China is No. 1 in executions, Amnesty says
　

RECORD-SETTER: Beijing has changed the way capital cases are handled, leading to a big drop in executions, but the actual number of people put to death remains a mystery

AGENCIES, LONDON, BRUSSELS AND BEIJING
Wednesday, Apr 16, 2008, Page 1

China executed more people than any other country in the world last year by putting at least 470 people to death, but the number of executions in the country actually fell compared with the year before, Amnesty International said.

In its annual report on worldwide executions, the human-rights group said yesterday that Iran remains the country with the second-highest number of executions, and that the number had nearly doubled from the year before. The 377 inmates included a man stoned to death for committing adultery.

The US was fifth in the rankings with 42 executions, reflecting a drop in the number of people put to death during the year. That was the lowest number of executions in the US in about 15 years, Amnesty officials said.

However, lethal injection executions have been on hold nationally while the US Supreme Court considers a challenge in a case from Kentucky.

Amnesty analysts said China reformed the way capital cases are handled early last year, leading to a substantial reduction in executions. But they cautioned that the actual number of people put to death in China last year is undoubtedly higher than the figure of 470 executions that could be confirmed —- and they warned that the drop may be temporary.

“We do actually believe there has been a reduction in number of executions,” said Piers Bannister, an Amnesty researcher. “But how permanent and how significant that reduction is we don’t know because it’s a state secret.”

One reason the number of people reported executed in China fell may be the reintroduction in January last year of a review by its top court of all capital cases, Amnesty said. The legislation is aimed at weeding out unfair convictions and reserving the death penalty for only the most severe cases.

But analysts are concerned the number could rise again because of a backlog in executions due to the extra set of judicial reviews. This makes them cautious about judging the significance of the halving of the number of people killed by the Chinese state.

China defended its use of the death penalty yesterday. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu (姜瑜) said China had no plans to scrap the death penalty.

In its report, Amnesty also “expressed deep concern” that many more people were killed secretly in countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam and Malaysia.

It urged countries to heed a UN resolution last December calling for the open and transparent use of the death penalty as a step toward abolishing it altogether.

China also topped Amnesty’s list for death sentences handed down last year, with 1,860 sentenced. In all, at least 3,347 people were sentenced to death in 51 countries, and as many as 27,500 people are estimated to be on death row, the group said.

Meanwhile, human-rights abuse are intensifying in China as the Beijing Olympics near, Amnesty International head Irene Khan said yesterday while stopping short of supporting calls for a boycott of the games.

“We’ve seen human-rights abuses intensifying in the lead-up to the Olympics, [with] a crackdown on activists and the use of re-education labor camps in lieu of detention,” Khan said in Brussels.

Europeans see China as main threat to global stability: poll

AFP, LONDON
Wednesday, Apr 16, 2008, Page 1

Europeans see China as a bigger threat to global stability than the US, Iran or North Korea, a poll published yesterday said.

The Harris survey for the Financial Times showed that an average of 35 percent of voters in Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy saw China as the biggest threat to global stability, compared with 29 percent who thought the same of the US.

In Italy, 47 percent of voters named China as the biggest threat, up from 26 percent last year.

Meanwhile, 36 percent of French voters thought the same of China, up from 22 percent last year, compared with 35 percent of Germans, from 18 percent last year. Some 27 percent of British voters named China the biggest threat, from 16 percent last year.

Only in Spain was the US regarded as a bigger threat than China, by a 41 percent to 28 percent margin.

Harris questioned a total of 5,381 voters the five countries between March 27 and April 8.

A new matrix of Taiwan relations
　

By Michael Hsiao and Russell Hsiao 蕭新煌，蕭良其
Wednesday, Apr 16, 2008, Page 8

‘As the KMT prepares to take executive leadership of Taiwan’s future for the next four years, we can expect it to take extra caution in not irritating the PRC in order to avoid military confrontation across the Strait, but the KMT government should be wary of falling into the trap of forfeiting Taiwan’s dignity and its long-standing public ethos to pursue its national identity.’

Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) promised during his presidential campaign that he would liberalize existing regulations on “economic” links between Taiwan and China, starting with direct charter flights, allowing more tourists from China, welcoming Chinese capital to be invested in Taiwan’s real estate market and lifting the existing cap on Taiwan’s firms that prevents them from investing more than 40 percent of their assets in China.

The cap was placed under President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) administration in an effort to stem the exodus of capital going to China and in an attempt to diversify Taiwan’s economic outflow to the local market and other less politically risky countries.

Despite the recent public display of affection, observers should not expect a substantial thawing of cross-strait relations in the near future. As president, Ma will also have to consider the 42 percent of Taiwan’s 13.1 million voters that cast their ballots for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷).

There is still a significant portion of Taiwanese who are concerned that a deepening engagement with China could have a corrosive effect on Taiwan’s nation-building process. During his presidential campaign, Ma also pledged that he would not enter into direct talks with China unless it removes the 1,400 missiles that it has deployed along the southern provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, an increase from 350 missiles in 2002.

The Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) proposition essentially amounts to an armistice, which Chinese government academics have flatly dismissed. Ma and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), however, have carefully avoided this delicate fault line, and instead have focused much of their rhetoric on the opportunities for closer cross-strait economic ties by using the so-called “1992 consensus,” an agreement the DPP administration has said is fictional.

Ma believes “one China, and each side has its own interpretation of ‘one China’” to be the foundation of cross-strait relations.

Ma’s “mutual non-denial” as the parameter for dialogue avoids definitions of what each side’s interpretations are and avoids politically sensitive issues such as independence or unification.

Again, the day after his election victory, Ma openly stated that he has no problem with the “one China” principle at an international press conference. He later qualified his statement by pointing out that “one China” is the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ma also emphasized that without room for different interpretations of “one China,” he would not negotiate with the PRC. However, Ma was immediately criticized by a wide range in the political spectrum for showing his cards too soon, and thereby compromising Taiwan’s security.

The rule Ma follows is no different from what former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and Hu agreed to on in 2005 — the so-called “five-point consensus.”

As president of the 23 million citizens of Taiwan, how will Ma detach himself from the KMT old guards such as Lien without putting himself in a puppet position? How successful will he be at fulfilling Lien’s promise to Hu without compromising Taiwan’s national security and interests?

The extent to which Beijing will genuinely pursue cross-strait rapprochement with the KMT will be gauged in Taiwan by its response to Taiwan’s long-standing campaign to gain observer status in the WHO and related bodies — organizations in which statehood is not prerequisite for entry.

Beijing’s consistent blocking of Taiwan’s entry into international organizations has had an adverse effect on the domestic polity in Taiwan, and its isolation as a result has given the DPP support for its more Taiwan-centric policies.

Ma recently said that unlike the Chen administration, which applied for WHO observer status under the name of “Taiwan,” he believed that there was no better name than “Chinese Taipei” for the application.

His statement stirred suspicion among the public. If Beijing continues to restrict Taiwan’s participation in these international organizations, then it will be a slap in the face for Ma and the KMT and consequently there may be more questions than answers concerning the feasibility of Ma’s approach.

Without the possibility of genuine overtures from Beijing, Ma will find it difficult to overcome domestic pressure from the DPP and pursue closer engagement with Beijing without being seen as kneeling to Hu’s crown.

The US welcomed Ma’s victory, praising the peaceful transition of power and consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, seeing the ascendancy of the KMT as a positive sign toward thawing cross-strait relations.

Leaders in Washington see Ma’s conciliatory position towards Beijing as offering a window of opportunity for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, a relief from the often tense atmosphere that has characterized cross-strait relations during Chen’s administration, and contributed to a deterioration of mutual trust between US President George W. Bush and Chen.

At the same time, the KMT’s victory moved the ball into China’s court to deal with how it should engage cross-strait relations with the KMT in power.

The US continues to spend political and economic capital on the “war on terrorism,” particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. As it also faces a stalemate on the six-party talks, Washington will take any breathing room it can get from a Taiwan less confrontational toward China.

In its view, unnecessary provocation “pushes the envelope” and raises the stake in cross-Strait relations.

This attitude, however, is not without risks and concerns. If Taiwan, already the most economically integrated country in Asia, is too close to Beijing, it could make the US more dependent on China for support of its foreign policy interests in Asia.

This poses a significant challenge to the US’ traditional security paradigm and its more value-oriented foreign policy that was initially adopted in Bush’s first administration but was then completely integrated into the global war on terrorism.

Ma’s attitude toward Japan, from his college years as a Diaoyutai activist throughout his political career leading up to his election as president, have shifted over time.

During the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005, Ma, while serving as mayor of Taipei, declared that Japan was “stealing” the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands. Ma’s statements on the disputed islands and Japan’s history of colonization are significant because they risk confusing Taiwanese, who had under the previous two Taiwan administrations had a far more intimate relationship with Japan.

Later as chairman of the KMT, Ma even called on Chen to “use a battle to force a peace” in a fisheries dispute involving Diaoyutai.

Under former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) administration, the KMT’s historically anti-Japanese stance was largely changed to project a new, pro-Japanese attitude.

In Japan, there was a prevailing fondness toward and admiration for Lee, especially after he was the first elected Taiwanese president in 1996.

Obviously, Ma’s past record in his relations with Japan can not be compared to Lee’s, nor to Chen’s. The Japanese impression of Ma’s unfriendly position will definitely be the biggest challenge in dealing with Japan during his presidency.

A critical issue that has perhaps deliberately been given less discussion by the KMT is the significance of the US-Japan security alliance and its importance for Taiwan’s security during Ma’s administration.

As Ma pursues opening economic links with Beijing while shelving discussion of sensitive political issues, the question remains as to how Ma will justify Taiwan’s need for a robust security relationship with the US and Japan if it chooses to ignore China’s military threat to Taiwan?

Where will Taiwan then pivot in the strategic landscape for the US and Japan? It appears that what Ma is offering is stasis in the Taiwan Strait, detaching cross-strait political conflict from international security, an initiative undertaken by the DPP administration in an effort to internationalize the issue of the Strait.

And if Ma was to strengthen the security relationship, how would Beijing react?

How Ma plans to maintain the US-Japan security alliance remains a mine field for his administration to navigate without jeopardizing the long-term security of Taiwan.

As the KMT prepares to take executive leadership of Taiwan’s future for the next four years, we can expect it to take extra caution in not irritating the PRC in order to avoid military confrontation across the Strait, but the KMT government should be wary of falling into the trap of forfeiting Taiwan’s dignity and its long-standing public ethos to pursue its national identity.

The emphasis on regional peace and stability in Ma’s national security formula should be welcomed by regional states, but the KMT government cannot be too compromising to the PRC at the expense of developing trustful relations with other important allies such as the US and Japan.

Taiwan under Ma must not get too much involved in the disputes between the PRC and Japan on matters such as the use of history textbooks, the Nanking massacre and the Yasukuni shrine, to name a few. Taiwan also needs to be especially careful in dealing with the unsolvable Diaoyutai issue between China, Taiwan and Japan.

It is, therefore, advised that the new foundation for the future of Taiwan-Japan-US security relations be implemented at the outset of the incoming Ma administration, which is based on the common interests of protecting and preserving Taiwan’s dignity, democracy and human rights as the only and strongest guarantee for enduring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Michael Hsiao is executive director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies at Academia Sinica. Russell Hsiao is the editor of China Brief at the Jamestown Foundation in Virginia.

Taiwan is missing its chance on Tibet issue

By Chang Meng-jen 張孟仁
Wednesday, Apr 16, 2008, Page 8

‘Regrettably, Taiwan didn’t take advantage of China’s crackdown on the protests in Tibet to spotlight its democratic values.’

After the head of the European Parliament invited the Dalai Lama to address the body on events in Tibet, parliament members passed a resolution urging China to resume talks with the Dalai Lama and called on EU leaders to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics in August.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced last Wednesday that he would not attend the opening ceremony of the Olympics, even though he had previously said he would attend.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy will also not rule out the possibility of boycotting the opening ceremony unless the Chinese government meets three conditions: ending violence against its population, releasing political prisoners and opening a dialogue with the Dalai Lama over recent events in Tibet.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel previously also declared that she would not be attending the opening ceremony.

In Italy, there are even calls for a boycott of the Olympics, as the majority of Italians, the right of center Northern League and the left of center radical parties all have expressed support for such a boycott.

Judging from former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s front-runner status in Italy’s upcoming elections, Italy is likely to promote such a boycott.

As a common position on the Tibet issue has gradually developed among the EU’s four largest countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Estonia, and the European Parliament, many believe that other EU member states will be influenced and follow suit to safeguard human rights.

In the wake of protests against the Olympic torch relay in London, Paris and San Francisco, strong global support is building in defense of human rights in Tibet.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will not attend the opening ceremony, an aide has said.

International Olympic Committee chairman Jacques Rogge, US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the Japanese government and the EU have spoken up in defense of human rights in Tibet, but democratic Taiwan has yet to express a firm view on the matter.

In order to facilitate broad cross-strait political and economic exchanges, Taiwan seems to intentionally brush aside the issue of Tibetan human rights while showing good will toward China.

Regrettably, Taiwan didn’t take advantage of China’s crackdown on the protests in Tibet to spotlight its democratic values.

Instead, Taiwan has chosen not to exhibit its democracy to the international community at this opportune moment.

After the new Taiwanese government comes to power, shouldn’t democratic Taiwan join forces with Western countries in an attempt to accelerate the democratization of China?

Chang Meng-jen is a doctoral candidate in Comparative European Politics at the University of Siena in Italy.