Media must keep an eye on the new legislature
　

By Lillian Wang 王秦俐
Monday, Jan 21, 2008, Page 8

In the recent legislative elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) gained two-thirds of the seats and Taiwan once again faces domination by one party. After enjoying democratic freedom since the end of martial law 20 years ago, many Taiwanese may fear a return to an authoritarian age.

Single party domination this time is different, though. Taiwan is no longer under martial law and Taiwanese media outlets are not official government mouthpieces. Many media outlets have been reduced to tabloids or have become polarized. Many misrepresent public opinion because of their political partisanship. The media has never attained professionalism.

Can the public expect the media to change overnight and become a professional watchdog over a legislature dominated by one party? Can we expect the media to measure the KMT -- a mega party that may gather up all five branches of the government into its hands -- by the same standards it measured the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) minority government?

Examining other Asian countries dominated by a single party may be instructive. One example is Singapore, where dominance has led to media conformity. The two largest media groups are owned by the government and the ruling party has even gone so far as to restrict the opposition from using Internet sites and blogs as part of their election campaigns. This blatant suppression of opinion is certainly not a good example for Taiwan.

Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has also long had the advantage of being a dominant party, but heavy media criticism led to it losing power in 1993 and suffering a severe defeat in parliamentary elections last year.

Though the rise and fall of the LDP stemmed from various issues, the structure of Japanese media nevertheless provides an instructive point. NHK, a public television station which enjoys Japan's highest viewer ratings, is generally politically neutral. As for print media, there is the right-leaning Yomiuri Shimbun and left-leaning newspapers such as the Manichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. It would appear then that a democratic system dominated by one major party can still avoid corruption and autocracy if it is monitored by diverse media and public opinion mechanisms.

Another means of monitoring is to construct a legislative television channel, such as C-Span in the US. The channel should be located near highly visible news channel frequencies, and broadcasts would open legislative operations and negotiations to the public so that there would be nowhere to hide and no need to go through second-hand mainstream media.

The KMT has promised to do its best to prevent abuse of legislative power. If this is so, it should be the first to propose setting up a legislative television channel funded by public resources and a corresponding multi-media database which would allow public access via the Internet. In the future, combined with the power of public watchdog organizations, it could become a public media platform and another supervisory force against legislative corruption outside of the mainstream media.

In short, as no one wishes to see the return of an Orwellian autocracy, it is hoped that the mainstream media can ultimately dispel political polarization. Taiwanese eagerly await the birth of a public platform for legislative supervision.

Taiwanese democracy cannot be allowed to regress -- both the media and the public are responsible for monitoring political forces.

Lillian Wang is an associate professor of journalism at National Chengchi University.

Identity issue is dead


Monday, Jan 21, 2008, Page 8

Based on the results of Taiwan's recent legislative elections, it is clear the DPP must make significant changes for the presidential election in March, as well as for 2012, if it wishes to rectify its defeat.

First, the most immediate and obvious change is to reduce the amount of infighting and finger-pointing within the party. Divisiveness and a lack of unity among DPP members have been principal reasons for its recent political failures.

Next, the recent legislative defeat, as well President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) resignation as DPP chairman, have signaled to the DPP that it has lost touch with the Taiwanese, and that the party should take this opportunity to consider what the people are saying.

While identity politics is a significant topic to resolve, quality of life and economic competitiveness issues have become much more important. Playing the "identity card" no longer resonates as powerfully as it used to among Taiwanese, and it is overplayed. Certain individuals still do not comprehend this fact.

Additionally, because of the nature of the global economy, Taiwan's leaders must realize that aggressive efforts to disrupt the status quo will not be well received by the international community, especially the US.

The US has repeatedly issued statements expressing its concern over any change to the status quo, and that any attempts to do so would harm Taiwan's relationship with Washington.

In order to compete in the future, the DPP must develop a cohesive core platform that emphasizes issues outside of identity politics.

Continuing to play the "identity card," such as the referendum in March concerning Taiwan's UN membership name, is a continuation of a misguided campaign strategy that will only lead to more defeat.

Alvin Lin
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Looking behind Ma's 'three noes'
　

By Ralph Cossa
Monday, Jan 21, 2008, Page 8

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has proclaimed a "three noes" policy -- no unification, no independence and no use of force -- in outlining his planned approach to cross-strait relations should he win the March 22 presidential election.

This is a clever spin-off of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) long-standing "three noes" -- no Taiwan independence; no "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and no Taiwan membership in organizations where statehood is required.

Ma's construct is much more thoughtful and positively oriented. It appears aimed at reassuring four audiences: the people of Taiwan, the PRC, the US and the international community in general.

Ma's first "no" actually reads, in full, "no negotiations for unification during my presidential term[s]." This serves several important purposes. It aims first to reassure those at home who fear that if Ma were elected, he would somehow "hand over Taiwan's sovereignty" to China.

Just as it has proven impossible for President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to unilaterally make Taiwan officially "independent," absent support from the people and legislature, it would be equally impossible for Ma to officially and unilaterally turn Taiwan into a province of the PRC, even if he wanted to. Nonetheless, fears and accusations persist. Hence the domestic importance of the "no unification negotiations" pledge.

This pledge also helps to further temper PRC expectations about what a KMT victory would bring. Most Taiwan-watchers in China expect that regardless of who wins in March, the next Taiwanese president is likely to be less confrontational than Chen. Some may harbor hopes that "reunification" would somehow be in the cards should the KMT prevail.

While being careful not to preclude unification as one possible long-term outcome -- to do so would trigger Beijing's "Anti-Secession" Law -- Ma's message reminds Beijing that talk about unification remains premature. In truth, nothing short of a remarkable complete political transformation in China will ever make unification attractive to the people of Taiwan.

His second pledge, "no pursuit of de jure independence," is aimed first and foremost at Beijing, although the message is equally welcomed in Washington and around the globe.

Moves toward independence, like beauty, are clearly in the eye of the beholder, but many would say that Chen has taken a long (and continuing) series of steps that seem aimed at stretching his own "no independence" pledge to the limit (if not beyond). Both China and the international community would welcome an end to what some interpret as a deliberately provocative game of chicken by Chen's administration.

No one loses much sleep worrying about a Taiwanese attack on China. Clearly, Ma's "no use of force by either side of the Taiwan Strait" is aimed at sending an important message to Beijing: Its current threatening "marry me or I'll kill you" approach has failed to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese and is counterproductive to China's openly professed long-term goal.

Let's be realistic: China will never give an unconditional "no use of force" pledge. Beijing realizes that the primary deterrent to Taiwan moving toward de jure independence is fear of the possible consequences. It is unlikely to give up this important leverage.

But, it is not too much to challenge Beijing, after the Taiwanese presidential election, to make a conditional no use of force pledge; namely, that "as long as the Taiwanese authorities do not take steps toward de jure independence, China will remain completely committed to a peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue." This is, in fact, consistent with China's stance and also with the "Anti-Secession" Law. It would set a positive tone for the future development of cross-strait relations, especially if accompanied by a freeze or (preferably) reduction in the number of Chinese missiles pointed toward Taiwan. In keeping with the "no use of force" pledge, the new administration in Taipei might also want to give serious consideration to scrapping its own offensive missile program.

Let me end with a bold (although some may say unrealistic or hopelessly naive) suggestion. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) has a clean slate in proclaiming his own list of assurances. Why not state, in the interest of (finally) having a bipartisan cross-strait policy, that he is also willing to endorse and adopt a similar "no reunification, no independence and no use of force" policy?

Such a move would help depoliticize Taiwan's most important and sensitive national security issue. It would help assure Beijing and Washington that the "new" DPP -- now under Hseih's leadership -- is genuinely determined to set a more cooperative course. It would also reinforce the shared DPP/KMT goal of increasing Taiwan's "international breathing space," a goal that some say can only be realistically accomplished with Beijing's acquiescence.

It would limit the impact of the upcoming UN referendum and also help limit Chen's options if he is tempted to try to institutionalize his own more controversial and divisive approach toward cross-strait relations either before the election or during the post-election, pre-May 20 inauguration period.

In short, it would serve Taiwan's, Beijing's and Washington's national security interests and create a long overdue "win, win, win" scenario.

Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.