Australia
eyes China and boosts defense spending
AFP , SYDNEY
Sunday, May 03, 2009, Page 1
Australia will spend more than US$70 billion boosting its defenses over the next
20 years in response to a regional military build-up and global shifts in power,
the government said yesterday.
A long-term strategic blueprint for the future of Australia’s armed forces
warned that war could be possible in the Asia-Pacific region in the next two
decades as emerging powers such as China flex their military might.
The US would continue its military dominance and be an “indispensable” ally for
Australia, the defense white paper said.
But as emerging or resurgent powers such as China, India and Russia tested US
primacy, the paper said there was “a small but still concerning possibility of
growing confrontation between some of these powers.”
“China will be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin,”
the paper said. “A major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a
globally significant military capability befitting its size.
“But the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation have the
potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained,
and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its
military plans,” it said.
If it did not take these steps, the paper said, there would be “a question in
the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force
development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears potentially to be
beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.
“China will have even more interest in convincing regional countries that its
rise will not diminish their sovereignty,” the paper said.
Greater engagement with Beijing was essential for encouraging transparency about
Chinese military capabilities and intentions, and securing greater cooperation
in areas of shared interest, the paper said.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) in March vowed to modernize his nation’s
military across the board, asking legislators for a 15.3 percent increase in
defense spending for this year to 472.9 billion yuan (US$69 billion) — double
the level of funding for 2006.
The global financial crisis was likely to accelerate a shift of power to the
Asia-Pacific region, and regional security would pivot on how strategic dynamics
were managed between the US, China and Japan, the blueprint said.
A major conflict on the Korean Peninsula remained a possibility, and the paper
said the collapse of North Korea could not be ruled out, while Myanmar remained
a “serious challenge.”
An escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan was also of “significant
concern,” and the paper said Islamist extremism would pose a direct threat to
Australia and its interests.
The paper reiterated Canberra’s commitment to the conflict in Afghanistan, which
it said could endure another decade or longer.
Canberra will acquire long-range cruise missiles, double its submarine fleet to
12 and buy 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets and eight new warships.”
Japanese
representative scolded over remark on Taiwan’s ‘unresolved’ status
By Jenny W. hsu and
Shih Hsiu-chuan
STAFF REPORTERS, WITH CNA
Sunday, May 03, 2009, Page 1
A former foreign minister-turned-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmaker
charged yesterday that Japan should recall its representative to Taipei over the
latter’s comment that Taiwan’s status is unclear. Taiwan’s former representative
to Japan, on the other hand, supported the Japanese representative, saying that
he did not say anything wrong.
The fuss stemmed from remarks made by Masaki Saito, head of the Taipei office of
Japan’s Interchange Association — Japan’s de facto embassy in Taiwan — on Friday
that Taiwan’s status is “still unresolved.” Saito made the comments at an annual
meeting of the Republic of China (ROC) International Relations Association at
National Chung Cheng University in Chiayi County.
The Japanese representative later apologized for his remarks after Deputy
Foreign Affairs Minister Andrew Hsia (夏立言) lodged a protest and demanded an
explanation.
A news release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) said Hsia summoned
Saito, who said that it was purely his personal view that Taiwan’s status was
unresolved and that his comment did not reflect the position of the Japanese
government.
The release said Saito apologized to Hsia, saying he was sorry that his remarks
had created difficulty for the ROC government. Saito said he would contact the
International Relations Association to withdraw his statement, the release
added.
KMT Legislator John Chiang (蔣孝嚴) said yesterday neither Saito nor the MOFA had
done enough to deal with Saito’s “serious gaffe.”
Saito and the Japan Interchange Association should offer a public apology in a
written statement and not just an oral apology to Hsia, Chiang said, adding that
the explanation offered by Saito and the Japan Interchange Association
afterwards that what Saito said was his personal opinion was “unacceptable.”
“Without a doubt, [Saito’s] comments in a public speech in a university in
Taiwan were his opinions made in his official capacity,” he said.Chiang called
on MOFA to “take stronger action” to demand a clear explanation of the matter
and to ask the Japanese government to recall Saito or have him replaced if it is
not satisfied with Japan’s response.
KMT Legislator Liu Shen-liang (劉盛良) said Saito and the Japan Interchange
Association should admit that Saito made “incorrect comments” on the status of
Taiwan instead of saying that his comments were personal.
Former Taiwan representative to Japan Koh Se-kai (?? yesterday said he believed
Saito had no reason to apologize because he did not say anything wrong and that
Hsia’s chiding was “merely a show.”
Koh made the comments on the sideline of a forum organized by the Taiwan New
Century Foundation.
Koh said the Treaty of San Francisco signed in 1951 did not clearly name a
recipient when Japan gave up its claim over Taiwan. The fact that no recipient
was specifically named means Taiwan’s status remains ambiguous even though it
maintains an independent body of governance with its own territories and
population, he said.
He said the ROC ceased to exist after the UN in 1971 passed a resolution in
which the People’s Republic of China replaced the ROC in the international body.
The view that the ROC and Taiwan are the same would only further confuse the
international community, he said, adding that such rhetoric was used as a
political tactic by people who want Taiwan to unify with China.
“Go ask any senior Japanese foreign ministry official. None of them will say
that Japan supports the view that Taiwan is part of China. But all of them will
say that Japan does not oppose such a view,” he said, adding that there is a
clear degree of difference between “supporting” and “not opposing.”
Koh also accused President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of betraying Taiwanese by
declaring a “diplomatic truce” with China.
The raison d’etre of diplomacy is for a country to survive in the international
community by co-existing with other nations. Any sacrificing of this effort
means the country wishes to discontinue its sovereignty, he said.
While the US and other countries are gravely concerned about China’s rapid
military buildup in recent years, he said, Ma has dragged his feet in procuring
arms to boost Taiwan’s defense capability.
Ma’s “diplomatic truce” is putting Taiwan’s future in Beijing’s hands, he said.
Pingpu
Aborigines heat up battle for ethnic identity
A PEOPLE’S ROOTS: An ethnic
reawakening of sorts for Plains Aborigines has long been hampered by policies
from the central government that erased their origins
By Loa Iok-sin
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, May 03, 2009, Page 3
“This just doesn’t make any sense because if you’re Aborigine, you’re born an Aborigine. How can you give up your own identity?”— Chen Chun-an, Siraya Culture Association member
|
Members of
Plains Aborigines tribes rally in front of the Presidential Office
yesterday demanding that the government restore their Aboriginal status. PHOTO: LO PEI-DER, TAIPEI TIMES |
Thousands of Pingpu (平埔), or “Plains” Aborigines, rallied in front of the
Presidential Office yesterday demanding that the government restore their
Aboriginal status. With many dressed in traditional outfits and holding
traditional instruments, they chanted slogans and sang as they marched from the
Legislative Yuan to Ketagalan Boulevard.
Rather than constituting a single Aboriginal tribe, Pingpu refer to between nine
and 14 tribes — depending on the type of classification — that once inhabited
flat lands across the country.
However, these people gradually “disappeared” over the course of time, largely
because of interaction with Hoklo and Hakka settlers who began coming from China
in large numbers about 400 years ago.
“To interact and trade with newcomers, Pingpu started to learn to speak Hoklo
[also known as Taiwanese] and Hakka, and adopted Chinese names and surnames,”
said Chan Su-chuan (詹素娟), an assistant research fellow at Acadmia Sinica’s
Institute of Taiwan History.
Aside from business connections, intermarriage between Pingpu and Hoklo or Hakka
also became common, Chan said.
“The interaction and cultural assimilation strengthened especially after the
Qing government took over Taiwan in the 17th century,” she said.
In some instances, Pingpu who had made special contributions to the Qing
government were honored by being granted Chinese surnames by the imperial court.
With Chinese surnames came with family books in which the origin of each surname
is recorded.
Such family books contributed to the loss of Pingpu identity.
“In the family book of a Pingpu family with the surname Tuan [段] living in
Tainan County, it is written that the Tuans are descendents of Bigan [比干, a
Chinese official from about 3,000 years ago],” Chan said. “But in fact, Pingpu
with the surname Tuan have no biological connection whatsoever with the Tuan
family from China.”
Results of censuses conducted during the Japanese colonial period in 1935 showed
that more than 57,000 people still identified themselves as Pingpu, while in
1956, another census — this time conducted by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)
government — showed that 27,000 people identified their ethnic group as “others”
from a list including “Taiwanese,” “Mainlander” and “mountain compatriots,” or
mountain Aborigines.
Comparing the censuses, geographer Yap Ko-hua (葉高華) said that parts of the
country where people referred to themselves as being of unknown ethnicity more
or less coincided with areas occupied by Pingpu in the 1935 survey.
“When the [KMT] government set up a new ethnic classification system after World
War II, it did not leave room for the Pingpu,” Yap wrote on his Web site. “As a
result, [the Pingpu] became people ‘of unknown ethnic origin’ in official
records.”
In addition to the critical condition of their culture, Pingpu have completely
lost their legal status. Pingpu descendents have gradually forgotten who they
are — until 10 or 20 years ago, when some decided to fight back.
Sixty-year-old Aylian Hsiao (蕭愛蓮) lives in her native Puli Township (埔里), Nantou
County, did not know she was a Pingpu Aborigine from the Kahavu tribe until 10
years ago when her mother created a Kahavu Culture Association and asked Hsiao
if she wanted to be a member.
“I said ‘sure, but why?’” Hsiao said, adding that “all my life, people have told
me that I look like an Aborigine and asked if I was one. I always told them that
I wasn’t.”
“My mother then asked me: ‘Did you not know you’re also an Aborigine?’” she
said.
Ever since Hsiao became aware of her Kahavu identity, she has been very active
in the Pingpu revival movement and has even endeavored to learn her lost mother
tongue.
“There are four Kahavu villages around Puli where some elders are still able to
speak Kahavu,” Hsiao said. “I’m old, I don’t learn very quickly, but if I can
learn a word or a phrase a day, I would know 365 words in a year and that adds
up with time.”
Last year, two Pazeh Pingpu from Puli, Pan Ying-chieh (潘英傑) and Wang Pan Mei-yu
(王潘美玉) — in their 60s and 70s respectively — won an award from the Ministry of
Education for writing poems in the Pazeh language, after learning to speak it
for five years under the tutelage of 94-year-old Pan Chin-yu (潘金玉), the only
person who can speak the language in Puli.
About 200 people now attend Pan Chin-yu’s Pazeh lessons.
Siraya Culuture Association chairwoman Uma Talavan and her husband, Edgar
Macapili, spent seven hours digging through documents left by the Dutch 400
years ago and published a 1,400-page Siraya lexicon last year.
The Sirayas are Pingpu who live mainly in Tainan County. Some of the Siraya
traditions — mostly religious rituals — are still practiced today.
The Tainan County Government was also the first government authority to
recognize Pingpu as Aborigines. A county-level Siraya Aboriginal Affairs
Committee was created in 2006 and since January the county government has
allowed residents to register their Siraya identity — provided they can prove it
with household registration records from the Japanese colonial period.
However, the movement suffered a major setback when the Ministry of the Interior
declared the Tainan County Government’s move illegal, saying that confirmation
of Aboriginal status fell under central government jurisdiction.
The Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP), on the other hand, said in a press
release that Pingpu could not be granted Aboriginal status as they “voluntarily
gave it up by not registering themselves as Aborigines in the 1960s and the
1970s.”
In 1946 the Taiwan Provincial Government issued executive orders to several
counties notifying residents to register their Aboriginal status according to
records from the Japanese colonial period. For various reasons, most Pingpu did
not do so.
“This just doesn’t make any sense because if you’re Aborigine, you’re born an
Aborigine. How can you give up your own identity?” Chen Chun-an (陳俊安), a Siraya
Culture Association member, said. “Besides, not all the counties received the
executive letter. Tainan County, for example, did not get it.”
A copy of the executive order showed it was sent to governments in Taipei,
Hsinchu, Nantou, Pingtung, Hualien, Taoyuan, Miaoli, Kaohsiung and Taitung.
“Even if you did see the letter but did not register at the time, you should
still be able to do so according to the Aboriginal Identity Act [原住民族身分法],” Chen
said. “After all, a law has higher status in the legal and administrative
hierarchy than an executive order — they should act according to the law.”
Following their demonstration yesterday, representatives of the protesters were
received by a Presidential Office official who took their petition and promised
to forward it to government institutions within a week.
“We’ll wait for a week or two. If we don’t get a positive response from the
government, we do not rule out filing a lawsuit against CIP Minister Chang Jen-hsiang
[章仁香],” Uma said.
Meanwhile, Tainan County Commissioner Su Huan-chih (蘇煥智) said the county
government would continue to accept Aboriginal registration from local Sirayas
despite the warning from the ministry.
“That’s because the county government is the one that’s acting according to the
law,” Su said.
On Chinese
zero-sum diplomacy
By J. Michael Cole
寇謐將
Sunday, May 03, 2009, Page 8
With Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and his team of
negotiators just back from the third round of cross-strait talks in Nanjing, it
is time to dwell a little on the concept of game theory.
A branch of applied mathematics, game theory is an attempt to understand human
behavior in a strategic context, wherein a party’s success is contingent on the
decisions made by another party.
In the context of negotiations, game theory contains four possible outcomes that
guide decision-making, which can be represented in the matrix commonly known as
the prisoner’s dilemma: win-win, win-lose, lose-win and lose-lose.
How negotiators weigh their options and how they negotiate is predicated on
whether they intend to play a zero-sum or non-zero-sum game. In a scenario where
a party chooses the zero-sum option, the negotiator seeks to maximize the payoff
to the detriment of the other side. In other words, benefits are seen as a
finite resource and the winner takes all.
The non-zero-sum approach to diplomacy, on the other hand, sees benefit as a
common, unquantifiable good rather than a finite resource that must be parsed
out unequally. This approach sees cooperation, rather than competition, as a
means to ensure that both sides benefit.
Knowing the other side’s intentions before approaching the negotiating table,
therefore, is a crucial precondition. When both sides adopt a non-zero-sum
approach, we see the emergence of what is known as the Nash equilibrium, which,
in simple terms, refers to both sides making the best decision they can based on
the assumption that the counterparty will do as much.
While departing from the Nash equilibrium (in other words, playing a zero-sum
game) in the knowledge that the other side has adopted a non-zero-sum strategy
can result in a greater payoff (that is, win-lose), a Nash equilibrium offers
the greatest assurance that the payoff will be spread equally (that is,
win-win).
Understanding the implications of game theory in the context of international
relations is of capital importance and underscores the need for awareness of the
counterparty’s intentions before entering negotiations.
Of course, when game theory leaves the realm of mathematics and is applied to
real-world interaction — as in the case of cross-strait talks — matters become
far more complex because they are multidimensional. On paper, the prisoner’s
dilemma is two-dimensional; it is an isolated system.
In international relations, however, negotiations simultaneously involve the
tactical and the strategic, meaning that the payoff accrued from the outcome of
negotiations is not isolated but part of a system.
What this means is that while it is possible to approach negotiations on a
specific topic at the tactical level, once we take a step back, they can also be
part of a grand strategy. One implication of this duality is that how one
assesses payoff at the tactical level may differ from an assessment at the
strategic level.
While this conclusion may seem self-evident, it is often overlooked. Taken into
account, however, it can serve to explain the behavior of parties during
negotiations.
Beijing’s approach to negotiations with Taipei can be better understood if the
simultaneous interaction of the tactical and the strategic are taken into
account, and the outcome of the talks in Nanjing — the signed agreements —
clearly indicate which items China sees as tactical, and which it sees as
strategic.
As a rule of thumb, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait will
take a non-zero-sum approach to tactical items, such as financial cooperation,
fighting crime and adding cross-strait flights, with the result that both sides
will enjoy payoffs.
When items under negotiation enter the strategic level, however, China adopts a
zero-sum strategy, in which the payoff takes something away from the
counterparty.
In the Nanjing round of talks, no agreement was reached on the “fifth freedom of
the air,” for example, as yielding on this item would have implied that air
travel between Taiwan and China is international rather than domestic.
By taking a zero-sum approach on this matter, China denied both parties the
moderate payoffs that a Nash equilibrium would have provided. It valued
lose-lose (or in this case not-win, not-win) at the tactical level above any
other possible outcome.
As cross-strait negotiations continue, it should become clearer which issues
China considers tactical and which it considers strategic.
On the former, it will show “goodwill” and take a non-zero-sum approach, with
the implication that negotiations can proceed smoothly.
On the latter, however — including the question of Taiwanese independence —
Beijing will very much be the zero-sum, intransigent player.
This shows us that, for China, the payoffs at the tactical level are a means to
an end at the strategic level — the same approach to negotiations that once led
an observer to reflect on former Chinese premier and foreign minister Zhou
Enlai’s (周恩來) style of diplomacy as not involving any substantial concession on
any important (that is, strategic) issue.
What has yet to be determined is whether Taipei will also take the zero-sum
approach to negotiations on strategic matters.
If it doesn’t, or if it fails to recognize that this is the game China has been
playing all along, it could very well lose everything.
J. Michael Cole is a writer based in
Taipei.