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US
security on July 05, 2004 US
security commission keeps dodging `one China' issue POLICY:
Almost everyone in Washington now recognizes that Taiwan is, and has been, a
separate entity from China. Yet official US policy is at odds with that reality When the prestigious
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission recently suggested that
Washington "conduct a fresh assessment of the `one China' policy" in
view of changes over the past several years on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,
the commission said little about what was on its mind. Chairman Roger Robinson said the commission was not advocating a wholesale
change in the policy or a recognition of Taiwan as a de jure independent state.
But neither he nor the panel's annual report to Congress laid out in what way
the group envisioned changes to the "one China" policy. The reason is that the commission members who wrote the report were
fundamentally split on the "one China" issue with some personally in
favor of all-out recognition of Taiwanese independence, others taking a
diametrically opposed stance and yet others urging caution. "There was a big argument of how to phrase every paragraph," one
commission member said. In favor of a major change in the policy were Robinson, commission vice
chairman Richard D'Amato, University of Miami professor June Dreyer and, to a
lesser extent, former House Democratic aide Michael Wessel, according to
commission sources. On the other end of the spectrum was former US Commerce Department trade
official Patrick Mulloy, who wrote a separate opinion defending the existing
"one China" policy and arguing that the US does not have a legal
obligation to defend Taiwan militarily. The commission made three specific recommendations: that the "one
China" policy be reviewed for its "successes, failures and continued
viability," that the US' defense coordination with Taiwan be reviewed, and
that ways be found to help Taiwan break out of its China-imposed international
isolation. It also urged the administration to unlock any secret assurances made to
China and Taiwan over the years that could bear on the review, and that the US
find ways to promote cross-strait dialogue. More importantly, the report served to raise the visibility of a "one
China" issue that many in Washington have wrestled with in recent years,
especially since the back-to-back elections of President Chen Shui-bian and the
increasing military buildup across the Strait. All but the most myopic supporters of China in this city now recognize that
Taiwan is, and has been, a separate entity from China. Yet official US policy is
at odds with that reality, and as democracy advances in Taiwan under the
Democratic Progressive Party, it becomes harder and harder to justify that
difference. But, from all appearances, many in the Bush administration and in
Congress are trying to bridge those gaps. When pressed to define the "one China" policy, most
administration officials just come up with imprecise aphorisms. The policy "does not mean that Taiwan is part of China. It is simply a
bumper sticker that we use to assuage Chinese sensibilities while at the same
time cautioning them that we don't accept Taiwan as part of China," one
senior administration official has been quoted as saying. The "one China" policy "is a means, not an end. It is a
tool, not a condition, not an existing state," another official said. When Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly was asked at a congressional
hearing this spring what the "one China" policy was, he said only what
it was not, that is, China's version of the principle. He described the policy
as an expression of "solidarity" between the people of the US and
Taiwan. One source close to the US-China commission described the "one
China" policy as "the sum total of all the policy statements and
documents [the US has produced] over the past 25 years." He said the
commission "wants a fresh look at all aspects" of the policy,
including the point in former president Ronald Reagan's "Six
Assurances" that Washington will not mediate a cross-strait settlement. "The commission's point is all those elements ... which are clearly in
play now, need to be reassessed," he said. "There should be a fresh
look at what's acceptable and what's not acceptable" for the US to help
Taiwan under any "one China" policy. "That's going on behind the scenes anyway," he added. One commission member puts it in stronger terms. "We wanted to stir up a debate. `One China' is a mantra. It's not
true. It never was," the member said. Others, such as Heritage Foundation Asia expert John Tkacik, bluntly
describe the "one China" idea as a "myth" that should be
ended soon. He also believes the administration is in the process of reviewing
its "one China" policy. When it signed the 1972 communique, the US acknowledged that all
"Chinese" on either side of the Strait saw Taiwan as part of China,
and that Washington did not challenge that. At the time, the only
"Chinese" that mattered to the US officials were the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party. Newly declassified transcripts of secret 1971 meetings between then US
secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai showed
clearly that the administration of former US president Richard Nixon had no
regard for the Taiwanese or their independence movement. As long as the KMT government-in-exile in Taiwan maintained its
"retake-the-Mainland" ideology and claimed to still rule all of China,
the "one China" issue went largely ignored in Washington. Even after
former president Lee Teng-hui's "state-to-state" declaration, US
officials paid little attention, as most assumed that Lee's successor would be a
member of the KMT, and the status quo would return. Now, of course, Washington must come to terms with a reality it still does
not understand, as framed by the Taiwanese people and their embrace of a
national identity that helped win Chen his latest election. The US
administration's biggest concern, needless to say, is that it might be sucked
into a cross-strait conflict beyond its control, or that it might be forced to
choose between one of its strongest anti-Communist friends of several decades
and a Communist state whose sheer size makes it a major world player. The result of any review of the "one China" policy is impossible
to predict, and the commission made it clear it did not want to
"prejudge" any outcome. From the imprecision evident in the statements coming out of Washington,
the review will be a long, tough and contentious one, with no dearth of
soul-searching, invocations of realpolitik, political posturing and, if
Washington is true to form, a big wad of nonsense. For the time being, though, the intensity of the issue has cooled
considerably since Chen's inauguration speech in May, and with elections coming
up this fall in Washington and Taipei, policymakers and pundits will have until
next year at the earliest to really confront the issue. But there's little doubt that it will be confronted. Beijing
plans massive military exercises this month SABER-RATTLING:
China wants to send a `substantial warning' to `separatists' with an amphibious
mock Taiwan-landing backed by guided missiles in Fujian province China is to carry out
its largest military exercises of the year this month aimed at sending a
"substantial warning" to Taiwanese separatists, state media reported
yesterday. The military drills will take place on Dongshan island in Fujian province,
just 277km west of Penghu Island, the Beijing News said. "The Dongshan Island exercises are different from other exercises ...
It is a joint exercise of the three militaries [army, air force and navy]. It's
the People's Liberation Army's [PLA] largest-scale exercise this year," the
Beijing News said. The report did not say when the drills would start or how long they would
last but similar drills in 2001 lasted for four months. Nor did it reveal how many soldiers would take part in the amphibious mock
Taiwan-landing backed by guided missiles, but a pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper
had said 18,000 troops would be involved. Western diplomats in Beijing had played down the anticipated drills, saying
the number of troops involved was not that large and that the exercises appeared
to be routine. "They are sending a signal by holding the exercises in Fujian, but it
is not a provocation due to the size of the exercises," one diplomat said. The exercises would be smaller than the 2001 drills, when some 100,000
soldiers engaged in amphibious exercises and mock warfare at sea aimed at
sinking an aircraft carrier. But unlike previous exercises, this one would aim at "achieving
control of the air", the report said. "This change doesn't just show that the PLA's military theory has had
an enormous change, but also indicates our military has acknowledged that
control of the air is the top priority in modern warfare," the Beijing
report said. Practically all the advanced weaponry China possesses will be put in use in
the military exercises, including the Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets purchased from
Russia, it said. "This exercise will be aimed at sending a substantial warning to
`Taiwan separatists.'" Nuclear-powered submarines, warships, the latest model missile destroyers
and a guided missile brigade would also be involved in the exercises. "It's not a preventive military manuever against Taiwan independence
as they were in the past," the report said. Hong
Kong democracy constantly delayed By
Jackson Yeh On a rainy day seven
years ago, 156 years of British colonial rule in Hong Kong came to an end. With
promises and slogans such as "one country, two systems," "Hong
Kongers administering Hong Kong" and a "high-degree autonomy,"
the territory was handed back to China. Beijing wished to achieve three goals through the handover. First, to use
Hong Kong's economic value; second, to further its goal of national unification
and third to use Hong Kong as an example for Taiwan. Hong Kong's democratic transformation is especially unique and worthy of
concern from the aspect of comparative politics. As a former British colony --
unlike other colonies after World War II, it was unable to obtain independent
sovereignty and turn itself into a new country through the process of
decolonialization and sovereignty handover. Due to Hong Kong's status of being
decolonized but not becoming independent, its democratization was destined to be
decided mostly by Britain and China (which now claims sovereignty over the
territory). As a result, this top-down process is constantly delaying Hong
Kong's democratization. There are two factors that continue to delay democracy in Hong Kong. First,
external forces (either the British or the Chinese governments) have the power
to carry out Hong Kong's democratization. The territory's transformation from
colonial authoritarianism to a representative system has been significantly
affected by both the People's Republic of China and Britain. Both the Britain
and China have dominated the loosening and tightening of political opportunities
in Hong Kong's transformation. Local democratic forces have limited influence
and can muster only passive responses most of the time. Second, the progress of transformation is slowed due to internal pressure.
Hong Kong's powerful political and business forces, along with a largely
apathetic middle class which is uninterested in politics are both
disadvantageous to democratic development. Further, the territory's conservative
political elite stubbornly resist the implementation of political
accountability, saying it may damage economic competitiveness, turn the
territory into a welfare state, or fail due to the lack of popular
participation. And, although the middle class supports the direct elections for
the chief executive and lawmakers, they are reluctant to pay a price when taking
action. On April 26, China's National People's Congress officially denied Hong
Kongers the right to directly electing their chief executive and lawmakers in
2007 and 2008, respectively. Thus, the limited democracy in the territory has
not improved after decolonialization. The people of Taiwan, on the other hand, should be glad for the freedom and
democracy they have obtained within less than 20 years after the government
lifted martial law in 1987. However, Taiwanese society faces constitutional
disorder, as many people refuse to recognize the legitimacy of national leaders.
The Taiwanese are also severely divided along political persuasions. The
situation in this country is much more serious and dangerous than in Hong Kong. Many Hong Kongers have strived to safeguard their existing freedoms while
pursuing democratization. The Taiwanese people should show their support for
such efforts. This also serves as an opportunity for Taiwan to cherish and
reevaluate its own democratic achievements. The people of Taiwan and Hong Kong
both deserve a more robust democratic society. Jackson
Yeh is a student at the Graduate Institute of Sociology at National Tsing Hua
University. Time
for the US to make new rules By
Nat Bellocchi In my last article, I
wrote about an idea to enhance better communications by having periodic meetings
on cross-strait relations. There were also two other thoughts that are a part of this
"meeting" idea -- the overdue need to change the US' internal rules of
conducting that relationship, and a question of how the US should manage a more
intrusive effort to work with Taiwan on sensitive cross-strait issues. This
article addresses the rules on conducting the "unofficial"
relationship with Taiwan. Changing them would be an important step in the
increasing necessity to have an established cross-strait dialogue between the US
and Taiwan. The rules were developed by the US when it changed its diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. They were made up quickly and completely
unilaterally, but based for the most part on what the US thought Beijing could
accept. Initially, the rules covered a very broad spectrum of behavior: Who can
meet with whom where; the limits on using the Republic of China (ROC) flag;
letterheads, license plates, parties that could be attended by American
officials; not using the words ROC; etc. Gradually, sheer common sense from time
to time raised its head and a decision to change or do away with a particular
rule was made to the advantage of both the US and Taiwan. The constraints under the rules cause inefficiency and at a high cost for
the US, not to speak of indignity for Taiwan. The TRA and the Shanghai
Communique, followed by the six assurances showed that the "Taiwan
issue" was to be more than a short term problem. More important, the rules
were sustainable only as long as Taiwan's authoritarian political system ruled. When it was clear that the political system in Taiwan could not continue in
its authoritarian and Mainlander-dominated form, Chiang Ching-kuo took steps to
lift martial law and allow a greater participation by the Taiwanese in
governance. The direction former Lee Teng-hui
was to take was demonstrated in the handling of the student protest and
national affairs conference in 1990, and that direction toward a pluralistic
democracy grows even stronger under President Chen Shui-bien . Throughout the 1990s, America was pleased with the direction
democratization was taking in Taiwan, but the rules that had been formed by the
US unilaterally were clearly beginning to show the need for adjustment. At the
same time, China's growing international presence and Taiwan's important and
globalized economic achievements was making these constraining rules even less
sustainable. Only one formal effort was made to adjust some rules, in 1994, with the
so-called Taiwan Policy Review. The "policy" element was immediately
established as meaning the rules of conduct only. Then that was further reduced
to a few changes that pleased few, and was overwhelmed by the much greater
number of rules that would not be changed. This need for change was especially apparent during the tense 1995 to 1996
PRC missile exercises, where the dangers of narrow and ineffective military
relations with Taiwan became so evident that a dialogue between the two
militaries was imperative. This was done largely by the US Department of Defense
with far less public airing than usually accompanies such changes. This
continues even now as the need arises. One can see how well the military
relationship has become more realistic with a minimum of public profile, though
sometimes even that is jeopardized by publicity. The new Bush administration in Washington saw that circumstances are making
it clearly necessary to do the same on the political side. It should not be
surprising. Even as early as the 1972 communique the US insisted on wording to
show that the "Chinese" (not necessarily the "people") of
Taiwan agreed with the "one China" phraseology. With Taiwan's democracy now continuing to move in its own direction, and
with America still trying to maintain a balance between the two sides of the
Strait, America is struggling with policy adjustment. Doubtless for the US, there will be more adjustments as needed, working
more closely with Taiwan on avoiding war while supporting its democratic system.
The biggest obstacle in moving in the direction of a more senior regular liaison
between the US and Taiwan in national security matters, of course, is objections
from China. But Taiwan doesn't make it easier. Raising the frequency and level of
communication tends to be seen in Taipei first and foremost in terms of high
profile visits or publicly noted bilateral meetings. It is well understood that
this is important politically in Taiwan, and in China, to demonstrate that
Taiwan-US relations are close. That is important for Taiwan. Unfortunately, it
is important for America as well, but in the opposite way. It damages the US
relationship with China. Finding a way that assures more effective senior level communications
between the US and Taiwan without every meeting risking tensions in the Strait
can be done. Videoconference calls might make lower profile meetings easier, but
have other disadvantages. The best means of having regular periodic bilateral
meetings on the subject of cross-strait relations in parallel with similar
bilateral meetings between US and China on the same subject. The meetings would
benefit all three players as each side gets accustomed to this dialogue and
eventually, perhaps, on occasion could have all three sides participating
together. But a key element to establishing some form of dialogue between them should
be the understanding that it is in the interest of all three sides that such a
dialogue take place. Nat
Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a
special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article
are his own. War,
peace and pacifism Concerning the letter from Chen Jia-ching (Letter, June 27, page 8) in
Oakland, California, I agree completely with the notion that world peace is the
most worthy of goals. It is the aspiration of billions around the world, myself
included. Chen states in his letter "it may seem that there are no easy answers
to our global conflicts, and that we who advocate disarmament are naive." I
totally agree with both statements. There are no easy answers, and Chen and
those who advocate unilateral disarmament are naive. This is not to criticize the concept of disarmament, which by itself is a
lofty notion. It is to suggest that disarmament alone will not suffice in this
rough and tumble world where rogues and scoundrels have access to
nation-destroying weapons, and lack the conscience and civil understanding to
inhibit their use, even against a "disarmed" foe. War will not, by itself, end terrorism; but pacifism will not appease
terrorists, unless the idea is to redefine "peace" as
"surrender." The things that terrorists want are so ruthless and
extreme, to appease them would be to end civilization as we know it. Sacrificing
civilization in the name of peace makes no sense to billions of people. To be
sure, communication, discussion, conciliation and justice are concepts that will
contribute to solving global conflicts. But, as Chen conceded, there are no easy
answers, particularly when the adversaries include a ruthless regime based on
raw power, brutality and tyranny. As for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, does Chen truly believe that if the
US was not committed to defending Taiwan, that if Taiwan could not defend
herself, China would hesitate for one nanosecond to pulverize Taiwan? It would
not. It would be wonderful if China would entertain peace with Taiwan, but the
only "peace" China has offered is the peace of communist captivity.
For tens of millions, that is no peace at all. Sitting in the anti-war locus in Oakland, it is easy to scoot over to
Berkeley or Marin, or elsewhere in the Bay Area and find tens of thousands (if
not hundreds of thousands) of people who share the same views. They are
enlightened views to be sure. But there are billions out there around the globe
in the midst of raw conflict who experience the ruthless determination and sheer
brutality of evil every single day. Those forces of evil do not cower in the
face of peace, they quail only in the face of ruthless opposition by civilized
society, and that society's actual ability to destroy them in battle. That is
the unfortunate truth, the truth the naive and the timid do not wish to (or
pretend not to) hear. You might ask the terrified millions in the Sudan whether
they would like the UN to send 50,000 peace activists, or 50,000 armed
peacekeepers to protect against the janjaweed scourge. Mahatma Gandhi led a nation of 600 million to throw out the British using
non-violent civil disobedience. Of course, even in that mostly non-violent
conflict, tens of thousands perished. But the bottom line is that civil
disobedience worked because British society is based on precepts of morality and
democracy developed after centuries of conflict, and the progress of civil and
democratic society. In other words, the British people have a conscience. The
same cannot be said of Osama Bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Kim Jong-Il,
Chinese President Hu Jintao , and others of that ilk, who neither have nor
believe in the same "conscience." Take Darfur or Tibet as examples of
the fate of the defenseless against terrorism, or worse, eugenics. If there's anything the Tiananmen Massacre showed us -- and Tibet shows us
today -- it is that Communist China will crush its opposition whenever and
wherever necessary, given the chance. Tibet sought "peace" through
peaceful means -- and has suffered eugenics on a massive scale. One might deduce that, were Taiwan to give up its defense, it would not
survive the first night of disarmament, just like democracy would not survive
the first ten minutes of "captivity" under the communist regime. I understand completely why a pacifist would characterize defense spending
as "pointless military buildup." It is of course correct -- in a
vacuum. But a stone's throw across the Strait, as opposed to more than 10,000km
across the Pacific, facing 500 Chinese missiles, it is hardly
"pointless." Sometimes, to survive, you just have to be prepared to slug it out. Chen is
correct that war does not bring much relief. But the avoidance of war through
defense often brings a great deal of relief, and sometimes it even produces
dialogue and change. We need pacifism to help navigate the world ship. Over the long run,
pacifists will prevent the rest of us from self-destruction. In the short run,
though, the rest of us will save civilization from destruction by defending it
against ruthless men with ruthless aims. Lee
Long-hwa United States
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