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two-pronged policy on Nov 29, 2004 US continues two-pronged policy By 
Yu Pen-li M  Following the recent resignation of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, US 
President George W. Bush appointed National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as 
Powell's successor. Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, will be replacing Rice. All 
signs point to members of the "Vulcans," Bush's foreign policy team 
during the 2000 presidential election campaign, directing foreign policy in his 
new cabinet. Yet decisionmakers such as conservative hawks Vice President Dick 
Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld still seem to view China as a 
strategic competitor. This looks positive for Taiwan. But are things really as 
they seem?  The most interesting thing is Hadley's appointment. Hadley was a lawyer, 
and during the 1970s he was a policy analyst in the defense department. He was 
later assistant secretary of defense during Bush senior's term in office, 
specializing in nuclear and conventional arms control issues.  In George W. Bush's first term, he made Hadley his deputy national security 
adviser hoping that Hadley, with his experience in arms control issues, would be 
able to explain the US missile defense plan to concerned countries. China is the 
greatest obstacle to the implementation of the US missile defense plan in the 
Asia-Pacific region, so Hadley should understand the strategic importance of 
Taiwan's geopolitical position. As a result, the new Bush government's strategic 
evaluation can be expected to lead to a deepening of security cooperation 
between Taiwan and the US, rather than to the abandonment of Taiwan.  There are possible compromises that could be made by realist members of the 
Vulcan group, based on consideration of actual international political benefits 
and interests. One example: although they are hoping for changes in the 
Pyongyang government, tough behavior might induce a Chinese reaction. This could 
seriously affect the region's strategic balance, so they might then take a 
softer, multilateral approach to handling the North Korean nuclear issue.  In the future, the new US government will face several new diplomatic 
challenges, such as the reconstruction of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestine situation 
following the death of Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and the North Korean 
nuclear issue. Doubtless they would be glad to see stability in the Taiwan 
Strait and the Asia-Pacific region so that they can concentrate on these other 
issues.  In particular, the US worries that nuclear weapons could fall into the 
hands of terrorist organizations and lead to terrorist attacks on US soil. 
Opposition to nuclear arms proliferation, therefore, is at the top of the US 
foreign policy agenda. Following this logic, China will become its most 
important partner when it comes to global non-terrorism and anti-proliferation 
efforts. Based on a realistic appraisal of the international political 
situation, the members of the Vulcan group will expand cooperation with China 
and downplay differences of opinion.  In other words, if the Vulcans want to see China as a diplomatic partner in 
the 21st century, it would be impossible for them to oppose Beijing over the 
question of Taiwan.  Based on Washington's objective of strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific 
region, stability in the Taiwan Strait will be an important pillar of US 
security, and Taiwan will be key in supporting this strategic balance. From this 
perspective, Bush's new team will not rashly abandon Taiwan, and the US is 
unwilling to tie any other issue to its arms sales to Taiwan.  But this support for Taiwan is not a blank check for Taiwan to use any 
which way. Although Bush didn't repeat the statements Powell made at a press 
conference in Beijing while meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC 
summit in Chile, this doesn't mean that the Powell effect has dissipated. The US 
leaders' emphasis on a consistent cross-strait policy seems to mean that the US 
will continue its clear, two-pronged policy: China should not take armed action, 
and Taiwan should not declare independence.  In other words, the most important goal of US cross-strait policy is still 
to maintain the status quo, as defined by the US. If Taiwan's government 
continues to misjudge the international situation, and US statements lead them 
to believe that the storm following Powell's statement has blown over, it may 
continue to move toward independence by, for example, holding a Taiwan 
independence referendum, or amending the law to allow changing the national 
emblem. This may cause the situation in the Taiwan Strait to deteriorate and 
maybe even give rise to a fourth cross-strait crisis.  In future, it is possible that Washington will issue a fourth communique 
with Beijing, to avert a crisis and guarantee stability in the Taiwan Strait and 
in East Asia. A fourth communique could clearly state that Taiwan does not enjoy 
sovereignty and that the US opposes Taiwan's independence, and even change the 
tactic of "pushing for dialogue" to "pushing for 
unification" in order to restrain Taiwan's actions. This could be even more 
harmful to Taiwan.  For the sake of its national interest, the most urgent task for Taiwan's 
government is to show restraint, strive for cross-strait stability, rebuild 
mutual trust between Taiwan and the US and put the US-Taiwan relationship back 
on track. This is the only way that the nation can continue to exist and 
develop.  Yu Pen-li is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of American 
Studies, Tamkang University. 
 China's subs coming into play By 
Richard Halloran The chief rivals for submarine supremacy in this region are China, which 
has given priority to submarines as it acquires a blue-water or deep-sea navy, 
and the US, which is rebuilding submarine capabilities that had atrophied after 
the Cold War.  China and the US are not alone. North Korea has a sizeable coastal 
submarine force and South Korea has begun to counter it. Japan has a modest but 
proficient fleet.  Taiwan is pondering the procurement of eight boats that would triple the 
size of its force. The city-state of Singapore has three submarines and is 
acquiring a fourth. Australia has six modern submarines, based on a Swedish 
design, for surveillance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  In South Asia, India has been acquiring a submarine fleet with Russian 
help. A specialist on South Asia, Donald Berlin of the Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies in Hawaii, has written that India will also build six to twelve 
French-designed submarines and is working on a nuclear-powered boat that will go 
to sea in 2006.  Pakistan has launched two submarines and is constructing a third. Berlin 
says "Pakistan will likely want a submarine-based nuclear weapons delivery 
system" to deter India. Iran has several submarines.  Even Israel, usually considered a Mediterranean nation, is believed to have 
sent submarines armed with cruise missiles through the Red Sea into the Indian 
Ocean to deter a potential nuclear attack by Iran.  In contrast, Russia, which once deployed 90 submarines into the Pacific, 
has laid up all but 20 boats because of that nation's financial distress.  "They've held onto their more capable boats," said a US official 
with access to intelligence reports, but their operations are constricted.  The Chinese submarine in Japanese waters was one of five Han class boats, 
the first of China's nuclear-powered submarines. After she left port at Ningbo, 
she was detected by Taiwan as she steamed east, then by the US near Guam in the 
central Pacific, and finally by Japan after she turned north to steam near 
Okinawa.  After a Japanese protest, Chinese spokesmen expressed regrets and blamed 
the mistake on unexplained "technical difficulties," raising questions 
about Chinese seamanship; the Chinese have long had problems operating 
submarines.  China is acquiring submarines to "patrol the littorals, blockade the 
Taiwan Strait, and stalk [US] aircraft carriers," say two researchers, Lyle 
Goldstein and Bill Murray, at the Naval War College in Rhode Island.  China, which has 50 submarines in two older classes, began expanding 10 
years ago when it bought four Russian "Kilo" submarines, then ordered 
eight more in 2002 for delivery starting next year.  The Chinese are producing the "Song" class of attack boats armed 
with cruise missiles. Training has been intensified throughout the fleet.  It is in the Taiwan Strait that Chinese and US submarines would most likely 
clash if China seeks to blockade or invade Taiwan, the country over which it 
claims sovereignty but whose people prefer to remain separate.  US submarines would go into action because Taiwan lacks sufficient 
anti-submarine weapons to break a blockade or stop an invasion. The US policy is 
to help defend Taiwan from an unprovoked assault by China.  In the US, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Walter Doran, has 
made the revival of submarine warfare his top priority and has set up a special 
staff to oversee that resurgence. The Navy has recently established an 
anti-submarine warfare center in San Diego to improve training and readiness.  The US has moved two submarines from Hawaii to Guam and will add a third to 
base them closer to operating areas. Where 60 percent of US submarines operated 
in the Atlantic during the Cold War and 40 percent in the Pacific, the Navy is 
planning to reverse that ratio.  Attack submarines whose mission after the Cold War was to launch cruise 
missiles at land and sea targets and to gather intelligence have been assigned 
anew the task of fighting other submarines since the best anti-submarine weapon 
is another submarine.  Six "SURTASS" ships (Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System) that 
use powerful sonar to detect submarines in vast areas of deep water have now 
been assigned to the Pacific. Four ballistic missile submarines are being 
converted to carry 150 cruise missiles each and to infiltrate 100 commandos onto 
hostile beaches.  Concluded a US official: "Once again, the value of stealth is being 
recognized."  Richard Halloran is a freelance journalist based in Hawaii.  Editorial: Missing: two policy platforms We are thinking of running the following classified ad: "Missing: two 
policy platforms, one blue one green, last seen ...". That's the problem, 
because it's been so long since there's been any serious policy debate that we 
can't remember when it was last seen.  We are well aware that President Chen Shui-bian has been saying something 
new every Saturday and Sunday for the last three weeks, but look at what he has 
been saying. Chen wants to abolish "Taiwan Province," reform the 
Constitution, draw a clear line between party and state, vest Republic of China 
(ROC) sovereignty with the people, perhaps hold a referendum if pushed to it and 
pass the weapons bill if he can. All the while he is talking about -- but 
providing no evidence for -- a "soft coup" in March.  You have to go back a month to hear the kind of policy pledge familiar in 
legislative elections elsewhere -- implementation of a senior citizens' pension 
plan. All the rest is fluff; rousing fluff for the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) faithful, but fluff all the same. Because while this newspaper agrees with 
and has long advocated most of what Chen has proposed, we also note that these 
are mostly symbolic issues. They have a lot to do with national identity, but 
have little to do with the day-to-day business of making Taiwan a better place 
to live.  Elsewhere in this newspaper, we report on the frustration felt by both 
environmental and women's groups. Issues close to their heart are not being 
addressed, and we share that frustration. Taiwan has one of the most degraded 
environments of any newly industrialized country, thanks to the Chinese 
Nationalist Party's (KMT) shortsightedness. What can be done to rectify this? 
Gender equality in the workplace, too, is still far from being a reality here, 
despite numerous laws mandating it. There's been no talk of solving Taiwan's 
dire fiscal problems, no mention of industrial hollowing out, no discussion of 
the possibility that the "Taiwan model" of economic growth is 
exhausted and urgently needs a rethink.  Compared with the pan-blues, however, the DPP look like policy wonks. The 
only thing we have heard at any time from the blues is that a blue majority is 
needed in the legislature to prevent the greens from doing anything. Perhaps 
that is not exactly what they say, but it is certainly what their message means: 
"Elect us so we can prevent Chen's hotheads from getting anything 
done." Of course we know the blues have more pressing concerns than policy, 
such as how to cope with KMT Chairman Lien Chan's delusional psychosis, and how 
to steal as much from KMT coffers as possible before the greens can make good on 
their threat to get the stolen assets back.  So the election campaign runs on, in a total vacuum of real policies. 
Perhaps that is simply because there is a broad consensus on the way the big 
things -- the economy, for example -- should be handled, so that all that is 
left to quibble about is the symbols.  There's certainly room for debate. Does Taiwan want a small government, 
low-tax, low-benefit kind of society, as it traditionally has had? Or does it 
want a high-tax, high-benefit, European-style welfare state? This cleavage is 
not reflected in the two camps at the moment, and more's the pity. Perhaps we 
simply have to wait for the defeated KMT to reinvent itself before the body 
politic becomes more sensible. Hopefully that day will not be too long delayed. 
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