PLA spending `threatening' Taiwan
　

By Jimmy Chuang
STAFF REPORTER
Wednesday, Mar 12, 2008, Page 1

China's sharp increase in military spending this year will tilt the balance against Taiwan, a Ministry of National Defense official said yesterday.

"We estimate that [China's] actual military spending is at least two to three times more than the figures made public," said Colonel Gong Chen-hua (龔建華), deputy director of the ministry's Intelligence Department.

Gong said it was no secret that China was constantly upgrading its military. He said the ministry estimated that the Chinese government had spent at least US$170 billion this year, rather than the US$59 billion reported by Beijing.

Gong said China was targeting Taiwan in the short term.

China's military buildup "is seriously affecting the military balance in the region," he said. "It is also threatening the security of major countries around the world."

Gong's comments were in keeping with the findings of the Pentagon's recently released annual report on China's military, which stated that the cross-strait balance continues to tilt in Beijing's favor.

Mark Stokes, the US defense secretary's country director for China under the Clinton and Bush administrations, told Defense News magazine recently that the pace and extent of China's military modernization raised doubts about Beijing's intentions in regard to Taiwan.

In related news, the ministry rebutted a rumor that the pilot of the F-16A Falcon that went missing last week had defected and landed at an unidentified airport in China.

"I must assure you that the plane is `missing.' The pilot did not defect,'" said Colonel Lisa Chi (池玉蘭), a ministry spokeswoman. "This kind of rumor seriously affects the morale of air force servicemen and women, as well as the missing pilot's family. It is not fair on them."

Chi said the military's search for the jet and its pilot, which have been missing for a week, was ongoing. At press time, no breakthroughs had been reported.

How to give up a green card

Wednesday, Mar 12, 2008, Page 8

The statements from both sides on whether Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is a permanent US resident have been confusing, so I went to the library to look up the issue in a legal encyclopedia. I found an informative article in American Law Reports (193 A.L.R. Fed. 673). Below are two relevant paragraphs: "If an alien has been abroad for a lengthy period of time, however, his commitment to permanently residing in the US is called into question."

"Abandonment of permanent resident status is generally found when there has been a lengthy absence from the US. Whether an alien has abandoned his status is a matter of subjective intention proven by objective facts, the ultimate issue being whether there is a continuing intent to return. Whether there was an intention to maintain permanent-resident status is not the issue, but rather whether there was a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the US."

A "temporary visit abroad" is generally defined as a situation in which either the permanent resident's visit is for a "period relatively short, fixed by some early event" or the permanent resident's visit will terminate upon the occurrence of an event having a reasonable possibility of occurring within a relatively short period of time.

A "temporary visit," however, cannot be defined in terms of elapsed time alone.

The alien's intention, when it can be determined, is a controlling factor. Some of the factors a court can use in determining whether an alien harbored a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return are: his family ties, property holdings and business affiliations within the US; the duration of residence in the US; family, property and business ties in the foreign country and whether the alien's conduct while abroad showed that he intended to remain in the foreign country.

The law seems to favor Ma, but he seems quite evasive and his explanation is not of the quality one would expect from a Harvard law graduate. What does he have to hide?

Alfred Tsai
Taipei

Taiwan must review security risks

Wednesday, Mar 12, 2008, Page 8

`The ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.'

The recent US Department of Defense report on PRC military modernization is a useful reminder of the challenges posed by China's rise as a major regional power. This year's report is the most detailed and insightful to date and a number of issues are worthy of consideration for Taiwan.

First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.

Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.

For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.

Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.

Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.

Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.

To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?

While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.

With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.

Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?

Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?

An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.

Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.

While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.

As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.

But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.

One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?

In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.

Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.

In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.

For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?

Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.

Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.

Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.

In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.

Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.

In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.

As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.

Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.

The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.

In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.

Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.

Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.

US report shows PLA could not take Taiwan
　

By Cheng Ta-chen 鄭大誠
Wednesday, Mar 12, 2008, Page 8

On March 3, the US Department of Defense published its annual report Military Power of the People's Republic of China. Apart from a few figures that have changed, the content of the report is largely the same as previous editions.

Chapter Six, which is of the most interest to Taiwan, describes possible courses of action that China's military might take against Taiwan. The possible contingencies are the same as in last year's report: China could move against Taiwan with limited force, in an air and missile campaign, with quarantines and blockades or through an amphibious invasion.

Like last year's report, it says that using limited force and carrying out an air and missile campaign might affect Taiwan's defensive systems and the willingness of the Taiwanese to fight, but when analyzed more closely, these two actions are only a part of, or perhaps a prelude to, a Chinese attack against Taiwan.

If there were no successful follow-up to these military actions, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) wouldn't be able to attain its goal of "reunification" or "liberating Taiwan."

But the authors of this year's report clearly are of the opinion that China's military capability to carry out either of those courses of action has not improved significantly in the past year and has possibly even weakened.

The authors of the report believe that using a blockade or quarantine against Taiwan would be very taxing on the PLA's capabilities.

Also, China is clearly underestimating the international pressure and the possibility of military escalation that could result from a blockade of the Taiwan Strait.

As in previous years, the US Department of Defense is of the opinion that if China chose to launch an amphibious invasion against Taiwan, its main strategy would still be the "Joint Island Landing Campaign." But the report also says an amphibious invasion is still too complicated for the PLA to carry out.

Last year's report was still only hinting that an amphibious invasion would constitute too big of a risk for the Chinese leaders in Zhongnanhai, both politically and militarily, and so China might lack the capability to successfully launch an attack on Taiwan.

This year's report clearly states that if China were to invade Taiwan's outlying islands, this would show its military capability and political resolve, but it could also turn the Taiwanese public against China.

Moreover, this year's report boldly states that it would be beyond the routine training of the PLA to take over an outlying island like Kinmen or Matsu, let alone invade Taiwan itself. Taiwan would only need to implement some "modest target investments" in defense facilities and equipment to be able to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

In the past years, the US army has paid close attention to the actions the PLA is taking in regard to its anti-access forces, which would be used to deter the US army from coming to Taiwan's aid in the case of an invasion.

Some analysts think that by around 2010, China may have sufficient power to launch an anti-access war. But according to this most recent report of the US Department of Defense on China's military power, an anti-access force that could stop the US army from coming to Taiwan's rescue is one thing, but actually invading Taiwan and succeeding in taking over the country is something else entirely.

Cheng Ta-chen is an independent defense analyst.