non-Muslims because different Muslim groups and
governments, such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran, compete
with each other in promoting their own brand of Islam and have
supported Muslim groups fighting non-Muslims from Bosnia to
the Philippines. If one or two states dominated the Muslim world,
which has not been the case since the end of the Ottoman Empire,
less violence would occur among Muslims and, probably, between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
Fourth, the Islamic resurgence has coincided with and been invigorated
by high birthrates in most Muslim societies, which have produced
a “youth bulge” with large numbers of people between the ages
of 16 and 30. Males in this age cohort often have secondary,
technical or higher education, are in large part unemployed
and hence migrate to the West, join fundamentalist organizations
and political parties, and in small numbers enlist in Muslim
guerrilla groups and terrorist networks. Young males are the
principal perpetrators of violence in all societies; they exist
in overabundant numbers in Muslim societies.
CIVILIZATIONAL WAR?
These factors are among the sources of the widespread violence
involving Muslims. To date, that violence has been largely localized,
limited and dispersed. Could it evolve into a major violent
civilizational war between Islam and the West and possibly other
civilizations? This is clearly the goal of Osama bin Laden.
He declared holy war on the United States, enjoined Muslims
to kill Americans indiscriminately and vigorously attempted
to mobilize Muslims everywhere for his jihad. He has not succeeded
in this effort, in part because of the many divisions within
Islam. The United States, on the other hand, has declared a
global war on terrorism, but in fact there are many wars by
different governments against different terrorist groups. The
United States is primarily concerned with Al Qaeda; other governments
are concerned with their own local terrorists.
The makings of a general clash of civilizations exist. Reactions
to September 11 and the American response were strictly along
civilizational lines. The governments and peoples of Western
countries were overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive, making
commitments to join with the United States in the war on terrorism.
This was particularly true of Britain, Canada and Australia,
societies that share a common Anglo culture with Americans,
and they quickly committed military forces to this effort. Strong
support was also manifested among Germans, French and other
European peoples, who staunchly identified themselves with America
and its cause. They saw the attacks on America as attacks on
themselves, a view epitomized in the famous Le Monde headline
WE ARE ALL AMERICANS! and the declaration of Berliners, echoing
President Kennedy, “We are New Yorkers.” The leading countries
of non-Western, non-Muslim civilizations—Russia, China, India,
Japan—reacted with modulated expressions of sympathy and support.
Almost all Muslim governments condemned the terrorist attacks,
undoubtedly concerned with the threat Muslim extremist groups
posed to their own authoritarian regimes. Only Uzbekistan, Pakistan
and Turkey, however, provided direct support to the American
response, and among major Arab governments only Jordan and Egypt
endorsed that response. In most Muslim countries, many people
condemned the terrorist attacks, a small number explicitly endorsed
the attacks and huge numbers denounced the American response.
The longer and the more intensely the United States and its
allies use military force against their opponents, the more
widespread and intense will be the Muslim reaction. September
11 produced Western unity; a prolonged response to September
11 could produce Muslim unity.
The age of Muslim wars will end when its causes change or are
changed. With the succession of generations, the intensity of
Islamic consciousness may decline, as it clearly has in Iran.
The resentment and hostility of Muslims toward the West could
be reduced by changes in U.S. policies toward Israel. In the
longer run, however, improvements in the social, economic and
political conditions in Muslim countries would be necessary.
Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and economic
needs of their peoples and suppress their liberties generate
violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments
that support them. So also do non-Muslim governments, like those
of Russia, India and Israel, that attempt to control Muslim
populations who prefer to be misruled by their own kind. While
the disunity within Islam seems unlikely to abate significantly
in the coming years, the demographic prospects are more optimistic.
Birthrates in many Muslim countries have been going down, in
the Balkans quite dramatically, but in some Muslim societies,
including Saudi Arabia, they remain high. By the 2020s, however,
the Muslim youth bulge will be shrinking. Conceivably, then,
the age of Muslim wars could fade into history and be succeeded
by a new era dominated by other forms of violence among the
world’s peoples.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Huntington is Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor
at Harvard and author of “The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order.”
