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Cabinet
on June 09, 2004 Cabinet
dismisses missile proposal TRAP
BY BEIJING: A report that China is willing to withdraw its missiles targeting
this country in exchange for a halt in US arms sales to Taiwan was rejected as a
ploy
"Instead of using the media to spread rumors, why don't they sit down
and talk with us about how to develop a military trust mechanism and how to
create a peaceful and stable environment across the Strait," Cabinet
Spokesman Chen Chi-mai said. Chen made the remark in response to a report in the pro-China Hong Kong
newspaper Wen Wei Po that claimed Beijing would consider withdrawing
ballistic missiles deployed along its southeast coast if the US government stops
selling advanced weapons to Taiwan. Dubbing the media report as hearsay, Chen said China would never withdraw
its missiles. "I'd like to point out that China has made double-digit increases in
its military budget every year since 1995, which seriously threatens security
across the Taiwan Strait," he said. "Take last year for example; its
military expenses were recorded at between US$50 billion and NT$70
billion." Taiwan, on the other hand, has been cutting military spending. Military
expenditures accounted for 24.3 percent of the total budget in 1994. They
accounted for only 16.5 percent last year. The Cabinet has requested NT$251.9
billion, or 15.6 percent of next year's annual budget, for national defense. Commenting on the media report, Minister of National Defense Lee Jye and
National Security Council Secretary-General Chiou I-jen said it would be of
little meaning to withdraw the missiles because they can be relocated elsewhere
and then brought back again. Also dismissing the proposal, Vice Minister of National Defense Huo
Shou-yeh said the media report sounded "unreliable" and the move to
withdraw mobile missiles was "meaningless." Huo made the remark in response to a media inquiry about the Wen Wei Po
report yesterday morning after briefing independent lawmakers on the planned
NT$614.1 billion (US$18.4 billion) special budget for arms purchases from the
US. The bill is awaiting approval by the legislature. The money is to be spent over the next 15 years, with NT$412 billion
earmarked for eight diesel-electric submarines, NT$145 billion for six Patriot
anti-missile systems and NT$53 billion for 12 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft. Defense ministry spokesman Major-General Huang Suei-sheng said China
pulling back its missiles along the coast would be meaningless since it has
long-range missiles located elsewhere and is developing its armed forces. "As long as China does not give up the intention to launch a military
assault against Taiwan, we should be on high alert," Huang said. "It's
just another of China's tricks to prevent the US government from selling arms to
us." Lu
gets rough ride over plan to alter name of country By
Lin Chieh-yu
Lu said yesterday her desire to resolve political disputes was behind the
suggestion and that the idea had nothing to do with amending the Constitution. "The reason I made the suggestion to call our country `Taiwan ROC' is
because I am concerned about the severe confrontations between the pan-green and
pan-blue camps. This political chaos stems from the issue of different national
identification among political forces, not ethnic conflict," Lu said in a
statement issued by the Presidential Office yesterday. "Everyone in the country now recognizes `Taiwan awareness' and `love
Taiwan.' The major problem is that some people in the country put their entire
lives into following the name `Republic of China,' while others put their faith
in the name `Taiwan,'" she said. "Therefore, I suggested that both
sides make concessions and call our country `Taiwan ROC,' which is aimed at
facilitating harmony and the union of all Taiwanese people." Lu stressed that her suggestion was not related to amending the
Constitution, which would be required to change the country's official name, and
that she supports President Chen Shui-bian on the constitutional reform issue. Criticism of her suggestion came from across party lines. Pan-blue and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) legislators as well as academics
from the US said Lu's remark did nothing to eliminate political disputes and
served only to make things more complicated. "Less than a month after Chen promised that the upcoming
constitutional re-engineering project would not touch on the issues of
sovereignty, independence or territory, Lu can't wait to destroy Chen's
credibility," said Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus leader Huang Teh-fu
. The Presidential Office originally refused to comment on Lu's remark,
saying it wasn't necessary to react to the vice president's "personal
opinion," but later issued a statement to address criticism by opposition
politicians. The statement said Chen clearly defined the substance of constitutional reform in his inauguration speech and that further remarks would not alter his plan. EU-style
integration offers hope By
David Huang In his recent
inauguration speech, President Chen Shui-bian noted that "regional
integration is not merely an ongoing but also a future trend." After
heaping praises on the EU's achievement in regional integration, Chen continued
to call on China to create an environment based on "peaceful development
and freedom of choice" together with Taiwan, and expressed willingness to
resume cross-strait dialogue to establish a dynamic yet stable framework for
peace. In this context, we can surmise that Chen's goal for his second term is
to replace the "one China" principle with the EU's framework of
regional integration. Chen's proposal for political integration is reminiscent of his 2001 New
Year's speech that sparked discussions on the EU model, which represents a
functional integration without political unification. At that time, China
insisted on its "one China" principle and rejected the EU's
integration model. In my opinion, if the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait can recognize the logic behind the EU integration and weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of alternatives to the current situation, they will
realize that only integration offers a path to peace. The logic behind the EU has never been a natural integration driven by
market economies. Instead, the EU's integration has involved a project of
precise political engineering. Not entirely economic, the EU's initial incentive
was to circumvent war in Europe. We can even boldly posit that economic and
market integration is merely an EU side effect rather than its original intent.
If the two sides of the Strait attempt to settle or waive the sovereignty
dispute via economic integration, this approach, though well-intended, would be
fruitless and premature. One thing needs to be made clear -- it is on the basis of creating a
political alliance that the EU member states have chosen to push forward toward
economic cooperation (such as cooperation in the coal and steel industries).
Despite occasional discord over issues of sovereignty, the EU member states have
never denied each other's sovereignty. In contrast to EU members' mutual
recognition, China pursues reunification while refusing to acknowledge Taiwan's
sovereignty, while Taiwan seeks independence and renounces the former regime's
claim to China. Given these tensions, the EU model is inapplicable. For example, one of China's strategies is using economic integration to
pressure Taiwan for political unification. On the economic front, this strategy
is effective insofar as economic exchanges have continued to increase over the
past decade. On the political front, however, cross-strait antagonism has only
escalated, as Taiwan's outflow of capital and companies to China may also carry
away the nation's pro-China voice. In addition, saber-rattling across the strait means the animosity between
Taiwan and China is unlikely to flag. China has resorted to military
intimidation, yet the threats of force against and the diplomatic blockade of
Taiwan only drive the Taiwanese further away from China. The reason for China's miscalculation is that it has overlooked the
divergence between economic integration and political unification. All EU member
states strive toward achieving a European Gemeinschaft without
anticipating a particular political framework such as a federation,
confederation or European commonwealth. Within the framework of integration, the EU's member states do not exclude
any ultimate form of political union. In theory, a member state can opt out of
the EU at any time, reverting to its status as a sovereign nation outside of the
EU framework. By contrast, the "one China" framework tries to limit the range
of uncertain cross-strait interactions by imposing a predetermined outcome. No
matter how both sides respectively make their interpretations, the "one
China" principle means that Taiwan belongs to one "China," and
the ultimate form of this "China" might well be the People's Republic
of China. Even if there may be other ultimate forms, the "one China"
principle preemptively excludes the possibility of Taiwan not being part of
China in its ultimate form. The problem is that any framework implying an ultimate form may be
unilaterally vetoed by China or Taiwan. For instance, China will not accept a
commonwealth or confederation, since both entities presuppose that members are
sovereign countries. On the other hand, Taiwan will find it extremely difficult
to agree to "one country, two systems" or to a federation, because
these models presume that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to China. Another example is the "interim agreement" the US suggested in
1999. Although such an agreement would allow the deferral of a showdown on
sovereignty and could temporarily stabilize the cross-strait situation, the
shadow of "one China" is still there. Therefore, there is little
incentive for Taiwan to participate in such an arrangement. Unless either side
is willing to concede its position on this sovereignty issue, any ultimate
framework for cross-strait interactions is unfeasible. Are both sides willing to accept a quasi-EU model of integration? If the
two sides fully understand how the EU's framework of integration operates, then
this integration could be a win-win strategy. To put it simply, the EU's mechanism is based on a direction toward
integration. The direction is further consolidated by an interlocked system of
"path dependency" while an uncertainty about the final outcome is
maintained. This is why the UK and Denmark did not opt to break away from the
path of European integration even when they were dissatisfied with the EU's pace
of integration. But theoretically, the UK and Denmark retain the power of sovereign states
to drop out of the EU. Yet the cost of withdrawal is high, so the probability of
such a move is therefore small. Similarly, a framework of cross-strait integration is acceptable for China,
since it means the direction toward unification is set unambiguously. Also, as
the institutions and policies of the two sides grow more interwoven, either side
wanting to pull out from the integration framework will have to pay a formidable
price. Therefore, once Taiwan enters a cross-strait integration framework, the
possibility that the country will declare independence will decrease. Unless China wants to seek immediate unification by way of war, the
integration framework would be a worthwhile objective for China to pursue. The
integration framework is also acceptable to Taiwan because the final outcome of
the integration remains uncertain, even though the direction toward integration
is set. Once the direction is set, the irrational threats from Chinese
nationalism will be weakened. Moreover, because the results of integration are
uncertain, the two sides may avoid any immediate showdown on the sovereignty
issue. But why should China accept an uncertain integration outcome? The answer is
that the direction of integration usually limits the range of forms the
integration will ultimately take. Then why should Taiwan accept integration,
knowing it will make the country increasingly dependent and eventually lead to
unification? Apart from the potential benefits of economic integration, the
integration process presupposes that Taiwan's sovereignty is robust, and
integration is a process of pooling sovereignty. Therefore, once the integration process begins, China will have admitted
that Taiwan has a certain form of sovereignty or autonomy. Taiwan will thereby
naturally have the right to drop out of the integration process at any time,
even though the likelihood of such a move is extremely low. Hence the two sides can immediately activate a systematic integration
framework and establish a clear direction in exchange for an uncertain outcome.
Otherwise, as we sit idly watching the current impasse periodically worsen, due
to Taiwan's elections and China's internal power struggle, and the two
countries' identities drift further apart, we may be forced to greet each other
on the battlefield and launch a unification or independence war. If the leaders of the two sides are genuine in saying "never give up
peace easily if there is still hope for peace," why don't they give the
integration framework a try? David Huang is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica. UN
ignores Tibet genocide Having failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda, and having stood aside as
genocide was committed in Srebrenica, one would think the UN would have learned
its lesson. Apparently not so. Mired in hopeless political fantasy, the UN is
utterly incapable of protecting the world's besieged. Right now in Sudan, Muslim extremists attempting to eradicate the
indigenous black Africans in the western Darfur region are butchering tens of
thousands of people. The UN will not speak out, it will not act. It cannot. It
is a weak and toothless old fool. But there is also genocide that has literally been going on for decades.
The fact that genocide is being committed in Tibet every day by the Chinese
Communist government is indisputable. China has for 40 years been engaged in a
relentless program to destroy the Tibetan people, their culture and religion.
Little or nothing has been done about it, particularly by the ever-impotent UN. Today, even if a national leader attempts to meet with the Dalai Lama,
there is an uproar from the cowards in Beijing. Whether Tibet is an independent
nation (as many believe it is) or a province of China (as the imperialistic
Chinese Communists would have the world believe), Beijing's intent is to erase
Tibetan culture in a policy of "ethnic cleansing" masquerading as
Beijing's "economic reform" of Tibet. The cowardice of the Communists is apparent. How truly timid and insecure
they are to fear monks and a child. Fearful of Tibetan culture, fearful of
Taiwan nationalism, fearful of Hong Kong democracy, fearful of the truth, of
information, and of another political party. The Chinese Communists resemble
hyenas, tails between legs, growling on the sidelines, fearful and ignorant. As long as the world is content to make money in China and ignore its human
rights violations and the commission of genocide, China will thumb its nose at
the UN. But appeasement is dangerous. The power of knowing they can simply
destroy a people while the world checks its wallet will only encourage the
Chinese Communists to pursue other plans of aggression. Who will speak out against this genocide? There isn't much time. The voice
of Tibetan culture is now merely a rasp in the wind, its colorful history merely
a shadow of the past. Before long, we will hear nothing of Tibet save another UN
report on its failure to stop another genocide, with mea culpas from [UN
Secretary-General] Kofi Annan and company. What a record of sorrow. What
tragedy. What is next? Taiwan? Hong Kong? Japan? Lee
Long-hwa United States How
Reagan helped Taiwan Regardless of how the
international community assesses the political life of former US president
Ronald Reagan, for the people of Taiwan, his contributions during his eight
years in office far outweigh his deficits. His policy that the Taiwan Relations
Act was the only foundation on which the cross-strait political problem could be
resolved swept away the shadows that had been gathering over Taiwan after then
president Jimmy Carter broke off diplomatic relations in January 1979. Reagan
helped Taiwan recover its confidence after that crisis in Taiwan-US relations. In his dealings with Taiwan and China, Reagan's biggest mistake was to
follow the advice of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who advocated the
erroneous policy of sacrificing Taiwan and joining with China to contain the
Soviet Union during the early stages of the first Reagan administration. During
a visit to China in August 1982, the Joint Communique of August 17 was signed,
in which the US promised to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. Fortunately,
Haig resigned some months later and the Reagan government took measures to
redress the damage done, issuing Reagan's "six assurances" the
following year, in which the US stated that it would not set a date for
termination of arms sales to Taiwan, not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations
Act, not alter its position about Taiwan's sovereignty, not recognize Chinese
sovereignty over Taiwan, not consult with China over arms sales to Taiwan and
not act as a mediator between Taiwan and China. The "six assurances" were historically significant as they marked
the first time the US made a policy announcement based on the Taiwan Relations
Act. In dealings between Taiwan, the US and China, this statement provided
substantial and clear guidance to subsequent US administrations and opened the
way for the US to send its navy to patrol the Taiwan Strait. With the guarantees
that this policy provided, Taiwan's military situation improved enormously, and
the nation continues to benefit from these guarantees. When some call Reagan the
"guardian of Taiwan," they are not exaggerating. We cannot say that Reagan made direct or obvious contributions to promote
Taiwan's democratic reforms. But he stabilized the cross-strait situation, and
therefore gained precious time and space for Taiwan's democratic movement to
develop. During Reagan's presidency from 1981 to 1989, activists bravely established
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) -- the first opposition party in Taiwan's
history -- even as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government led by then
president Chiang Ching-kuo made mistake after mistake in trying to suppress
democracy, even going so far as to send gangsters to California in 1984 to
assassinate writer Henry Liu , who had written critically of him. The DPP forced
Chiang to tacitly recognize the party's existence, and this was a turning point
for Taiwanese, who had endured almost 40 years of oppression under martial law.
Finally, this vicious law that deprived the Taiwanese people of their freedoms
of speech, publication, assembly and association was lifted in July 1987. In
1988, the ban on newspapers also was lifted. The Reagan administration helped to provide a stable external environment
for Taiwan, helping the Taiwanese people stand up again after the repression
surrounding the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. Taiwan's democracy activists were able
to change the destiny of the people, eventually allowing the nation to cast off
an autocratic regime and join the ranks of the world's democratic countries.
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