China beefing up military brains
　

By Richard Halloran
Sunday, Mar 09, 2008, Page 8

Tacked onto the end of the US Defense Department's new report on Chinese military power is an appraisal of the effort by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to transform itself "from a force dependent on mass to a streamlined, information-based military with highly qualified officers and soldiers."

Until now, most studies of Beijing's forces have focused on guns, planes, ships, rockets, nuclear weapons and other hardware the PLA has acquired as China's expanding economy provides funds for a surge in military power.

As any old soldier will attest, however, it is trigger-pullers in the infantry and marines, sailors with trained sonar ears aboard ships and submarines and skilled mechanics for aircraft and aircraft carriers who win battles.

And the old soldiers will point to the non-commissioned officers (NCOs), the sergeants and Navy petty officers as the leaders who get it done.

The PLA, having been an unschooled army that relied on human wave tactics in the Korean War and other conflicts, is now seeking qualified officers and NCOs.

When former US secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger visited China in 1983, he was shown a drill in which a rifle platoon attacked a hill. The exercise, however, showed unimpressive leadership, routine maneuvers and poor marksmanship.

Chinese leaders, the Pentagon report says, are concerned that "low education levels in the PLA negatively affect its operating capability and professionalism."

For officers, continuing education in civilian universities has started, with 1,000 officers studying for master's and doctoral degrees. The Pentagon's report notes that potential NCOs must have a high school education, in contrast to their 8th grade educations so far, and further training in NCO academies.

Training has become more demanding. The report says new PLA guidelines emphasize realism in training, requiring scenarios "to resemble actual combat conditions as closely as possible." Some are even designed to compel officers "to deviate from the scripted exercise plan."

In its overview, the Pentagon complains -- as have US leaders, repeatedly -- that "China's leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA's modernizing military capabilities."

In particular, it asserts that "China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditures."

The Pentagon had hardly handed out the report when Beijing, through the Xinhua news agency, contended that it "disseminates the China military threat theory, severely distorts the truth, interferes with China's internal affairs and violates norms of international relations."

In one dispute, the Pentagon estimated that Chinese military spending reached between US$97 billion and US$139 billion last year, after what the Chinese said was a 19.5 percent increase over the 2006 budget. Xinhua also reported that China's military spending for this year would rise 17.6 percent to US$57.2 billion.

The Pentagon says China's defense budget omits spending for nuclear forces, foreign acquisitions, research and development and paramilitary troops. The authors assert that most experts arrive at the same conclusion: "Beijing significantly under-reports its defense expenditures."

In a news conference, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates contended there was a difference in the US handling of the recent destruction of a crippled satellite and the Chinese conduct of an anti-satellite test last year.

"We were very open from the very beginning about what we were going to try and do, the purpose of it, that it was a one-time effort to deal with what we regarded as a potential emergency. We did it in a way that minimized the amount of debris in space, and where much, if not all, of that debris would burn up in a very short period of time," Gates said.

"The Chinese didn't offer any information about their test, no advance notification," he said. "It took place several hundred miles further into space than ours, significantly greater amount of debris and debris that will be up there for many years."

As an emblem, Washington and Beijing have set up a hotline that is supposed to help avert potential crises. The hotline took more than two years to negotiate, evidently because of Chinese reluctance to be seen to be tied too closely to the US.

Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of US military forces in Asia and the Pacific, put it in this perspective: "We really don't need a hotline for better communications, technically. There's a broader point, meaning it will give us a better sense of communications even if it won't make it any easier or harder to communicate."

"It's a symbol," he said.

Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.

Choosing a president to safeguard democracy
　

By Jackson Yeh 葉國豪
Sunday, Mar 09, 2008, Page 8

With less than two weeks to the presidential election, now is a good time to revisit an assessment by political scientist Pei Minxin (裴敏欣) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace before the 2004 election.

Pei voiced concern that Taiwan might become an illiberal democracy as a result of political infighting and ethnic conflict and lose international support.

Four years have passed and the division of authority in Taiwan's democratic politics appears to have clear differences to Pei's predictions. Confronted with the pan-blue camp's recapturing of an absolute majority in the legislature, the pan-green camp has warned strongly against the return to single-party rule and advocated the continuance of a political party "for the Taiwanese."

As one of the countries that democratized during the third wave of democratization, we should give careful consideration to the political risks inherent in the slow and chaotic process of consolidating democracy.

Since 1996, the World Bank has compiled the Worldwide Governance Indicators for 212 countries or territories. The indicators are: "Voice and Accountability," "Political Stability and Absence of Violence," "Government Effectiveness," "Regulatory Quality," "Rule of Law" and "Control of Corruption."

Compared with 1996, Taiwan has seen a sharp drop in its rankings in control of corruption and political stability. Its performance in terms of rule of law, accountability and regulatory quality also showed signs of regression. The country only rated well in government effectiveness.

The decline in control of corruption and political stability represents increasing political risk. This not only results in obstruction and possible damage to the economy in terms of foreign investment, but also loss of public confidence in the effectiveness and superiority of the democratic system. This is reflected in several aspects.

First, drastic changes in administrative policies: for instance, the building of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Policy flip-flopping has caused enormous losses in real economic value and setbacks to rational debate.

Second, ethnic issues continue to be employed as a tactic and mobilizing strategy by politicians to achieve their ends. Take the discussion of the 228 Incident for example: Reflection on its seriousness is dominated by the rise and fall of political forces and has resulted in missed opportunities to effect transitional justice.

Third, government wavering on cross-strait relations has obstructed development of Taiwan's politics and economy. Take the three links and the recognition of Chinese educational qualifications, for instance: a conservative and passive cross-strait policy has only given people a vague or erroneous perception of China's rise and development. The government lags behind the public's vision, but the public is forced to sustain the results of erroneous political decisions.

Taiwan is a newly developed democracy. Subjectively, it would be highly unlikely for the Taiwanese public to accept another authoritarian regime or dictatorial politics. Yet corruption and the failure of the rule of law could seriously hurt public confidence in the democratic system.

We should cast our vote for a president who can facilitate the consolidation of democracy and is capable of effectively lowering political risk. This president will not be the "leader" of Taiwan-ese democracy, but rather a law-abiding and honest citizen who has the vision and is willing to use the authority granted to him through the system to achieve it.

Jackson Yeh is a research assistant at the Center for Contemporary China at National Tsing Hua University.