Us’ Taiwan on Dec 27, 2004

When the US sneezes, Taiwan catches cold

By Liu Kuan-teh

Unsurprisingly, the comments made by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that Taiwan was "probably the biggest landmine" in US-China relations as well as "the US is not required to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act" stirred up domestic finger-pointing in Taipei.

When the US sneezes, Taiwan catches a cold. We have seen this pattern repeated over the past year. Partisan calculations aside, can Taiwan's leaders -- from both camps?learn lessons and re-examine their strategy toward the new US-Taiwan-China relationship?

The Armitage quote was made Dec. 10 -- on the eve of Taiwan's legislative elections. The PBS network chose to run the interview more than ten days after the pan-blue camp secured a majority. Washington must have been relieved that the pro-new-constitution, pro-name-rectification pan-green forces failed to win the campaign. There is no need for Washington to intentionally sabotage the Chen Shui-bian administration. Yet more prudence is required in future communication between Taipei and Washington.

Armitage was simply explaining an old nuance in the TRA and the Three Communiques, and not a new policy change. But no one can deny the incremental adjustment in the US tendency to replace its old strategy of "ambiguity" with a clearer identification of what can and cannot be done.

Washington's move to draw a clear "red line" has been closely associated with a growing misperception of Taiwan's status and a lack of trust in Chen's next step regarding constitutional reforms and name change.

Taipei's lack of determination to strengthen its self-defense capability in the face of a potential military crisis originates from China's reckless and irrational miscalculation.

The US conviction is that all these factors would drag it into an unnecessary military conflict with China, which the Bush administration does not want and would be unable to solve.

Therefore, Armitage's comments displayed a unified Bush administration attitude to send clear messages to Chen's government, the pan-blue camp and Beijing.

Washington's warning to Chen is simply "don't take the US for granted." There is indeed a presumption in Taiwan -- advocated mostly by Taiwan's independence proponents -- that Taiwan can be provocative to China, and the US will bail Taiwan out.

Despite the differences between Chen and former President Lee Teng-hui and his Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) on the strategy and goal of constitutional reforms and the name-change proposals, the push for a stronger Taiwan consciousness has no doubt worsened Washington-Beijing relations.

Such a notion that "the US will come to our aid anyway" has led to even more worrisome behavior by the pan-blue force's mindless and irrational boycott of the 6-million dollar purchase of eight diesel submarines, six Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile defense batteries and 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft.

In keeping with the TRA, the US should provide Taiwan with weapons sufficient for its defense to deter military action, but there is a difference between "deter" and "defend." Without showing any will to defend itself, how can Taiwan count only on the US' assistance?

To Beijing, it is not a good time to take advantage of US policy maker's criticisms of Taiwan's leader, either. The alleged move to enact the so-called "anti-secession law" is a straight manifestation of unilaterally changing the status quo of Taiwan Strait.

As one of the actors, China should not portray itself as both arbitrator and law-enforcer. The move is not conducive to a peaceful and stable cross-strait dialogue.

US not getting the picture

Since the legislative election on Dec. 11 we have seen absolutely no indication from the pan-blues of an about-face over their rejection of the NT$610 billion arms budget.

After years of thinking that the pan-greens are dangerous hotheads who will cause trouble with China while the blues are for the status quo and cross strait dialogue, the White House just can't understand that the sides have changed. It is the greens that want the status quo of de facto independence and the blues that want capitulation to China.

US criticism of Chen Shui-bian in the last two weeks of the election campaign probably helped the blues to victory, a victory that was absolutely not in the US' strategic interest.

When, a century hence, the history is written of the end of US power in the Western Pacific, the White House's action in the runup to the Taiwan elections of December 2004 will be cited as the tipping point.

Gregg Banks Hsinchu  

Editorial: US' Taiwan policy is in shambles

The last month has been a succinct demonstration that the US policy toward Taiwan is in shambles. We have seen the Department of Defense confirm that starting next year US military attaches will be posted at the American Institute in Taiwan. It is also a matter of perhaps not so common knowledge that relations between the US military establishment and its Taiwanese counterpart are the best they have been for 20 years -- so far so good.

Compare this to the State Department's behavior: "O what a falling off was there," to quote Hamlet. November saw US Secretary of State Colin Powell, that sorry wreck of a once principled man, trying to buy China's help over the North Korean nuclear program by denigrating Taiwan's status, in absolute contradiction of both international law and 30 years of US policy. Then there was the furor over Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's statements.

Taiwan has whipped itself into a frenzy over the perfectly obvious, while the real viciousness of Armitage's statement has been ignored. Alarmingly, when prompted to name a "landmine" in US-China relations, Armitage named Taiwan. Yet isn't this obvious? China wants Taiwan, the US doesn't want China to have Taiwan. Taiwan is therefore a source of conflict between the two -- and this has nothing to do with anything Taiwan does.

Some find it appalling to learn that the US is not committed under the Taiwan Relations Act to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. Since the TRA was passed in 1978, one would think that Taiwan's punditry and politicians would have got around to reading it over the last 26 years. But nobody ever bothers, and as a result the TRA has become like the Magna Carta -- notable for what people think it's about, rather than what it actually says.

Armitage's remarks concerning US intervention in case of China's attack being decided by Congress were a sleight of hand. Actually, it is up to the president under the War Powers Act, and Congressional approval only comes two to three months down the line. On the other hand, Congress has always been far more supportive of Taiwan than the White House.

If there was a time Taiwan should have raised its voice over Armitage's remarks, it was over his highly offensive "We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China." Who is this "we?" The US has never agreed that there was only one China. At best it has said that since the two sides of the Strait agreed there was only one China it would not challenge that position. After breaking relations with Taiwan, it "recognized" Beijing as the sole government of China but only "acknowledged" that Beijing claimed Taiwan. Acknowledgement does not mean approval or agreement. It is simply a statement that one understands the other side's position, not that one supports it.

Challenging Armitage on the "we" was the first thing TECRO should have done after the PBS broadcast -- otherwise what do we have diplomats for? Amazingly, this has still gone uncommented on in Taiwan.

China's law reinforces 'one country'

By Nat Bellocchi

The DPP is lamenting its failure to reach the goal of a majority in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT is breathing a sigh of relief that it remains in play as a major domestic political party by continuing its majority. China, on the other hand, has been busy putting together a strategy that focuses very importantly on its relations with the US. As a result, we may be entering a new atmosphere in cross-Strait relations. There will be the same three players, (the US, China, and Taiwan), but the game will be considerably different.

Analysts have had a variety of reasons for the unexpected results of the legislative elections on Dec. 11. Like the strategy of the KMT in the presidential election in March, the DPP strategy in the LY election missed the mark. Whether it was the national identity issue, or allocation of candidates policy, the nature of an LY election compared to a presidential election, or the influence of the international media, the main point was that it didn't produce the intended result.

`[China's new law] could "legalize" an attack by the PLA, for example, or it can be used as a pre-condition for dialogue. It could even establish what it considers as "legitimate" provocation, or "neutralize" the TRA.'

The KMT, on the other hand, seems to have regained its acumen on how to manage grassroots elections, and seems to have had the resources to pursue it. In the process, however, its ideology within the party may have shifted toward the present mainstream of Taiwan's political spectrum. What we may be seeing is both of the two major political parties struggling for the middle ground (i.e. the mainstream that has developed in the last few years). How this plays out, however, depends on whether both parties can restrain themselves from trying to defeat their major opponent, not destroying it.

In China, all of this activity on Taiwan for the most part is of less importance than the new strategy Beijing is developing to cope with the "Taiwan issue." The announcement that government is developing a law which would make any secession by any entity it claims as part of China, against the "law." That is supposed to put it on a higher level of authority than regulations presumably. It depends on who is reading it, of course, as the making of a law in China is a bit different than, say, Taiwan.

As no details on just what is in the proposed law have been released yet, an accurate analysis of it is not possible. The possibilities are infinite however. It will most certainly challenge the American policy of no unilateral change to the status quo. It could "legalize" an attack by the PLA, for example, or it can be used as a pre-condition for dialogue. It could even establish what it considers as "legitimate" provocation. Yet another possible use of this "law" is that it could "neutralize" the TRA. America has often based its actions on cross-Strait matters as being required by law.

There was one public statement in Beijing's announcement regarding the new law that made clear "one country, two systems" would in any event be used as a part of a future agreement on this subject. If that was meant to offer solace to Taiwanese voters, it indicates just how much the leaders proposing this law are misjudging what Taiwan is about today. The wording of the system has changed but the gap in real terms remains. China wants a "one country, two systems" for Taiwan.

Their objectives remain generally that: (1) there is only one China, and Taiwan is a province of China, not an independent sovereign state; (2) unification of Taiwan and China is inevitable; (3) Taiwanese authorities must recognize the Beijing leadership as the central government of China; (4) negotiations can be conducted on an equal basis by political parties or non-government entities, but not between the two governments; (5) Beijing prefers a peaceful resolution but reserves the right to use force; (6) Beijing is the only legitimate power, and decides on issues of sovereignty, national security, and foreign affairs.

By comparison, Taiwan's position on unification is generally that: (1) both sides must acknowledge the existence of two independent and sovereign entities; (2) both sides must agree that the status of each entity is equal; (3) there will be no official negotiations unless China renounces the use of force; (4) China must be democratized; and (5) it must have a free market economic system.

A "one country, two systems" accommodation with China is clearly unacceptable to the people of Taiwan. The US has often publicly stated that any change to the status quo regarding Taiwan must have the "assent" of the people of Taiwan. Where does that stand in dealing with a China "law"? Will the commitments made in the six assurances be in jeopardy?

This takes us to the new atmosphere between the US and Taiwan. As was openly mentioned in the State Department's daily briefing, the US is communicating, apparently in narrow channels, with both China and Taiwan when it believes some action or statement by the government leaders on either side are provocative on a cross-Strait matter.

If that becomes the norm in dealing with both sides on a matter that might develop into dangerous tension, there will likely be criticism even in the US.

Given the nature of the presidents' decision-making process in both Taipei and Washington, the ad hoc use of narrow channels to communicate a matter is questionable. It too easily results in misunderstanding, and is more likely to generate a broader oversight by the legislative branch on both sides.

China's proposed new "law" should be a wake-up call for both Taiwan and the US. Given the potential harm this "law" could cause both, it is high time the two major parties establish an understanding on how to restrain themselves in dealing with sensitive sovereignty-connected issues while debating legitimate and much-needed reforms.

From the US perspective, it is now taking a step in advancing a better rapport with Taiwan's military. It has changed from having no communications at all to the posting of active uniformed military personnel stationed in Taipei. It was badly needed by both the US and Taiwan even in the days of relative quiet on security matters.

That same reasoning is sorely needed on both sides -- Washington and Taiwan -- on political matters.