China’s goal is invade Taiwan On July 24, 2004

There's wisdom in speaking softly

By Trung Latieule
 

The emergence of a national identity has led Taiwan to redefine its US policy. This could hurt US relations if domestic considerations prevail over strategic interests. President Chen Shui-bian in his inauguration address on May 20, however, seemed to placate US concerns.

He promised that the revision of the Constitution would not touch on the issues of statehood and sovereignty. He also tacitly reiterated the "five noes" pledge he made four years ago.

Beneath that moderation, however, Taiwan has quietly moved toward a more aggressive foreign policy. Presidential advisor Koo Kuan-min has called on the US to revise its "one China" policy. And Minister of Foreign Affairs Mark Chen has said that the international community should respect Taiwan as a sovereign and independent nation.

The policy shift led to diplomatic tensions with the US in April. Mark Chen stressed that independence and sovereignty were Taiwan's status quo. But Washington rebuked that stance. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly said that Washington would only agree to the status quo as the US defined it.

The US definition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is quite simple, even though the US policy may seem contradictory. In theory, Washington acknowledges the three communiques it signed with Beijing that say Taiwan is part of China. In practice, however, it considers Taiwan's status to be unresolved and is committed to help the nation defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act.

The cross-strait status quo, according to Washington, means that China must refrain from using or threatening to use force against Taiwan, while Taiwan must avoid provoking Beijing with unilateral moves toward de facto independence.

The diplomatic status quo is reinforced by the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. China's weight in the status quo at first derived from the support of the majority of countries that echo the "one China" principle. But the rise of a Taiwanese identity has weakened the status quo by diminishing Beijing's bargaining power.

To regain leverage, China is trying to tip the military balance in its favor by upping the ante in the cross-strait arms race. But "balance of power" tends to be a tricky concept. If China's goal is to invade Taiwan, the balance of power is, for now, in Taipei's favor because Beijing does not have the amphibious capacity nor the adequate air cover it requires to carry out an invasion, according to a recent Pentagon report.

But if China's objective is to threaten Taiwan's integrity with its 500 missiles, then Beijing already has an edge, since Taipei hasn't acquired the Patriot anti-missile batteries offered by the Bush administration, and is still negotiating to obtain the AEGIS defense system.

The Chen administration should ask Washington to include Taiwan with Japan and South Korea in its proposed missile defense shield, because it looks unlikely that Taiwan can sustain an arms race with China in the long term.

The "one China" policy is a by-product of the Cold War. Its aim was to woo China and confront the Soviet Union with the possibility of a two-front war. But it still serves US interests. The challenge of terrorism has now replaced the Soviet threat and Washington needs China's cooperation over North Korea and the Middle East.

Were Taiwan to see cross-strait relations as a zero-sum game, it could risk the US returning to the "three noes" policy implemented by the Clinton administration. But the widening gap between US and Taiwanese interests comes from Taiwan's failure to understand the meaning of what an alliance is. The Taiwan Relations Act is a US law, not an alliance treaty, but its content turns US-Taiwan relations into a quasi alliance.

Certain statements by Taiwanese officials and the controversy over the possible dispatch of Taiwanese marines to Iraq reflected Taiwan's mismanagement of US ties. When Washington expressed its concern over constitutional reforms, some officials reacted violently by saying that the US was interfering with the nation's internal affairs.

Koo has said that Taiwan is not a colonial state of the US. True, Taiwan does not need to halt its plan to create a new Constitution simply because the US opposes it.

But an alliance, by definition, implies coordinated policies and actions. An alliance offers rights and advantages, but it also sets duties and constraints.

It also serves mutual interests. Taiwan can rely on US military aid to counter China's military threat. And Washington can check China's expansion in the South China Sea through its cooperation with Taiwan.

Chen and public opinion made it clear that Taiwan would not shed blood in the Middle East after two US congressmen introduced a resolution in May calling for the deployment of Taiwanese troops in Iraq. Yet it would be foolish to think that the US would sacrifice its grand strategy in Asia in the name of Taiwanese independence. Kelly bluntly said in April that the US wouldn't defend Taiwan under all circumstances.

No president could sell a war to the US public for the sake of Taiwanese independence. There would be a disjuncture between the perils and the benefits of such a war. US public opinion may accept a war against Chinese militarism, but that would imply a Chinese attack without Taiwanese provocation.

Taiwan must avoid an aggressive cross-strait policy if it does not want to jeopardize its relations with Washington. As such, it should focus on underground diplomacy. That would be more efficient than loud policy pronouncements.

Taiwan should increase efforts on the diplomatic front to prevent the EU from lifting its embargo on arms sales to China. Yet it should also continue to offer olive branches to China. That would help convince the US government that the Chen administration is sincere in dealing with China.

Were Beijing to reject Taipei's offers for talks over the next four years, Washington would draw its own conclusions about China's real motives and eventually upgrade the Taiwan Relations Act.

Trung Latieule is a journalist based in Paris.

China's power based on state terror

By Paul Lin
 

Over the past six months, China has been continuously advocating its new "peaceful rise" position. But no matter how we look at it, a more suitable name to describe this process would be "rise by terror."

This "peaceful rise" idea was proposed for the first time in Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's  speech on Dec. 10 last year during a speech at Harvard University. "China today is a country undergoing reform and opening-up and a is rising power dedicated to peace," Wen was quoted as saying in the Harvard Gazette.

In a symposium to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth on Dec. 26 last year, general secretary of the Communist Party and President Hu Jintao said China would "adhere to the development road of a peaceful rise." On March 14 this year during the 10th National People's Congress, Wen outlined the features of this so-called "peaceful rise:" The rise of China will not stand in the way or pose a threat to any other country; it will not be achieved at the expense of any other country; and China does not seek hege-mony now, nor will it seek hegemony even after it becomes powerful.

Obviously, these lies are intended to deny the threats China poses to Taiwan. China's "peaceful rise" notion was crafted by the 11th Party Congress central committee and will continue until the middle of this century, when its basic modernization goals are achieved. But despite all the rhetoric, there has only been terror. For example:

Just two months after the Party Congress, China declared a war of "self-defense" against Vietnam, fighting its way to Lang Son before pulling back. This was done to threaten neighboring countries and to oust Hua Kuo-feng, who was chairman of the Central Military Commission.

On June 4, 1989, the government surrounded the capital with troops to crush peaceful protests in Tiananmen Square. Zhao Zi-yang, then party general secretary, was incarcerated.

In July 1999, the government cracked down on the Falun Gong movement. Many people have died from the persecution and many more have been incarcerated. This crackdown, along with that of other dissident groups, has been done in the name of maintaining stability.

Even China's economic development is fraught with violence. Chinese government officials in every region work with transnational corporations and Chinese "entrepreneurs" to exploit Chinese workers. Recently, US Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao signed four joint letters of understanding with China to improve workplace safety and protect workers' rights. That such actions required foreign intervention gives us an idea of the terror ingrained in China's economic development.

Since 1995, Beijing has constantly threatened Taiwan with invasion and frequently holds military exercises along the coast of Fujian Province. It has even test fired-missiles towards the country. Threatening language is commonly employed in reference to Taiwan among Chinese officials and their media. High-ranking military officials have also threatened nuclear strikes against Los Angeles or against dams in the US as part of an "unlimited war" strategy. As communications in China's media are strictly monitored, it can only be assumed that these views are at least tacitly accepted. All this is simply government-sponsored terrorism.

The Straits Times daily in Singapore, in a recent report, said that some members of the National People's Congress and other party officials sent a letter to the central government suggesting that if Taiwan ever intended to threaten the Three Gorges Dam, they should revoke their guarantee of not using nuclear weapons against Taiwan in the event of war.

Note the use of the word "intended." It only requires Bei-jing to judge Taiwan's intentions for it to go back on its international commitments not to use their nuclear capabilities in a first strike. It is widely known that the National People's Congress cannot oppose government decisions, so their suggestions are crafted to coincide with the wishes of their superiors -- or as a "nuclear bluff" game at the least. This is the behavior of a rogue state.

Whether internationally or domestically, China uses the tactics of terror to reinforce its power. This by any other name is still the rise of terror.

Paul Lin is a commentator based in New York.

Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Ian Bartholomew

Singapore mitigates cross-strait situation

By Liu Kuan-teh
 

With less than a month to go before he is slated to take over the premiership, Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong came to Taiwan on a low-key visit earlier this month. During his stay, Lee had the opportunity to meet heavyweights from across the political spectrum, as well as business tycoons.

The timing of Lee's visit deserves special attention, and the influence that he might exert on Asian affairs should not be overlooked. The main purpose of Lee's short stop-over before heading back to Singapore was to get first-hand information on what's going on in Taiwanese politics, as well as sounding out President Chen Shui-bian's policies toward Singapore and China.

A lot of attention focused on whether Lee was playing the role of a special envoy between Taipei and Beijing, but he strongly denied this and reiterated that Singapore has no intention of acting as a go-between. And unlike his father in 1992, Lee also rejected the idea of pushing for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.

It would have been inappropriate for Lee to interfere in the cross-strait stalemate in this way. Despite Chen having offered another olive branch to Beijing on May 20, China still refuses to talk to the Chen administration. The best chance for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to restart talks would be next year -- if the Democratic Progressive Party wins the majority in the legislative elections and US President George W. Bush is re-elected.

The cross-strait situation is a hot potato which no one would be interested in touching at the present time. Lee is smart enough to know what the bottom line is. As he has been traveling to China on a regular basis, but last visited Taiwan 12 years ago, the first thing he needed to determine was the real atmosphere of what has been going on in Taiwan before making any potentially inappropriate moves. Portraying himself as someone with good political connections to both Taipei and Beijing leaves plenty of room for Lee to exert political pressure in the future.

While keeping a proper distance, Lee skillfully expressed his observations on the current cross-strait situation. He said he was "troubled" by two things: The first is the growing Taiwanese identity among the population, in which is embedded a deeply rooted belief that China will not attack Taiwan and that the US will come to Taiwan's rescue if Beijing does attack.

Second, Lee emphasized that the Taiwanese are too preoccupied with elections and domestic issues, which has led to a severe lack of comprehension of international affairs. He did point out, however, that the development of the cross-strait relationship and Taiwan's democratization have been driven largely by domestic concerns.

Indeed, there are two sides to a coin. Taiwan's internal democratic change is a road of no return. But just because domestic factors overwhelmed international influence in affecting Taiwanese politics does not mean Taiwan has isolated itself from the global community.

The rise of a Taiwanese identity has followed a natural course and is the product of democratic consolidation. In essence, democracy is what separates Taiwan from China. There is no justifiable reason to think that the rise of a Taiwanese identity is detrimental to cross-strait peace. China's endless diplomatic saber rattling and constant military threats are the major obstacles to the normalization of cross-strait relations.

Everyone concerned about cross-strait peace should recognize this fact and adopt a more unbiased attitude in terms of breaking the ice in the cross-strait relationship. This is perhaps the role that Singapore can and should play.

Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.