Listen to the voice

AIT denies tougher guidelines
　

NO CHANGE? : US State Department guidelines on relations with Taiwan issued to all diplomatic personnel this month were almost twice as long as the 2006 version
　

By Charles Snyder
STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON
Friday, Sep 12, 2008, Page 3

A comparison of State Department guidelines issued this month to all US diplomatic personnel explaining US policy on interactions with Taiwan and a parallel document issued in September 2006 shows that the latest guidelines contain a broad range of new prohibitions, despite statements by US and Taiwanese officials that the new guidelines offer “nothing new.”

The new guidelines, sent to all US diplomatic posts in an annual cable in advance of the Double Ten Day celebrations, are nearly twice as long as the 2006 document. The Taipei Times obtained a copy of the 2006 version on Wednesday.

Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) became the first officials from either side to confirm the existence of the guidelines after a story about them appeared in the Taipei Times on Tuesday.

The Taipei Times has yet to receive a copy of last year’s guidelines, so it was not clear whether the additional prohibitions were added this month or a year ago, when tensions between US President George W. Bush, seeking China’s international support, and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) were at rock bottom.

But the 2006 document contained significantly fewer prohibitions than the current one.

For instance, this year’s cable added a ban on flying the Taiwanese flag at any US government building, inserted a long section that severely limits US correspondence with Taiwanese officials, makes reference to the US’ so-called “one China” policy, contains a long section on the US’ policy toward Taiwan’s membership in international organizations and has a detailed list of curbs and prohibitions on travel by US officials to Taiwan.

None of these appeared in the 2006 cable.

In no part of the recent document are the tight restrictions on meetings between US and Taiwanese officials relaxed.

The cables are based on US government restrictions on interactions with Taiwan in force in one form or another since the US broke diplomatic relations in 1978, and most recently issued as formal guidelines in 2001, just after Bush took office. However, references in the 2006 cable indicate that the annual cables have been issued at least since 1991, when Bush’s father, George Bush, was president.

One of the more striking additions to the current cable is the section on Taiwan’s international participation, which does not directly relate to the cable’s main subject.

“Consistent with our one China policy,” it says, the US does not support Taiwanese membership in organizations requiring statehood, although it does support “as appropriate” Taiwan’s “involvement” in other international bodies.

“Within the parameters of our one China policy,” it adds, the US “does not take a position on what Taiwan’s title should be in international organizations. The United States supports flexible arrangements and nomenclature acceptable to both the PRC [People’s Republic of China] and Taiwan and opposes attempts by either side to use nomenclature for political purposes inconsistent with US policy.”

Washington’s “overall goal,” it says, is “to enable the people on [sic] Taiwan to comply with international regulations and guidelines and receive appropriate international assistance and advice, despite Taipei’s general lack of recognition as an independent state.”

If that paragraph was added last year, as appears likely, instead of this month, that would coincide with Chen’s efforts to win an election-day referendum to have Taiwan join the UN using the name Taiwan, a move, vehemently opposed by both China and the Bush administration, that poisoned Washington-Taipei relations last year.

The other additions to the cable, such as the travel restrictions, the convoluted rules on written correspondence and the strictures on attending official affairs and parties, are not inconsistent with the 2001 guidelines.

In Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday reiterated that the latest guidelines do not offer any new insight into Washington’s Taiwan policy.

The document, ministry spokesman Henry Chen (陳銘政) said, has been sent each year since 1991 and although there have been minor changes, the overall principles remain the same.

AIT Director Stephen Young echoed Henry Chen’s remarks and said that US policy toward Taiwan had “not changed at all.”

“The media just made a story out of it,” he said yesterday.

AIT Press Officer Lawrence Walker said the AIT was a non-governmental organization that is instructed to carry out unofficial relations between Taiwan and the US and therefore a bulk of the guidelines do not pertain to AIT staff, such as attending the Double Ten Day celebrations.

Listen to the voice

Diplomatic truce: tactic or strategy?

By Kan Yi-Hua 甘逸驊
Friday, Sep 12, 2008, Page 8

Taiwan’s national strength and status in the international community are not commensurate with those of a mature democracy and a highly developed economy. As a result, Taiwanese pay more attention to foreign affairs than people in many other countries. This is commendable and shows that the planning of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategies cannot be based solely on the ideas of a political elite, but also need to take into account the opinions of a population that possesses sufficient ability and interest to monitor the government’s diplomatic policies. These policies need to reflect the public consensus.

The diplomatic and cross-strait policies promoted by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) have garnered a great deal of attention both domestically and internationally. Given Taiwan’s diplomatic difficulties, the success of any diplomatic strategy relies on whether the government has plans in place that take both national interests and international moral standards into consideration.

Many people are questioning Ma’s “diplomatic truce” strategy. The administration must offer a clear definition of whether the truce constitutes the government’s major diplomatic strategy or if it is just one of their tactics. A clear definition is necessary because the difference between strategy and tactics cannot be confused — Taiwanese can easily judge the feasibility of the diplomatic truce and the success of the government’s overall diplomatic policies on events between Taiwan and China and with the rest of the world.

Given the problems that have plagued Taiwan’s diplomatic policy in the past, we must first establish the core values of a new diplomatic strategy.

First, diplomacy is part of a government’s overall policy and is inextricably linked to the welfare of the general public. Therefore all diplomatic actions should be aimed at promoting the interests of the nation and the public.

Second, diplomatic expansion cannot be judged based solely on an increased number of diplomatic allies. The true goal of diplomacy lies in fulfilling one’s responsibilities as a member of the international community. A nation’s diplomatic resources must not be wasted.

In addition, to be able to maximize Taiwan’s national security and promote its interests, we must understand that diplomatic and cross-strait policy are closely linked and complement each other. This makes it necessary to avoid vicious diplomatic competition with China. We must use these values as the standard when evaluating the success of the government’s diplomatic policy.

Based on what Ma said during his campaign and after taking office, the government’s main diplomatic strategy is probably a “flexible diplomacy,” with the diplomatic truce being a tactical part of that strategy. Past governments placed too much emphasis on bilateral diplomatic relations. A nation’s diplomatic strategy should include participation in bilateral diplomatic and multilateral international mechanisms, participation on a regional level, as well as substantial economic interactions, especially free trade agreements. A “flexible diplomacy” should be aimed at actively promoting Taiwan’s participation in every international sphere possible.

As for the tactics behind the diplomatic truce, it is easy to see that they are aimed merely at easing tensions in bilateral relations, which easily leads to vicious competition. The diplomatic truce should be used to prevent passivity and inaction and encourage action. Tactics are aimed at helping one reach one’s strategic goals and as a result, the diplomatic truce must be an expression of friendliness so as to help build an environment beneficial to regional security. We must let China and our diplomatic allies see the effort and sincerity we have put into the truce.

The diplomatic truce should also focus on the Taiwanese public. Taiwanese have a good awareness of democracy and insight into international society and they are fed up with Taiwan’s “money diplomacy.” Therefore, the diplomatic truce should also include non-traditional diplomatic aspects. Of course, it should also be in line with international moral standards for it to be able to achieve its ultimate goal of peace.

Ma’s new diplomatic policies have caused much doubt and opposition. The government therefore has a duty to explain its new diplomatic thinking to the Taiwanese public and the international community.

First, to deal with doubts about the diplomatic truce disclosing the government’s bottom line for negotiation too early on, the government should come up with a clear “roadmap” for the truce and make it clear that the tactics used are merely one path on their roadmap. The government should also demonstrate its sincerity from the outset so as to encourage China into giving us a friendly response.

Second, some people have questioned whether the diplomatic truce is overly passive, saying that apart from focusing on the truce, the government needs to be more proactive in unfolding Taiwan’s diplomatic plans by participating in more multilateral organizations or giving out more international humanitarian aid.

Third, some of the concerns surrounding the diplomatic truce have been caused by an uncertainty about China’s reaction. If China does not respond positively and continues to belittle Taiwan in the international community, the truce will become something we have used to belittle ourselves. To remedy this, the government must also make it clear that the truce is not the goal of our diplomatic policy — the goal of the truce is to create an environment beneficial to the development of Taiwan’s diplomatic space. If China’s response is not favorable to Taiwan, our allies will be able to see who the real “troublemaker” is and will support us in gaining wider international participation.

Fourth, the government’s diplomatic policy has been criticized as being excessively pro-China and for causing doubts amongst Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. The government therefore needs to explain that its new policies are based on its “flexible diplomacy” concept and aimed at avoiding a zero-sum game and creating a win-win situation for all parties concerned.

The government’s diplomatic strategy is aimed at maximizing Taiwan’s overall interests and dignity, so it also needs to fight for more international space for Taiwan while playing the role of a peacekeeper. Such moves will depend on Taiwan’s soft and hard power.

Taiwan needs to share with the international community and make contributions. This represents an embodiment of a soft power that can help Taiwan win international respect, while a determination to uphold Taiwan’s national sovereignty and security will help build a strong foundation for engaging in healthy competition with China.

Kan Yi-hua is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.

Listen to the voice

Ma’s obscured unification

In the last 100 days, many Taiwanese have become aware of the gap between President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) pre-election rhetoric and his post election performance. The role of the media in facilitating this gap was critical.

It was Taiwan’s politically affiliated media that helped propagate election slogans, argued for and against particular candidates and decided what extent of print, Web and TV coverage would be devoted to what the candidates said and the possible impact of their manifestos.

In spending five times more than the DPP on their election campaign, the KMT achieved a saturation of media that greatly boosted Ma’s chances of victory.

Such was the penetration of their election propaganda that many of the KMT talking points became decontested in voters minds; that is, they entered the realm of “common sense.”

Many light green supporters and young voters took this “common sense” without questioning it.

They thought Ma to be pragmatic, not radical, more of a consensus builder than a conflict instigator. They believed him when he expressed his determination to protect the sovereignty of Taiwan and promised that with Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) as vice president, the economy would improve dramatically.

One of the most notable slogans to aid the insemination of these misconceptions about Ma was a pun meaning “Ma becoming president is a good thing” and “Things will be better immediately.”

Later this was amended to “When Ma is elected, things will start to get better immediately.”

On the day Ma was inaugurated, however, the stock market dropped and has yet to recover. During the election, Ma and the KMT glibly promised a benchmark of more than 15,000, but today the TAIEX stands at 6,300, well below the critical 7,000 line.

It is possible that Ma and Siew may well have even believed their own lie about Chen’s poor economic management and thus overlooked the clear signs of global economic slowdown ahead, but their own act of misleading the Taiwanese public paradoxically left them unready to respond when the stock market crashed.

Their first limp response was “When Ma is elected, things will gradually get better.”

Things haven’t and tens of thousands of politically mobilized Taiwanese recently took to the streets to raise the question that if the party of the economy can’t make the economy better, can they be trusted to defend the country?

After Ma’s recent comments that Taiwan was not a country, perhaps a new slogan is appropriate for these times: “Ma won and Taiwan will soon be finished.”

The real tragedy is that many Taiwanese voted for unification without knowing it because they believed the sophisticated advertising designed to obscure the KMT’s not so hidden agenda.

Those interested in using democracy to rebalance this abuse should prepare themselves to vote DPP for all township, county and mayoral elections next year.

Only this way will the KMT get the message that Taiwan as a country and its democracy are here to stay, and they will not be allowed to trade it for their own pernicious financial gain.

Ben Goren
Meinung,
Kaohsiung County