Hsieh congratulates the victor
　

FAREWELL? : Although he promised to 'continue to protect Taiwan,' Hsieh also hinted that he would make good on a promise to quit politics if he lost
　

By Ko Shu-ling
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Mar 23, 2008, Page 3
　

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) yesterday conceded defeat and promised to "keep all his promises" following his loss in the presidential election.

Hsieh lost to his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) rival Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) by more than 2 million votes. While Hsieh and his running mate Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) garnered more than 41 percent of the vote, the KMT ticket amassed more than 58 percent.

This is the second election setback for the DPP this year. It lost to the KMT in the legislative elections in January, with the KMT securing a strong majority.

Hsieh had said in the run-up to the election that he would quit politics if he lost. It is also customary in the DPP for the party chairman to bear the political responsibility for an election defeat by resigning from the post.

Hsieh, however, did not say anything about stepping down last night after talking to supporters who gathered outside his campaign office after the election result was released.

With the crowd chanting "Frank Hsieh, don't go" and "jiayou" (an expression of encouragement), Hsieh led his campaign team in bowing to the public and apologized to the people of Taiwan for failing them.

"This is my personal setback, not the failure of Taiwan," he said. "It is the outcome of democracy and not a failure. Don't cry for me tonight. I will continue to protect Taiwan and its people. My life is here, not anywhere else."

Hsieh said he was sorry that his party's performance failed to meet the expectations of the public and that he should be held responsible for the defeat.

"The people of Taiwan used their ballots to make a decision today," he said. "I accept the result of the election and I want to offer my congratulations to my competitor."

He urged DPP supporters to accept the election result and to face the loss calmly. Although the process was disputable, Hsieh said, he would accept the result and urged his supporters to do the same.

"Let's mend the fractures caused during the election process so that people can again live in an environment that is full of love and trust," he said.

Although the DPP lost the election, Hsieh said, there was a more important thing to do: to carry the torch of democracy.

"Let's turn our disappointment into power and continue to protect democracy," he said.

The country's development had never been plain sailing, Hsieh said. But the bigger the wind, the more determined we are, he added.

"We will always be with the people," Hsieh said. "I sincerely pray for Taiwan and we believe in the people and this land."

Hsieh thanked the hard work and contributions of his campaign team and volunteers. He said he would never forget the people whose hands he touched at the "million people high-five" rally organized by his party last Sunday.

Hsieh said he was deeply touched by the passion of the people that day and would forever remember their enthusiasm. He said he would use that enthusiasm to inspire himslef to continue to love Taiwan.

Meanwhile, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) issued a statement promising to stabilize the political situation before their terms end on May 20.

In addition to extending their congratulations to Ma and his running mate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長), Chen and Lu pledged to hand over power to the 12th president and vice president.

Chen and Lu praised the maturity of Taiwan's politics and the democratic accomplishment of its people.
　

Out with the old, in with the older

Sunday, Mar 23, 2008, Page 8

Taiwan's voters have changed government for only the second time, re-installing the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the presidency. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) defeated the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) by almost a 17 percent margin. Ma was the favorite in the election and opinion polls had at one time put him as many as 25 percentage points ahead of Hsieh.

Public dissatisfaction with the DPP's political record and consequent losses in January's legislative elections sapped party morale, and this was reflected in the results of the poll, despite a narrowing in the performance of the candidates.

The key issues in the last days of the campaign were the "one China market" and the problem of China's oppression, as seen in Tibet. The DPP had seemed to score points by focusing on the possible threat posed by Chinese laborers and poor quality products entering Taiwan, but ultimately the scare tactics failed to produce the effect the DPP had hoped for.

In more direct language, the electorate rejected the DPP's campaign and reverted to the approximate 60-40 pan-blue/pan-green split of the 2000 election. That is, the 10 percent of voters that the DPP stole from the KMT in 2004 have returned to the fold.

The cruel truths of China's oppression in Tibet -- as well as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) harsh warnings against Tibet and Taiwan -- were the best possible election gift for the DPP camp, but 12 days of unrest in Tibet were still not enough to make up for the public's dissatisfaction with the party's performance over the last eight years.

Ma will have an easier job as president than outgoing President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), who was plagued by the hindrance of a majority opposition in the legislature throughout his eight years in office. With the KMT's legislative majority, many of Ma's long cherished ideals could easily become hard policies. Here lies an opportunity -- and a danger.

As the opposition, the DPP has almost no real power with which to stop Ma's executive momentum. Single-party dominance in a country struggling to fortify institutional checks and balances poses a threat, and the DPP will need to work hard to monitor erosion of the line between party and state.

The KMT should be especially cautious when dealing with the cross-strait problem. Cross-strait relations should be improved, but implementation of the "one China" principle remains dangerous.

There are numerous reasons for this. For now, this will suffice: The Dalai Lama has repeatedly expressed that he seeks real autonomy for Tibet rather than independence, but still China has dealt with the situation forcefully and brutally.

Let this serve as a stark reminder for Ma: Taiwan's long-term possibilities must not be sacrificed for short-term economic benefits, and toeing China's line offers no guarantee of a peaceful outcome.

Once Ma assumes office, he should begin to repair the increasingly worn US-Taiwan relationship and facilitate cooperation with Japan to reduce the Chinese threat. Hundreds of Chinese missiles threaten this country and Taiwan's president cannot sit idly by as their numbers grow.

Ma must immediately begin to make up for the arms deficit resulting from eight years of KMT budget boycotts. Only real might can serve as a backup to meaningful cross-strait negotiations.

Kosovo, Taiwan, Tibet rattle China
　

By Wen Liao
Sunday, Mar 23, 2008, Page 8

Why is China behaving as it is in Tibet? What makes Tibet so important to the government in Beijing? At the heart of the matter is the fact that nothing worries China's rulers more than when the country's unity is called into question. And nothing makes them more anxious than their fear that a regional dispute might, if not brought to an end quickly, steamroll into national disintegration.

Kosovo's recent declaration of independence sharpened the Chinese government's anxieties over the protests in Tibet. Although supporters of Kosovo's independence argue that it sets no international precedent, China's rulers fear otherwise. Moreover, Taiwan's presidential election has further ratcheted up the tension for China's government.

It may sound strange to the outside world that China, which has known nothing but economic success for three decades, should feel its unity to be so fragile. But China's history, both ancient and modern, suggests that there is nothing permanent or stable about the country's current unity.

Indeed, today's unity was secured only with Mao Zedong's (毛澤東) victory in 1949.

From the Warring States period (403BC to 221BC) to the warlord period of the 20th century (1916 to 1928) -- and many times in between -- China's territory has splintered into separate, rival regions. So, while loudly proclaiming the unity of the Chinese state, the leadership is obsessed with the country's fragility and works constantly to reduce tensions between provinces.

The government's failure to eradicate chronic regional tension underscores the limits of central authority in China, which was partly intentional. An integral feature of the reforms that Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) launched 30 years ago was greater autonomy for local authorities -- a move aimed at fostering accountability and creating incentives for growth.

But some provinces have gone further. The central government's loss of authority is reflected in the number of its appeals -- usually unsuccessful -- that it makes to local government for compliance with limits on investment or controls on pollution.

In any country as vast as China, far-flung regions are bound to have different interests and identities. Though few in China speculate aloud about it, there are some who believe that such differences may continue to tug the regions away from the center, and that some might one day break away.

This is the fear gnawing at China's rulers as they confront the unrest in Tibet. Of course, to judge from official rhetoric, there is no threat to unity. All of China's peoples, including non-Chinese in annexed territories such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, are firm and loyal supporters of the system, Beijing says. But the government's frequent rotation of local officials tells a different story. Keen to prevent any coalescence of regional identity and local authority, senior officers in China's seven military districts are also rotated regularly.

Another precaution taken by the central government is to shape the military districts so that they do not overlap with natural regional or economic divisions. This arrangement is designed to ensure that military and economic regionalism will cancel each other out. But it also reflects the Chinese government's constant fear that regional tensions may lead to national fragmentation.

Nevertheless, none of these precautions can assuage the anxiety of China's leaders about the struggle underway in Tibet, particularly in view of events in Kosovo and Taiwan. In principle, of course, conflict between Taiwan and China is not inevitable. With increasing change in China and growing economic and social contacts across the Strait, it should be possible to find a formula that allows the Taiwanese to maintain their market economy and democratic system without a placard at the UN.

The West has historically stressed two bright lines with respect to Taiwan: no independence and no use of force by China. But, in view of Kosovo's independence against the will of Serbia and without UN sanction, these bright lines have become blurred in China's eyes.

The world is risking much by injecting ambiguity into an issue that once seemed clear-cut. Thirty-five years ago, in a supreme act of modern statecraft, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來) and US president Richard Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique, which set the following unambiguous standard: There is only one China, and Taiwan is part of it.

An unequivocal reaffirmation of that understanding, particularly by the US in the light of its role as primary backer of Kosovo's independence, is now needed if China is to be reassured that its unity will not be called into question.

The West does not have an interest in helping either Tibet or Taiwan become sovereign countries, and efforts by some Tibetans and Taiwanese in this direction present the danger of a miscalculation that could create lasting enmity.

Some Chinese suspect the US of seeking an independent Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for use against a future Chinese enemy. Such suspicions can feed a climate of excessive nationalism in China.

Both China and the West must now avoid letting exaggerated fears create self-inflicted prophecies. Events in Tibet can only be properly viewed with the shadows cast by Kosovo and Taiwan in mind.

Wen Liao is a Chinese lawyer practicing with a US firm in London.