20041217

The elections for the sixth Legislative Yuan have come to a close. It appears that the overall political scene has not changed. The fact that the smaller governing party will be dealing with a larger opposition party remains.

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is still the second-largest party in the legislature and the pan-blue camp can maintain its majority if the KMT continues its alliance with the People First Party (PFP). The political climate is still presided over by the same group of politicians, although the situation they find themselves in is slightly different.

Not only will there be changes within the political parties, the relationship between the parties may also change.

After three consecutive losses in the previous elections, the KMT, at the helm of the pan-blue camp, has ended its losing streak, but has not climbed back to its past political dominance.

The pan-blues seized 114 seats and the pan-greens 101 seats in the 225-seat legislature. Compared with the previous legislative elections, the pan-blues lost one seat and the pan-greens gained one seat. The total vote for the pan-greens rose by 2.2 percent, whereas it dropped by 3 percent for the pan-blue camp. As such the pan-blue camp has once again gained a majority in the legislature.

The question now is whether or not Lien Chan will finally step down as chairman of the KMT and hand the reins of power to the younger generation. If the victorious Lien becomes so conceited that he decides to cling to his chairmanship, it remains to be seen how he will keep control in the legislature and also over the younger KMT politicians.

More importantly, we do not yet know if the PFP is willing to merge unconditionally with of the KMT with Lien still at the helm. PFP Chairman James Soong thinks of his party as the third power after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and KMT, adding that the PFP will play the crucial minority role in the competition for the Legislative Yuan speakership.

Thus, it would seem that the KMT and PFP are no longer compatible, and neither is willing to play second fiddle to the other. On the other hand, if the KMT wants to maintain a balancing force to the government, it must rely on the PFP. Inside the PFP rank and file, however, disagreement has risen. Legislators-elect such as Lee Ching-Hua , Diane Lee and Chou Hsi-Wei have called on Soong to make concessions to the issue of merging with the KMT, reflecting tension throughout the party.

The green camp's failure to win a majority is a setback for the Chen administration, but it is not necessarily a setback for the pan-greens.

For the moment, we are sure that Chen's ambitions have not been fulfilled and a host of policy proposals will probably not go through. He has to face up to the reality and plan a whole new strategy.

What Chen has to mull over is how to gain control of the legislature. If he cannot, he has to make sure the legislature will not become a source of political upheaval. The president will have to think outside the box if he is to resolve the friction between the green and blue camps.

The mainstream values of this nation without a doubt have to remain in place. More importantly, the DPP has to stick to its principles.

It is more difficult to accomplish a mission in times of adversity than in favorable circumstances. These are trials for both Chen and the DPP.

Translated by Daniel Cheng

The 59.16 percent turnout rate of the legislative elections marked a new low in Taiwan's electoral history. Many voters may have contracted "election fatigue," so that no matter how hard the pan-blue and the pan-green camps tried to motivate them using sensational rhetoric, they could not increase the level of interest.

Now that the elections are over, all candidates, both winners and losers, should not forget this lesson. They should not let this instance of "election fatigue" deteriorate into "democracy fatigue," exacerbating the public's existing political apathy. In the long run, this indifference could become an incurable disorder, and then it will be too late to seek a cure.

Compared with the previous legislative elections, why was this election so lackluster and the campaign so chaotic that the candidates failed to stand out? The main reason may be that party leaders from both camps focused on sensitive issues carried over from the presidential election; it simply became overtime for the presidential election.

As such, the legislative candidates had little opportunity to express their political opinions and personal qualities. Ultimately, due to the failure of the vote-allocation strategy, it all came down to sympathy votes for underdog candidates.

The worst aspect of vote-allocation is the high level of uncertainty that comes with it. Apart from passively following the instructions of the party on how to vote, voters are often influenced by the call to "save" certain candidates. In this election, votes were concentrated on underdog candidates, so that they won with huge margins, while candidates that had been high in the polls failed to get elected.

Because of the multi-member district system, vote-allocation has been a part of every legislative election. In the last one it was the blue camp that suffered, but this time it was the green camp.

Several election commentators say the pan-green camp nominated too many candidates without the ability to attract more voters. As a result of its failed vote-allocation strategy, the green camp, in certain districts, lost seats it should have won. As as result, the dream of having a legislative majority failed to come true.

Looking back on the election, we can see that apart from a small number of issues, such as the arms procurement budget and subsidies for the elderly -- which can be considered public policy issues -- the tendency was for campaigns to focus on "high-level" or conceptual issues that had nothing to do with people's daily lives.

This battle around conceptual issues, included the matter of changing Taiwan's name and constitutional reform, which, while not unimportant, tended to lead voters to believe that the election had little to do with them directly.

There was also a segment of the electorate that had simply become fed up with the endless political rhetoric and believed that whoever won a majority, the legislature would remain equally chaotic. This segment, therefore, simply couldn't be bothered to vote.

It appeared that the green camp's goal of achieving a clear majority in the legislature had little to do with actually improving the lives of ordinary people. Even though President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) announced "five guarantees" and "10 priority legislative bills" the day before the poll as a means of catering to bread-and-butter concerns, it was done too late to change the dynamics of the election and had little effect on undecided voters.

Now that they have been taught a lesson, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union must change their strategy and put more effort into quality of life issues if they are to survive the halving of the legislature and the introduction of single-member districts in 2007.

Although the pan-blue camp has retained a majority, if they get too arrogant and take the opportunity to "disarm" the DPP -- forcing it to give up the right to form a Cabinet, or continuing to make the legislature a battlefield over the issues of national status, cross-strait relations and ideological matters -- they will be seen regarded as being irresponsible.

If they undermine the DPP's ability to achieve anything in government, the blue camp would be seen as seeking only to increase its own power without regard to political or social stability.

The best policy for the pan-blue camp will simply be to make their presence felt in the legislature, while at the same time implementing internal reforms and a generational shift in the leadership, so that they can put aside the popular impression that they are incapable of separating party and state. If the pan-blue camp is able to show that it is capable of introspection even in victory, who can say that it will never again win power?

We also must point out that democratic politics are not just a battle between government and opposition, for the spirit of democracy is the power of the people. So although the people elect their representatives, as citizens they must continue to monitor the performance of their representatives and take an active part in public affairs.

Although the election is now over, there are some unsatisfactory aspects to the event that still warrant consideration.

Only when increasing numbers of people become unsatisfied with simply being a voter, and learn more about exercising the rights of a citizen, will Taiwan have a mature and balanced democracy.

If this happens, in future elections, those citizens unsatisfied with the state of things will not shirk their responsibility to vote, but will exercise their ability to collectively counterbalance political power and help direct the country along the path of greater prosperity. The experience of Western nations suggests that this is the only way to achieve a truly effective democratic government.

Ku Chung-hwa is a professor of sociology at National Chengchi University and chairman of the Taipei Society.

Translated by Lin Ya-ti and Ian Bartholomew

By Richard Halloran
Prudence suggests that not too much be read into the surprisingly inconclusive results of Taiwan's legislative election, because, fundamentally, little has changed and the confrontation with China will persist in jeopardizing the security of East Asia. After the balloting last weekend, President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its allies ended up with only one more seat, 101, than they had before in the 225-seat legislature. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and its partners ended up with 114 seats, one less than before. Independents held the rest.

The outcome was a surprise to Chen, political pundits and much of the foreign press, all of whom had predicted that the pan-green coalition would gain enough seats to have a majority. When that didn't happen, Chen resigned as chairman of his party to take ritual responsibility for its failure.

Much speculation focused on Taiwan's conflict with China, which has been summed up in the phrase "cross-strait relations." Conventional wisdom said the attitude of the voters on this issue would determine their choices.

As the dust has cleared, however, reasons for the outcome have begun to emerge and they seem to have more to do with Taiwan's internal politics than with cross-strait relations. The adage that in a democracy "all politics is local" seems to have been proven once again.

Consequently, the split government means Chen will continue to run into obstacles in his plans to revise the Constitution, use the name "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China," reorganize the government and make other moves intended to keep Taiwan separate from China and nudge it toward independence.

The president, who has run into acute political adversity before, may trim his sails but is not likely to change course. Chen and his predecessor Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) have molded a strong sense of Taiwanese identity even if a small majority think the status quo ought to be preserved for now.

The restrained initial response from Beijing suggests that the communist government there was caught by surprise and is uncertain about what the outcome meant. Even so, China's Xinhua news agency contended that the vote demonstrated "the unpopularity of the leader's obstinate separatist stance."

"The voters were alarmed by Chen's rash lurch toward independence, especially his plan to change the name of Taiwan's overseas representative offices," Xinhua argued.

Those offices are quasi-embassies in nations, including the US, that lack diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

In light of that stance, there's not much hope that Beijing will soften its policies toward Taiwan. The authorities apparently believe their hard line helped to bring about Taiwan's election results and therefore they should stick to it and move on with their military buildup. Washington was cool toward the election results after having cautioned Chen that he was going too far too fast and might provoke a military attack from China. Despite those cautions, many senior officials in the Bush administration are reported to favor a Taiwan separated from China and possibly independent.

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, asked to comment on the Taiwanese election, told reporters: "They had a successful election. That's a good thing. We're glad to see it. What they decide to do within their political system now on some of these issues is going to be decided in Taiwan."

US military officials have been delivering two messages to Taiwan and China. Noting that a US$18 billion arms purchase from the US has been held up by the KMT in Taiwan's legislature, US officers have told the Taiwanese they must do more to help themselves if they expect the US to come to their rescue in the event of an assault from China. On the other side, US officials have repeatedly warned China not to miscalculate. They have told Beijing's military leaders that US military forces will respond with sufficient power to prevail in the ensuing hostilities if China mounts an unprovoked attack on Taiwan.

In domestic politics, the DPP evidently failed to adopt tactics suited to Taiwan's electoral system. In addition, the KMT, which had dominated Taiwan's politics for decades, has far more money in its coffers than does the DPP, a comparative newcomer to the scene. And, as in most democratic nations, citizens voted with their pocket books. Chen had evidently not fulfilled his economic promises to the voters and he paid for it at the polls.

Richard Halloran is a journalist based in Hawaii.

THREATS: Beijing said that letting the former Taiwan president and `mastermind behind forces for Taiwan independence' visit would seriously damage ties
By Melody Chen
STAFF REPORTER , WITH AGENCIES
Taiwan welcomed yesterday Japan's decision to issue a visa to former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), while China demanded Japan rescind the move and warned bilateral ties would worsen if Lee was allowed to visit.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda announced in a press conference that Tokyo agreed to allow Lee to travel to Japan as a private citizen after he promised not to engage in any political activities during his stay.

Tokyo notified Beijing of its decision on Wednesday, Hosoda said. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi later told reporters that Japan had no reason to reject Lee's visa application but stressed Japan wanted to continue developing its relationship with China.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said in a news conference that Beijing has "already expressed very clearly to the Japanese side that Lee Teng-hui is a mastermind behind forces for Taiwan independence."

"We demand that the Japanese side revoke such a decision immediately. Otherwise it will of, course, have a negative impact on relations between China and Japan," Liu said, adding the visit was "by no means personal or one of nostalgia."

"I think his activities in Japan constitute a provocation against the reunification of China and we are strongly opposed to all kinds or forms of connivance with such activities," Liu said.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei welcomed Japan's decision. Gary Lin , director general of the ministry's Department of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, nevertheless said that the ministry was not clear about details of Lee's trip because it is of a private nature.

The Japan Interchange Association (JIA) in Taipei said yesterday Lee has not filed his visa application yet.

"He might take the trip at the end of this year," an official at the association said.

Japanese media reported Lee might travel to the Kansai area, famous for its hot springs.

The Central News Agency quoted a close friend of Lee as saying that Lee has not decided whether to take the trip at the end of the year because his wife Tseng Wen-hui is still recovering from a cold.

Lee once said he wished to bring Taiwan's Aboriginal children to Japan to perform singing and dancing when campaigning for the Taiwan Solidarity Union's (TSU) legislative candidates, according to the agency.

"It has been former president Lee's hope to visit Japan and the US, particularly Japan," said TSU Secretary General Lin Jih-jia yesterday.

Lee's visit to Japan would be his first since he received treatment for a heart condition at a Japanese hospital in 2001. At that time, Tokyo said it had granted Lee entry to Japan in 2001 on "humanitarian grounds."

Protests in China are nothing new. By some accounts, Chinese officials currently negotiate upwards of 50,000 "major incidents" annually. Widespread corruption has bred deep discontent: workers protest the Enron-like bilking of their life savings, townspeople fight against illegal land seizures, and villagers battle injustices -- small and large -- on a daily basis.

Typically, these protests are local in nature and generally resolved with a combination of payoffs, arrests, and promises of future improvement. Occasionally, China's government takes action against local officials whose crimes are considered egregious. As long as protests remain local, however, they can be managed as isolated cases that won't pose a broader challenge or spark a movement toward systemic change.

Yet the government's days of putting out protests like brush fires may be ending. Over the past year and a half, China's environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have organized protests that reach across provincial boundaries, engage Chinese from all social strata, garner support from China's media, and directly address the issue of failed governance on a national scale.

The catalyst for these broad-based protests is the proposed construction of hundreds of dams throughout western China. Dam construction in China has never been open to public debate. China's environmental activists, meanwhile, have focused on the "politically safe" issues of protecting biodiversity, recycling, and environmental education.

Now, however, these activists have become more assertive, launching campaigns against a number of proposed dams along the Nu and Jinsha rivers in Yunnan and the Min River in Sichuan. They still raise traditional issues of biodiversity loss, destruction of sites of natural beauty and cultural importance, and social justice issues surrounding resettlement.

But now they also challenge the shoddy governance and corruption that allow dam construction to proceed unchecked, without environmental impact assessments, as local officials siphon off resettlement funds and ignore the claims of local villagers.

The political stakes are high, and China's hydropower interests are strong. Environmental activists who are currently battling to halt damming and flooding in the culturally and scenically renowned region of the Tiger Leaping Gorge in Yunnan are battling hydropower kingpin Li Xiaopeng , son of former premier Li Peng .

Dam protests can often be volatile. In October, tens of thousands of villagers protesting inadequate resettlement compensation held a local official captive for several hours before 10,000 People's Armed Police officers rescued him.

These protests are striking not only for the sensitive nature of the issues they address, but for the broad-based support they have elicited. While spearheaded by Beijing-based NGOs, the dam protests involve Chinese from all parts of the country, employ all means of communication, and engage the support of central government officials.

Beijing-based NGOs are allying with local Sichuan NGOs to launch Internet campaigns, distribute petitions, and mobilize villagers.

In one case, environmental activists took villagers from a proposed dam site to another town to see firsthand how poorly others had fared in the dam resettlement process.

University students in the regions of the proposed dams have also become engaged through Internet chat groups. Environmental activists have found allies among officials within the State Environ-mental Protection Administration, Meteo-rological Administration and Forestry Bureau.

The dam projects have also become a focal point for a broader political debate within the Chinese media. Newspapers such as Southern Weekend, China Youth Daily and even the traditionally conservative China Daily call directly for greater political openness, increased political participation, and for strength-ening the rule of law.

Similar environmental protests have evolved into demands for broader political change in other countries.

In the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, environmental activism contributed dramatically to regime change. In countries like Thailand, Indo-nesia, and the Philippines, environmental protest has helped spur political reform.

The same may happen in China. Many of China's leading environmentalists are former students and intellectual leaders from the Tiananmen protests of 1989 who believe that environmental activism offers an avenue for advancing broader political reform. Others began apoliti-cally, but have come to believe that there can be no environmental protection without political change.

This shared commitment to systemic reform is putting China's government to the test.

China's leaders recognize that their policy options are limited: business as usual, repression, or reform. Thus far, the government has demonstrated some flexibility while trying to manage this new challenge with traditional means.

Premier Wen Jiabao has stayed the construction of a number of dams until environmental and social impact assessments could be undertaken. Some have been approved while others have not. With hundreds of dams still likely to become targets for protest, pressure will only intensify for a more significant response.

The government could launch a broad crackdown on such protests, although this would risk damaging China's prestige internationally and provoking larger, more violent protests.

The third option is to use environmental protection to justify moving China ahead with real political reform sooner rather than later. While this is currently an unlikely outcome, as the anti-dam protests gather strength, China's leaders may realize that if they do not move quickly, they risk being swept away.

Elizabeth Economy is a senior fellow and director of Asia Studies at the US Council on Foreign Relations and author of The River Runs Black, an examination of the environmental challenges to China's future.