a success on Aug 12, 2004

Failed referendum still a success

By Lai I-chung

Taiwan's first national referendum was held concurrently with the presidential election on March 20. The two referendum questions failed to pass, as fewer than half of eligible voters participated.

After the presidential election, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) alliance with the People First Party (PFP) refused to accept the election result. They staged a near month-long protest and attracted much public attention, while serious discussion on the referendum issue was mostly ignored.

After the March 20 election, the referendum issue was only brought up three more times. First, the KMT and PFP claimed to be pushing for a referendum for a special investigation committee on the shooting of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu when the December legislative elections are held.

The issue was mentioned again when they attacked the holding of the referendum in tandem with the presidential election, believing it would skew the vote. Finally, in President Chen Shui-bian's inaugural speech, he changed his promise of making a new Constitution through a referendum by 2006 to amending the Constitution by an ad hoc National Assembly and "incorporating into the Constitution the people's right to referendum on constitutional revision."

Although the referendum was rendered invalid due to a lack of participation, this does not mean that the nation's first national referendum was a failure. Judging from the number of its participants -- in the face of a boycott by the opposition camp -- about 45 percent of the eligible voters took part in the referendum. The number of people who participated is higher than the total amount of votes cast for the Chen-Lu ticket, and the turnout was much higher than in many European countries which held referendums at one time or another. In this sense, the referendum was successful, and it was only the excessively high cutoff rate required to make the referendum valid that caused it to fail.

But the implementation of the referendum was not without its problems. From the time it was proposed to when it was finally put before the voters, public discussion and debate on the referendum was insufficient. One the one hand, the public focused too much on the connection between the referendum and the presidential election and viewed it from an electoral perspective.

On the other hand, various factors delayed the question-making process, so the public did not have sufficient time to discuss the meaning of the questions.

Since voters did not have enough time, televised political debates on the issue were certainly the most important way for us to understand it. The design of the public debates on the referendum, however, was the same as the presidential candidate debates, and failed to focus on either side of the issue.

The criteria for determining who would participate in the debates also turned into a stage for pundits and politicians on both sides of the political spectrum to cheapen the issues with showy grandstanding.

The various technical flaws during the voting process must also be addressed. The Central Election Commission (CEC) to divided the presidential election and the referendum into two stages to avoid confusion. But receiving a ballot for the election and a ballot for the referendum at the same time is not unprecedented.

Further, the casting of votes into the wrong polling boxes and the casting of invalid votes are two completely different problems. Since many actually complained that the two-stage voting process was confused, logistics of the election must be examined to understand whether such complaints were in fact reasonable. This examination should also serve as an opportunity to design a voting process that is simpler and more easy to understand.

Moreover, those who know about Taiwan's political situation know that it is necessary to amend the Referendum Law. Regarding the minimum number of votes required to make the referendum valid, any poll can be defeated if a single political party actively opposes it and mobilizes their supporters to do so.

Whether the failure of a referendum equals a veto of the issue at hand is questionable. Of course other factors must be examined, such as the procedure involved in initiating a referendum as well as the relationship between this form of direct democracy and our elected representatives.

For those who care about Taiwan's democracy, the point is whether this experience is helpful for the nation's political process. In light of the result, it can be said that the referendum did not arouse issues contentious enough to motivate a minimum amount of voters to participate in it.

The voting process was peaceful, and people eventually accepted the results. Most did not question the legitimacy of the referendum, although some social elites claimed that it was a violation of the law.

Thus, the referendum was successful in that it is now part of the country's political language, just like general elections. Although the process was problematic, the holding of such a vote contributed to Taiwan's political culture by breaking the taboo of holding referendums.

Chen's re-election shows that "Taiwan consciousness" has become part of the nation's mainstream political culture. The referendum also ensured the legitimacy of direct democracy in Taiwan, and therefore served its ultimate purpose. A more complete "Taiwan consciousness" and more direct democratic system are the fundamental pillars of the nation.

Taiwan's move toward direct democracy looks better than ever. It is an urgent task for those who care about the country's democratic development to seriously review the experience of the March 20 referendum.

Lai I-chung is the director of foreign policy studies at the Taiwan Thinktank.

TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG

Error at US airport due to plain ignorance, Lee says

By Charles Snyder
STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON
 

Taiwan's new top representative to Washington, David Lee, says the reason he was fingerprinted and photographed when he arrived at Washington's Dulles Airport last month can be attributed to ignorance of procedures by low-level bureaucrats in the airport's security system.

In his first full-fledged press conference with the Taiwanese media in Washington since taking up his post on July 23, Lee also said he hopes that final arrangements for President Chen Shui-bian's transit visit to the US at the end of this month can be made later this week.

He also expressed the opinion that US policy toward Taiwan would not change much if Senator John Kerry wins the presidency over current President George W. Bush in November.

Lee dismissed his treatment at Dulles as a problem of "implementation by the lower echelon of US government bureaucrats at the airport."

Most Taiwanese officials arrive using West Coast or New York airports, where security officials are more competent in dealing with incoming Taiwanese. In Washington, by contrast, security officials are not familiar with the E-1 type visa Lee was traveling on, Lee explained.

That visa, issued to Lee and other Taiwanese officials, does not necessarily grant them diplomatic immunity, but an agreement signed by Washington and Taipei in 1980 grants some diplomatic privileges to Taiwan's officials visiting the US.

Lee, the chief of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, said that "high-ranking officials" from the administration apologized and he accepted that.

"They didn't do anything impolite to me at the airport, and I understand it is an information problem," he said.

Regarding Chen's upcoming transit, Lee said he is still working with US officials on the details of choosing the two cities that Chen will be allowed to land in during his trip to and from Latin America.

"I hope we can get it done this week, because time is really running short," he said.

He would not comment on reports that the Chen administration requested transit sites on the east coast, including New York, Baltimore and Boston, but that those were vetoed by the Bush administration.

He said only regarding New York that "I don't think that is our plan. We never requested to go to New York."

Lee indicated that Chen would not be allowed to conduct any public activities during his transit. "That is not our request," Lee said.

Last year, Chen raised hackles in Washington and Beijing when he received a widely publicize human rights award in New York, during which he made a public speech and conducted other public events.

Those events were in stark contrast to the previous rules that banned Chen from saying or doing anything publicly while in the US.

That earlier rule was so strictly enforced that a leading conservative congressman, Representative Dana Rohrabacher, was forced to sneak in through a kitchen to speak to Chen in his hotel room during an earlier transit in Los Angeles.

Regarding the presidential election, Lee said that a Kerry administration would not treat Taiwan much differently than Bush has.

"We have many friends on the Democratic side, and certainly now we are working with the Republican administration," he said. "In the past 18 days, I've already touched base with people from both camps," he said. "I think there is a bipartisan foreign policy approach vis-a-vis the relationship with Taiwan and China, because that has been the policy since 1971."

"We have seen some evolution of the policy, but in general this is an American policy, the so-called American `one China' policy, the so-called three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as the cornerstone of the relationship," he said.

Lee also played down the fact that both the Democratic campaign platform and Bush on Monday neglected to mention the Taiwan Relations Act as part of their Taiwan policy.

He said that Bush's comments were "not a prepared Q and A."

He said he didn't think the Democratic document was a deliberate omission

"We would rather consider this a shortened version of the Democratic platform," Lee said.

Chinese are being hasty in pushing Japan away

By Paul Lin

 
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, its relations with Japan can be divided into two stages.

The first stage was from 1949 until 1971, before the two countries established diplomatic ties with each other. Since the Japanese authorities did not recognize the Chinese government, Beijing carried out unofficial diplomacy and had a good relationship with the Japanese private sector, while at the same time calling the Japanese government militaristic.

The second stage is the period from 1971 to the present. For China's part, accusations of Japanese militarism stopped after the establishment of diplomatic ties. But China's relationship with the Japanese private sector has gradually cooled down. Japan, meanwhile has consistently yielded to Beijing politically in order to develop economic relations. For example, Japan ignores China's crackdown on human rights and has even sacrificed its friendship with Taiwan. Japan is afraid of a rising China and is unwilling to irritate Beijing politically.

But after entering the new century, Sino-Japanese relations have changed. China is now the world's factory, and does not value Japanese capital and technology anymore. Japan also has a sense of crisis greater than any Western country and refuses to transfer technology to China. Not to mention that China has stirred up nationalism to consolidate itself. The growing political, economic and military pressure from China has triggered Japanese nationalism, especially in the younger generation. A series of incidents over the past few years have also changed their relations drastically. First, China's military development has forced Japan to review its policies. Chinese military expansion has gotten on Japan's nerves, so the latter has reduced its low interest rate loans to China. It has also amended its Constitution, which restrains its military power, while constantly adjusting its policy, and has sent troops to Iraq for peacekeeping purposes. These subtle adjustments have been made to prepare for drastic changes in the future.

China's anti-Japanese prejudice also worries the Japanese people. The aroused nationalism can hardly be eliminated. Crude messages left on Internet Web sites by angry Chinese youth also irritate Japan, which is under pressure from the Japanese people due to its concessions.

Recently, the tension between China and Japan has been shown in two respects. In addition to the sovereignty conflict over the Tiaoyutai (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands), China's survey ships in the East China Sea have approached Japan's territory repeatedly, clearly showing that it wants to fight with Japan for access to the undersea oil fields in this area and to collect data on the sea environment for submarines. Also, take the recent Asian Cup soccer match in China for example. Chinese fans' anti-Japanese rhetoric and actions against Japan's soccer team were almost out of control. The Japanese government was unable to hide its irritation and was forced to take a harsh stance.

These cases may have the following impact: First, Japan will speed up its military reform, and promote military cooperation with Taiwan and the US. Second, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs will face greater criticism for its pro-China policies, and is therefore likely to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan. Third, Japan's effort to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council will be blocked by China. Fourth, Chinese nationalism will make the world question China's ability to host the 2008 Olympic Games.

The decline of Sino-Japanese relations at present is related not only to the political situation across the Taiwan Strait, but also to the peace and stability in Asia.

Paul Lin is a political commentator based in New York.

TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG