KMT victory
not a defeat for Taiwan values: Tung
CHANGING: MAC’s vice chairman
said China’s leadership adjusted its policies on Taiwan, suggesting that it was
unable to ignore the reality of Taiwan’s democratic development
STAFF WRITER, WITH CNA
Saturday, Apr 19, 2008, Page 3
The decisive victory of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the March 22
presidential election represented a victory for democracy but not a defeat of
the Taiwan-centric political line, a high-ranking Taiwanese official said on
Thursday at the Taiwanese American Center in New York.
“Taiwanese identity and Taiwan-centric consciousness have become a consensus and
common language in the country since the election,” said Tung Chen-yuan (童振源),
vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), who is currently on a
speaking tour of the US.
“The KMT owed its victory partly to its tilting toward the Taiwan-centric
advocacy that has been championed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),”
Tung said.
Tung said the contributions that outgoing President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has
made in deepening Taiwan’s democratization and consolidating Taiwanese identity
are undeniable.
“Chen’s efforts have altered the mode of cross-strait relations development and
have also created strategic maneuvering space between the two sides,” he said.
Meanwhile, Tung said, China’s leadership has ceaselessly adjusted its Taiwan
policies and is still adjusting them, which he said indicates that Beijing has
also been unable to free itself from the impact of Taiwan’s democratic
development.
Arguing that Taiwan’s democracy is a core asset in cross-strait relations and
the bottom line of cross-strait negotiations, Tung said Beijing has had no
choice but to adjust its stance in the face of Taiwan’s democratic progress.
He said that although Beijing has never openly acknowledged the notion of “one
China, different interpretations,” its stance seems to have changed, according
to a March 26 telephone dialogue between US President George W. Bush and Chinese
President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤).
A Xinhua news agency English-language report on Hu’s conversation with Bush
reported that Hu said “it is China’s consistent stand that the Chinese mainland
and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of ‘the 1992
consensus,’ under which ‘both sides recognize that there is only one China, but
agree to differ on its definition.’”
Hu’s remarks show that China in a sense will change and will accept the “one
China, different interpretations” idea, Tung said, adding that should China
anticipate any progress in political engagement across the Strait, it must face
squarely the fact of the Republic of China’s existence on Taiwan.
He also said that Taiwan must get to know China better, given that it is an
enemy and Taiwan’s closest neighbor.
He suggested that cross-strait relations be developed under a “triangular,
two-tier” framework taking the opinions of Taiwan, China and the rest of the
world into account, while heeding the will of the people on both sides of the
Strait.
The
sinister forces behind Boao
By Ruan Ming 阮銘
Saturday, Apr 19, 2008, Page 8
One of the reasons Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the presidential election is a
considerable number of voters saw him as separate from former Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰). Behind Lien stands not only the
remnants of the KMT’s old guard, but also Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤)
“one China” principle.
China let Lien walk down the red carpet when he visited in 2005, and Hu signed a
joint communique with him, but this didn’t mean that China liked this perpetual
loser; it only meant that Beijing hoped to bring the joint efforts of the KMT
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) back on track once the KMT returned to
power.
Ma has not yet taken office, but already he is being tested.
At the Boao forum last weekend, vice president-elect Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) issued a
“16-word statement,” proposing that the two sides “face reality, take sight of
the future, shelve disputes and pursue a win-win scenario.”
Hu said he completely agreed. But where does this “16-word statement” come from?
The first part is from the joint communique signed by Hu and Lien when Lien
visited China to endorse the “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005. The “face reality,
take sight of the future” part is there because Lien, at the time of his visit,
had lost two consecutive presidential elections. It was therefore impossible
that the Taiwanese government would tolerate the “one China” component of the
“Anti-Secession” Law.
Thus, the only option was to join hands with the CCP to block Taiwanese
independence and wait until the KMT returned to power. Only then could the two
parties begin to cooperate and set their sights on a future “one China.” By
using this line from Lien and Hu’s joint communique, Siew showed that he wants
to continue Lien’s line and reassure Hu.
The last part of the statement is the creation of Siew and Ma themselves.
“Shelve disputes” means concentrating on “one China,” but leaving aside
“different interpretations” of what the expression means.
This contradicts statements that Ma made during the presidential election
campaign. During the second debate between the two candidates, Ma said: “The
‘1992 consensus’ is ‘one China, different interpretations,’” and that “‘one
China’ means ‘the Republic of China.’” But now, “1992 consensus” is taken to
mean “one China, with no interpretations” and the term “Republic of China” (ROC)
will not be heard outside Taiwan. Naturally Hu was very happy when he heard
this, and of course he said that he agreed.
“Pursue a win-win scenario” is simply deceptive language.
Didn’t Ma say that China and Taiwan should take a position of “mutual
non-denial?” This expression meant that Hu could interpret China as being the
People’s Republic of China, and Ma wouldn’t deny this; Ma meanwhile could
interpret China as the ROC, and Hu wouldn’t deny this.
But the reality is different. Hu talks about his interpretation to the whole
world, and in the eyes of the world China equals communist China. Ma could only
express his interpretation of “one China” being the ROC within Taiwan during the
election campaign, but now that he has been elected, he will presumably “shelve
the dispute” if he leaves the country and avoids talking about his own
interpretation. Is this mutual non-denial? Is this pursuing a win-win scenario?
Although Ma has not yet taken office, he has offered Hu this statement through
his vice president and taken a first step down the same road as Lien, a
dangerous road that will make Taiwan part of “one China.”
The next step will be personnel selection and concrete action after Ma and Siew
take office, so the remnants of the KMT party-state system and “one China”
forces under China’s thumb are preparing to move.
They are plotting to have Su Chi (蘇起) — the architect of Lien and Hu’s KMT-CCP
communication platform — appointed secretary-general of the National Security
Council. Chiang Pin-kun (江丙坤) has already been named as director of the Straits
Exchange Foundation. This would give these people full control of and the
ability to integrate Taiwan’s military diplomacy, national security and China
strategy in keeping with Lien’s plan to join hands with the CCP against
Taiwanese independence.
This means that the manipulations of communist China will move Taiwan from
economic and cultural integration toward political and military integration and
thus precipitate its downfall.
Ma doesn’t have much time left to rein in his horses and take another look at
his national security team and the future direction of Taiwan.
Ruan Ming is a consultant at the Taiwan
Research Institute.