Beijing’s
‘North Korea’ card no ace
By J. Michael Cole
寇謚將
Monday, Sep 29, 2008, Page 8
Well before President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) peace overture to Beijing required
supposed nursing by the international community, many commentators rationalized
US President George W. Bush’s unexpected policy volte-face on Taiwan by arguing
that the US needed China’s help in the six-party negotiations to disarm a
nuclear North Korea. Cognizant of Beijing’s style of diplomacy, in which it
never gives freely but always expects something in return, the US and other
countries involved in the talks with Pyongyang allowed themselves to become more
flexible on a matter they knew was of tremendous importance to China — Taiwan.
Some could argue, therefore, that Taipei became the sacrificial lamb to ensure
the participation of Beijing — North Korea’s principal diplomatic ally and
neighbor — in the disarmament talks.
For a while, it looked like the six-pay talks, launched in 2003, had borne
fruit, with Pyongyang agreeing to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and
allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, to
install seals and cameras at the facility. Academics who saw the outcome with
optimism were even hopeful that a mechanism for peace and security could evolve
in Northeast Asia, with the six-party talks involving the US, China, Japan,
South Korea, North Korea and Russia as a foundation.
But the euphoria did not last, as Pyongyang earlier this month announced it was
pulling out of the hard-won disarmament pact, ostensibly over Washington’s
failure to meet commitments it had made as part of the deal, including taking
North Korea off its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Days later, it was ordering UN inspectors to remove the seals and cameras that
had been installed at Yongbyon and announced it would reactivate the nuclear
complex, where refinement could produce plutonium, a main component of nuclear
weapons. The North’s military was also reported to have conducted missile tests
at a new launch facility in the west.
In and of itself, Pyongyang’s sudden change of heart will have implications on
diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear issue as well as the ongoing — and not
unrelated — hostilities between the two Koreas.
But other developments are sure to magnify the impact of this decision, namely
the coming to power in Japan of conservative Prime Minister Taro Aso, who favors
a hard line on North Korea (and who will see that decision as confirming his
views), ballistic missile defense tests Japan will conduct, with US
participation, in November and the deployment of a nuclear-powered US aircraft
carrier at the naval port of Yokosuka in the middle of this month.
While it is too early to tell where things are headed — especially in light of
news that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is ailing, with scarce intelligence on
who could succeed him or assume control of the military should he be
incapacitated — all these factors point to a move away from a diplomatic
resolution of the North Korean nuclear program and a renewed period of regional
tensions.
Furthermore, if we take a step back from the region and bring things to a
geostrategic level, it becomes obvious that emerging animosities between Moscow
and Washington over Russia’s military adventure in Georgia last month will throw
a monkey wrench into any move to create a regional security apparatus, if not
revive the six-party talks themselves.
Given the right-of-center “realistic idealism” of US presidential candidate
Senator John McCain, who has vociferously opposed Bush’s approach on North
Korea, a Republican win in November could also cast a shadow over the future of
diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
All these are imponderables and Pyongyang’s choices in the coming weeks will be
a principal factor deciding whether diplomacy stands a chance in the Korean
Peninsula or if decisionmakers in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul and Moscow
ultimately reach the conclusion that the key to resolving the problem now lies
(as some have long argued) with military force.
Should the latter view gain traction, it is likely Beijing would oppose the use
of force against North Korea, for reasons ranging from the risk of a sudden
influx of North Korean refugees crossing the border into China to Beijing’s
longstanding opposition to the use of force by external powers in its own
backyard.
As a side effect to a policy shift on North Korea, whatever influence Beijing
had over Washington’s position on Taiwan could vanish, which in turn could
weaken the elements in the White House and at the State Department who in the
past five years have been willing to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of China’s
role in the North Korean disarmament talks.
While there is nothing to celebrate in the failure of diplomacy to persuade
Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, a reversal of fortunes—combined with
a Taiwan-friendly Japanese prime minister — could bring about a positive shift
in policies toward Taiwan, at modicum a lessened sense of isolation. If that
opportunity emerges, it should be seized.
KMT to
blame for arms sale snafu
Monday, Sep 29, 2008, Page 8
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration has suffered a major diplomatic
and national security defeat. As the US Congress adjourned late on Friday, it
had not received notification from the State Department about the arms sale
package for Taiwan, meaning the package is certain to remain stalled. Although
Congress will remain in session for a few more days to deal with the US
financial crisis before going into recess ahead of the November general
elections, it is highly unlikely the arms sale will make it onto the agenda. The
issue may be dealt with when Congress resumes in late November, or be left for
the next president.
The government has consistently deceived both itself and the public over the
arms purchase. When Ma attended Armed Forces Day celebrations on Sept. 3, he
said: “The latest signs from the US imply that the US government will notify
Congress that the legal procedures [for the arms sale] should be completed.”
National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi (蘇起) said all the information
he had obtained during a visit to the US pointed to support for the sale. In an
interview on Sept. 9, Representative in Washington Jason Yuan (袁健生) said: “the
arms purchase has never been in question” and that work on the deal had never
been stopped.
The reality, however, looks different.
Does the US government’s preoccupation with the US financial crisis mean it
isn’t interested in selling arms? Not at all. The State Department sent out
notifications for arms deals with France, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The
Taiwanese deal has been discussed for seven years. It can no longer be delayed
with the excuse that it is still under discussion. Both houses of Congress have
passed resolutions expressing concern over arms sales to Taiwan and requiring
that the administration give them regular detailed briefings on the progress, a
move that was opposed by both the State Justice departments. The Justice
Department even said the bill “would infringe upon the president’s right to
conduct foreign policy.”
This makes it clear that the case is not being blocked by Congress, but by the
State Department and the White House. This is a serious blow to the Ma
administration’s efforts to work with the US and to Ma’s national security
strategies.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must assume responsibility for this result.
Pan-blue camp politicians boycotted what they called an overpriced arms
procurement deal since it was announced, using it as tool in their political
battles with former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). To dispel the Bush
administration’s misgivings over his pro-Beijing tilt, Ma repeatedly said he
would follow through on the arms purchase plan. But the White House’s commitment
to defending Taiwan at any expense has been replaced by disappointment in
Taiwanese politicians.
The US needs Beijing’s cooperation in fighting terror, on North Korea’s nuclear
disarmament and stabilizing the global financial system. Arms sales to Taiwan
may disturb its relations with China. The Ma administration’s unilateral tilt
toward China has prompted many US politicians and think tank experts to worry
that arms and military technology sold to Taiwan will be leaked to China.
The KMT and the Ma administration’s misreading of the White House and the US
Congress has caused the arms procurement effort to fail. The government must
learn from this defeat, revise its faulty pro-China strategies, make personnel
changes in the National Security Bureau and rebuild relations with the US. If it
doesn’t, there is a real risk that relations between Taiwan, the US and China
will become dangerously imbalanced.