Failure `One country, two systems' on July 08, 2004

`One country, two systems' a failure: experts

By Joy Su
STAFF REPORTER
 

The recent march for democracy in Hong Kong earlier this month highlights the inadequacies of applying China's "one country, two systems" formula in Taiwan, according to experts on cross-strait relations yesterday at a forum organized by the Friends of Hong Kong and Macau Association.

"It is no longer possible to push for the `one country, two systems' model in Taiwan using Hong Kong's example anymore. Ironically, China is now attempting to block Hong Kong's democratization by likening it to the movement for Taiwan's independence," said Chen Ming-tong , former vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council.

According to the march's organizers, as many as 530,000 people turned out to participate in a march for democracy in Hong Kong on July 1, the seventh anniversary of the former British colony's return to China. Hong Kong police estimated the size of the crowd to be around 200,000. The participants demanded direct elections and expressed dissatisfaction with China's hand-picked leader, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa . The march followed a similar demonstration, staged on the same day one year ago.

"Since Hong Kong's July 1 protest last year, and the referendum and presidential elections in Taiwan, China has begun to use Taiwan to suppress Hong Kong by portraying Taiwan's democratization as societal division and turmoil," said Chang Wu-yen , a professor at the Institute of China Studies in Tamkang University and secretary-general of the Friends of Hong Kong and Macau Association.

Despite the effort to "demonize democracy in Taiwan," as the lecturers referred to Beijing's tactics, Chang said that the only way to overcome challenges to democratization is through increased efforts to secure democracy.

Chao Chien-min , a political science professor at National Chengchi University further elaborated on the topic, explaining the need for Taiwan's democracy to increase in institutional complexity.

"What Taiwan needs now is to seek greater levels of complexity. For example, we've never before had an assassination attempt on the president before an election. Now we have to implement judicial investigations and other mechanisms. This is all part of a process to erect democratic institutions," Chao said.

Chao said the different levels of institutional complexity are an indication of democratic consolidation.

"Hong Kong is also working on erecting institutions. But while Taiwan seeks institutional complexity in democracy, Hong Kong seeks the institution of democracy itself. It is the same with China, but at a much lower level. China is going from having no laws to having laws," Chao said.

Chen also explained the function of institutional complexity, pointing to the need to resolve all situations without resorting to extra-legal or extra-institutional mechanisms.

"It is important that the government look for a systemic solution to every problem. The establishment of a special committee to investigate the March 19 shooting incident is an example of the effort to resolve problems using institutional mechanisms," Chen said.

"To resolve the election controversies using institutional mechanisms despite a polarized society -- that is the real significance of the presidential election," Chen added.

Despite resistance from Beijing however, Chen yesterday likened democratization to a rock rolling down a hill, pointing to the gathering momentum and inevitability of the process.

"The staging of a protest in Hong Kong again this year indicates that the July 1 demonstration could take place on a regular basis until goals are achieved. Hong Kong's democratization has begun, and it is like a rock being shoved off a mountain -- if you stand in the way, it will crush you, and it will gain momentum as it falls," Chen said.

"Hong Kong is now being transformed from Hong Kong, Ltd, or just a large company, into a political entity. Its situation is typical of post-colonial countries -- now that the colonizer is gone, Hong Kong begins to think about self-governance. Thus China is just an external stimulus to Hong Kong's democratic movement. It is really the will to self-governance that is the driving force behind democratization," Chao said.

"China's main concern in blocking democratization in Hong Kong is its own prosperity and stability, but China is now surrounded by democratizing nations on all sides ... perhaps Hong Kong will be the straw that broke the camel's back," Tung Li-wen, vice president of the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Issues.

China's 'Asia co-prosperity sphere'

By Sushil Seth
 

The US preoccupation with Iraq and global terrorism has given China an ideal opportunity to expand its role. In Southeast Asia it has forged a free-trade agreement with ASEAN. It has also signed a "Strategic Partnership" agreement with the regional organization. Although the partnership is supposedly "non-aligned, non-military and non-exclusive," it has a wide scope to cover almost anything and everything. For instance, it calls for cooperation in "politics, economy, social affairs, security and regional affairs."

On the surface, China's regional diplomacy is not directed against the US. Indeed, according to Vice Premier Qian Qichen , a foreign affairs veteran, "We welcome a positive role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region for regional peace and development." But, in effect, Beijing is working on a two-pronged approach.

First, by enlarging its political and economic space in the region through multilateral forums, Beijing will make it increasingly difficult for Washington to enlist regional support against China in the future.

Second, by virtue of its membership and or cooperation in the regional forums, it would have assured itself a seat in the conduct of regional affairs. And because of its political and economic weight, it will have a leading, if not determining, role.

In the longer run, China has a larger ambition of forging and leading an East Asian community. As a Chinese diplomat has put it, "China sees its integration with Southeast Asia as part of the East Asia pact." He added: "If you look at the world today, you see Europe with its integration having grown for many years now. And you look at North America and NAFTA. Look at Southeast Asia, we still lack this."

Beijing, though, makes it sound like it is doing it for Asia's common good. But the real objective is to establish China's pre-eminence. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi , blurted it out some time ago when he told China Daily that regional economic cooperation "will serve as a helpful trial and practice of China's new security concept featuring comprehensive, common and cooperative security."

Interestingly, there is a regional audience for the new Chinese initiative for regional integration. Mari Pangestu, an Indonesian economist has put it this way: "The growth of China led to a growing realization that the region could form a large and dynamic economic bloc ? and seek a more effective voice in the global arena hitherto dominated by Western interests."

China's charm diplomacy continues to reinforce this sense. Speaking at an Asian forum last year, Premier Wen Jiabao said that China "should opt for dialogue in resolving disputes, step up cooperation in maintaining security, and bring about lasting peace and stability in Asia through the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational." You can't be more reasonable than this.

Whatever China's own agenda, this kind of charm offensive appears a welcome contrast in the region to the US policy of making terrorism the litmus test of all international relationships. China is, therefore, emerging as a benign power. As a Thai defense analyst has said, "China seems to become more and more of an attractive option," especially when it is increasingly projected as an economic powerhouse.

In reality China is recreating imperial Japan's East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of the 1930s and 1940s. Like Japan at the time, China too feels the need for assured markets and raw materials to sustain its economic growth and project power. But in today's world, it cannot follow the ways of the old empires to expand territorially.

Fu Ying, China's new ambassador in Australia, has sought to put it in perspective in an interview. She said, "There is a fear about the future orientation of Chinese foreign policy. It's not surprising, because in world history many big powers rose and caused earthquakes. But I think China is going to be different, because the world has changed. It is not like in the past when powers had to expand territorially in order to get markets.?"

Therefore, Beijing will do it differently by forging one big happy East Asian community. It will include Southeast and Northeast Asia with China at the center. It will be like the old Middle Kingdom all over again with its modern version of tributary Asian states providing easy access to their markets and materials.

China also has a place for Japan and Korea in its long-term plan. Japan, though, might be a problem because: one, it is part of the US security system and two, it is a regional political and economic rival. But that might not be an insurmountable problem were Japan to feel marginalized from an Asian initiative. It might then want to be inside the Asian club If everything were to work according to the Chinese script, the US might find itself politically eased out of the Asia-Pacific region over a period of time.

As it is, things are not looking too good for the US. It is knee-eep in the Iraqi quagmire, notwithstanding the transfer of sovereignty routine. Its "imperial overstretch" is helping China to spread its tentacles further into Asia at US cost. James Steinberg, a foreign policy analyst at the US' Brookings Institution, regards this "as a zero-sum game." In his view, "If their [China's] power is greater, it diminishes ours. If [regional] countries have relations with China, they'll do less to help us. There will be less support on US bases" and so on.

China obviously has grandiose plans for its great power role, but it is not always that simple and neat. Some of its neighbors are not likely to take kindly to China's expanding role. They will, therefore, always welcome a US presence in the region to balance or deter China. Besides, China has a long way to go to replace the US as the regional and or global economic powerhouse. Equally, as the world's second-largest economy, Japan will not be easily subsumed into any Chinese grand plan.

China's biggest problem is its archaic Marxist-Leninist political system. The deeply embedded contradiction between its relatively open economy and closed political system (already dead in its Soviet homeland) is akin to a superstructure built on a sandy foundation. There is no knowing how long it will last. And when it does crumble, the country will become preoccupied with its internal problems.

Already, China is said to be racked with a number of small and big protests in its rural and regional backyard. All China's initiatives abroad are, therefore, hostage to a flawed political system at home.

Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.

Let HK's majority speak

Speaking through the Xinhua news agency after last Thursday's massive show of public support for democracy in Hong Kong, the Chinese government claimed that a majority of Hong Kong's people wished to "play a genuinely constructive role to maintain stability and prosperity" ("HK activism is unharmonious: Chinese official," July 3, page 1).

Beijing implied this "majority" of Hong Kong residents opposed the peaceful expression of opinion by up to 530,000 of their fellow citizens. How, I wonder, have the Chinese leaders ascertained the size and political position of this "majority"? Certainly not through any open and fair electoral process.

So, I propose that the people of Hong Kong help determine the truth about what views they have and how many have them by holding, under the careful watch of nonpartisan international observers, a non-governmental referendum on issues of democracy in the territory.

Let all adult citizens of Hong Kong be given the opportunity to say yay or nay to a series of questions regarding their future, such as whether they should have universal suffrage and the right to directly elect their leaders and representatives. The results of such voting could go a long way toward informing Hong Kong residents, the Chinese government and the rest of the world about where the real majority lies, and might well give clearer meaning to the July 1 protest slogan that Beijing found so distasteful: "Return power to the people."

Matt Nicodemus  Taipei