KMT warns DPP over prolonging rally
　

TRAFFIC WOES: A KMT lawmaker said the DPP would be breaking the law if its anti-government rally on Sunday continued into Monday, disrupting the city
　

By Flora Wang and Mo Yan-chih
STAFF REPORTERS
Thursday, May 14, 2009, Page 3
　

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus warned the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) yesterday that it would be responsible for any disruptions caused by the DPP’s anti-government rally scheduled for Sunday.

KMT caucus deputy secretary-general Lu Hsueh-chang (呂學樟) told a press conference that the DPP should shoulder all legal responsibility if the rally caused any inconvenience to commuters and students on Monday morning.

Lu criticized DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) for rejecting the Taipei City Government’s offer of a permit to extend the rally on Ketagalan Boulevard into Monday.

“The DPP obviously wants to challenge the legal system and defy the law by holding an illegal rally on Monday,” Lu said.

Tsai said on Tuesday that the party would not apply to the city government for permission to hold a 24-hour sit-in protest against the Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法) and a proposed amendment to it.

The protest is scheduled to start on Sunday in front of the Presidential Office after a rally against the government’s pro-China policies.

Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) on Tuesday called on the DPP to negotiate with the organization that has a permit to stage a rally on the boulevard on Monday over use of the space. He was referring to the Taipei City branch of the KMT.

Tsai called Hau’s offer “ridiculous and hypocritical,” saying it was the KMT that had arranged for a “civic organization” to apply for rally permits on the boulevard on Monday in a bid to block the DPP’s rally plan.

The Taipei City Police Department’s Traffic Division said yesterday that it would implement flexible traffic controls on Ketagalan Boulevard and rally routes beginning at 8am on Sunday for the duration of the DPP’s rally. The boulevard will be closed to traffic at that time.

The traffic control measures will also include Hangzhou S Road, Hangzhou N Road, Civic Boulevard, Zhonghua Road, Heping E Road and Heping W Road starting at 12pm.

Sunday’s rally will divide into four routes around the city.

Protesters are asked to gather on Zhongxiao E Road, at the Zhongshan Soccer Stadium, the Wanhua Train Station and in front of National Taiwan University. They are scheduled to begin marching toward the Presidential Office at 3pm.

Fang Yang-ning (方仰寧), director of the division, said bus services along the four routes will be affected, and urged bus riders to pay attention to the alternative route information posted at bus stops.

He urged those who planned to visit National Taiwan University Hospital on Sunday to enter the facility via Hsuzhou Road. Passengers going to Taipei Railway Station or Taipei Bus Terminal on Sunday should take the MRT and leave home early to avoid getting stuck on the road, he said.

Fang said the division would maintain flexible traffic controls around the area on Monday and clear part of the road to allow people to get to work.

Fang said the division would talk with the DPP and seek to reduce the impact of the rally on traffic.

Meanwhile, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) said she and Deputy Kaohsiung Mayor Lee Yung-te (李永得) would join the Taipei rally after participating in one held earlier in the day in her city.

Chen said she would respect the decisions of other Kaohsiung City Government officials about attending the two rallies.

Meanwhile, DPP Legislator Huang Wei-cher (黃偉哲) said former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) daughter, Chen Hsing-yu (陳幸妤), and son, Chen Chih-chung (陳致中), would join the Taipei rally.

“They have a right to join the protest. But the rally is not a show of support for Chen,” Huang said.

The Central News Agency, however, reported that a friend of Chen Chih-chung said the former first family members had no plans to join the rally.

In related news, Chen Shui-bian’s secretary, Chiang Chih-ming (江志銘), said yesterday that Tsai was scheduled to visit the former president in the Taipei Detention Center today. DPP spokesman Cheng Wen-tsang (鄭文燦), however, said Tsai has not decided whether to make the visit.

“Tsai believes Chen is being detained for political reasons, and she said she would find ways to support Chen’s judicial rights,” Cheng said.

Rights activists urge Ma to turn words into action
　

By Loa Iok-sin and Ko Shu-ling
STAFF REPORTERS
Thursday, May 14, 2009, Page 3

“The ratification and signing of the two treaties is an important step in Taiwan’s human rights history. It not only gives them the status of domestic law, but also a promise to the world ... What’s more important, however, is whether the contents of the covenants will be implemented, not the rituals.”— Lin Chia-fan, Taiwan Association for Human Rights chairman

Domestic and international human rights activists urged President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday to honor human rights through actions rather than words.

Ma is scheduled to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) into law today.

“The ratification and signing of the two treaties is an important step in Taiwan’s human rights history. It not only gives them the status of domestic law, but also a promise to the world,” Taiwan Association for Human Rights chairman Lin Chia-fan (林佳範) told a news conference. “What’s more important, however, is whether the contents of the covenants will be implemented, not the rituals.”

More than 20 people representing human rights groups from Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, Cambodia, Mongolia and Taiwan attended the press conference in Taipei.

The two treaties were signed by ambassador to the UN Liu Chieh (劉鍇) in 1967, but were only ratified by the legislature in March.

Lin said the proposed amendment to the Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法) would be a test case of the government’s determination to implement the covenants.

The Assembly and Parade Act was enacted in 1988, the year after martial law was lifted, to “maintain social order.”

As the government and lawmakers across party lines agree the law needs overhauling, the government proposed an amendment that activists have criticized for being tougher than the original law.

“To honor the spirit of the two international human rights covenants, the government should change its mentality and truly revise the law to protect people’s rights to freedom of assembly, instead of restricting it like the current law and the Cabinet amendment do,” Lin said.

Chalida Tajaroensuk, executive director of Thailand’s People’s Empowerment Foundation, welcomed Taiwan’s ratification of the covenants, but agreed with Lin that laws need to be amended in accordance with the two treaties.

She urged the government to come up with “an action plan and timeline for when the Taiwanese government will complete what.”

Tajaroensuk also reminded the government that the “death penalty was in violation of international human rights standards” and should be quickly abolished.

Amnesty International Taiwan chairman Peter Huang (黃文雄) said that the government should keep a list of laws that are not in accordance with international human rights standards and revise them accordingly.

“An important clause in the treaties is that the signatory country is responsible to educate the people about values laid out in the treaties,” Huang said. “Unfortunately, our civil servants, police, military and intelligence officials are not taught about human rights in school or in on-job training.”

As Taiwan is not a UN member, the representatives all vowed to stand in solidarity with and support Taiwan’s efforts to advance human rights as members of international civil society.

Ma met the activists at the Presidential Office later yesterday morning and told them that he had been doing his best to protect human rights for one year.

He said the Assembly and Parade Act would be amended to give the public more freedom. Ma also said he has asked the Cabinet to reduce the fine for violators of the act.

“We are doing our best to promote Taiwan’s human rights,” he said. “We are willing to learn from you and hope that every country in the world will enjoy the full protection of human rights.”

On Dec. 10 last year, World Human Rights Day, Ma asked the legislature to ratify the two UN conventions.

He said yesterday that he has been very concerned about the human rights issue during his time as minister of justice, Taipei mayor and now president. When he was justice minister, Ma said he began conducting opinion polls on the death penalty, blocked the execution of three death row inmates and approved their requests for special appeals three times.

“It was unprecedented in our country’s legal history,” he said.

Ma said that as Taipei mayor, he had established more than 80 modern interrogation rooms at the city’s police precincts to record the questioning process.

“Torture does not exist in Taipei City any more,” he said. “The purpose of video recording is to protect human rights and avoid wrong accusations against the police.”

He said that as mayor he had also established a human rights advisory committee, making the city the only local government with such an agency.

He said he had also devoted a chapter of his campaign platform to human rights to oppose illegal eavesdropping, government intervention in the media and prosecutors’ selective litigation.

The risks and benefits of detente
　

By Yu Tsung-chi 余宗基
Thursday, May 14, 2009, Page 8

‘No policies should be carried out in haste simply to achieve short-term gains. A long-term engagement has the potential to encourage greater cooperation and produce greater profits.’

Does economic interdependence increase or decrease the probability of peace across the Taiwan Strait? With bilateral trade between China and Taiwan hitting a record high of US$132.9 billion last year, according to the Bureau of Foreign Trade, this question holds great significance.

Liberals argue that trade creates vested interests in peace and that economic interdependence can lower the likelihood of war by making trade worth more than the option of aggression. According to this view, economic interdependence reinforces institutional constraints and spill-over effects by creating non-state actors and transnational ties that encourage cooperation rather than conflict.

A May 4 article by Daniel Rosen in the Wall Street Journal Asia, “Investing in Cross-Strait Relations,” takes this viewpoint.

“The reduced political risk of cross-Strait hostility is the most exciting economic dividend” of the third cross-strait meeting in Nanjing, Rosen writes.

A case in point is Taiwan’s recent admission — with Beijing’s agreement — to the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer. This was not only a major breakthrough in the nation’s persistent campaign for international space, but also a gesture of goodwill from China.

But realists dismiss the liberal viewpoint, arguing that economic interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war because asymmetrical dependence, political discord and vulnerability have a negative bearing on the politics of national security.

Some China specialists warn that economic overreliance by Taiwan on China will give the latter leverage to achieve unification. China could impose economic sanctions on Taiwan, potentially coercing it into making political concessions or suffering the military consequences for resisting. This constitutes an imminent threat to national security.

A Taipei Times article by John Tkacik (“An Obama TPR: Too little, too late?”, April 29, page 8) echoes this argument: “An Obama TPR [Taiwan Policy Review] will judge that the powerful momentum in cross-strait dynamics is pushing Taiwan rapidly into full economic dependence on China. It will conclude that Taiwan’s inextricable economic dependence on China — absent counterbalancing action — will quickly drive the country beyond its ‘tipping point’ toward political and, ultimately, security dependence on Beijing.”

But economic interdependence is Janus-faced — obfuscating our understanding of its complex processes and impact on cross-strait relations.

There are two outcomes of economic interdependence: zero sum and nonzero sum. In a zero-sum scenario, China wins, or gains as it may, and Taiwan loses — or vice versa.

In my view, this scenario is less likely today because globalization is making the world smaller and binding each country’s destiny within a worldwide network of mutual dependence. It is thus impractical to perceive recent cross-strait interaction as a zero-sum game.

Nonzero-sum scenarios, however, deserve closer analysis, including positive-sum and negative-sum outcomes.

A positive-sum game entails a win-win situation — everybody benefits.

A precondition for this is that China and Taiwan both see economic interdependence as an absolute gain that is mutually beneficial and do not stray from this view.

In his recent book, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, Joshua Kurlantzick writes: “China has drastically changed its image in many parts of the world from dangerous to benign.”

On Dec. 31, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) made six proposals concerning Taiwan. Hu said China would pursue a policy of “peaceful development” and look for win-win solutions to cross-strait matters.

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), meanwhile, has since taking office promoted his “three noes” (no unification, no independence and no use of force); the concept of a “diplomatic truce,” or mutual non-denial; postal, transportation and commercial links; and an economic cooperation framework agreement.

Recent breakthroughs in cross-strait relations showed China’s flexibility on allowing Taiwan to observe the WHA and strengthened Ma’s argument that the best way to ensure Taiwan’s prosperity and security is to reassure and engage China.

In a poll conducted on April 28 by the Chinese-language China Times, 62.8 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with the third round of cross-strait negotiations in Nanjing, while 66.7 percent said they believed the talks would have a positive effect on economic development. The poll also found that 44.9 percent of respondents felt Ma was doing a good job.

If goodwill across the Taiwan Strait continues, economic interdependence could evolve into the “complex interdependence” state described by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, in which a decline is seen in the use of military force and coercive power in bilateral relations.

Hopefully, this vision will come to fruition. Only then can the traditional model of national security be broadened to include economic elements and market forces essential to Taiwan’s survival, development and stability. Perhaps cross-strait peace could thus be realized.

Under a different scenario — the negative-sum game, in which everybody loses — China and Taiwan enjoy no mutual trust and view economic interdependence as a competition or relative gain. Each side will look for opportunities to cheat and gain the upper hand over the other.

If each side doubts the other’s intentions, they will adopt policies based on fear rather than hope. Future objectives will influence present behavior and a spiral of negative actions and reactions will hasten an armed conflict.

In his book, Kurlantzick says: “In addition to cultural tools ... trade, investment, aid, and the appeal of China’s economic model ... make up the second potential weapons in China’s arsenal.”

But, “China could overplay its hand, making promises to other nations that it cannot fulfill,” he writes.

At first, the public had high hopes for opening up to China. When Chinese tourists and exports of agricultural products to China fell short of the great benefits that had been promised, their attitude turned upside down and Ma’s approval ratings plunged to a nadir.

Kurlantzick says: “Despite Beijing’s rhetoric of cooperation, when it comes to core interests, China, like any great power, will think of itself first.”

As examples he cites China’s dam on the Mekong River and says that despite “signing a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water.”

Cross-strait interactions have begun by focusing on more easily attained, economic goals. Sooner or later, however, developments will lead to the elephant in the room: sovereignty, the pivotal interest for both sides and the most controversial question.

Taiwan must exercise caution to avoid any negative impact on its long-term interests.

Will China eventually drop its “win-win” rhetoric and present Taiwan with aggressive, unilateral demands? Are its goodwill gestures a disguise? Is China playing a game of go with Taiwan, in which it seeks to entrap its opponent? Fear can raise many specters.

Many people fear that Beijing’s cross-strait trade policies are politically motivated, with the goal of making Taiwan economically dependent on China. China’s political dominance and its absolute military supremacy require peace to develop — as it must accumulate wealth through economic growth.

Much to the government’s chagrin, China has not only increased the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan by more than 100 since Ma took office last May, it has also increased its military spending this year by 14.9 percent, showed off its naval forces on the 60th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and plans a military drill with 50,000 troops this year.

China has no right to criticize Taiwan and the US over sales of state-of-the-art weapons systems: Beijing has more than 1,000 missiles deployed across the Strait, compelling Taiwan to arm itself out of fear for its safety.

After US arms sales to Taiwan, China tends to become more determined to boost military spending to deter Taiwanese independence. This vicious circle results in a security dilemma that is negative for both sides.

Under this negative-sum scenario of economic interdependence, there is potential for China to coerce Taiwan’s political concession by manipulating the imbalance in power. Economic factors would, in other words, bring about an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait rather than stability.

From the perspective of a nonzero-sum game, Taiwan must take short-term influence and long-term vulnerability into account.

The immediate effects of dependence on China must not be overlooked. Any changes in cross-strait policy that could have a wide-reaching impact in a short period of time should be approached slowly to prevent a backlash or political discord.

No policies should be carried out in haste simply to achieve short-term gains. A long-term engagement has the potential to encourage greater cooperation and produce greater profits.

Vulnerability, on the other hand, concerns the nation’s flexibility and access to alternative sources of various resources. In the face of an imbalance in power, Taiwan must look for strategies to minimize its vulnerability.

Two lessons come to mind.

“In Singapore, China’s growing diplomatic assertiveness has suggested to some Singaporean officials that China’s charm is merely a facade. Fear of China, along with mistrust of Chinese charm, in fact, explains in part why Singapore has boosted defense cooperation with the United States in recent years,” Kurlantzick writes.

In an article in the Wall Street Journal Asia on May 6, “Australia Bulks Up,” Andrew Shearer writes that Australia, with China firmly in mind, “lays out a grandiose vision for a stronger Australian defense force” that “would have enhanced maritime capabilities, Joint Strike Fighters, a larger army, big amphibious ships to transport it and at least three air warfare destroyers.”

“Australia’s six existing conventional submarines will be replaced by 12 larger and more capable boats. And in a first for its immediate neighborhood, Australia would acquire land-attack cruise missiles,” he writes.

Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council of the US.

Who dares to cross the PRC-backed SEF head?
　

By Lu I-Ming 呂一銘
Thursday, May 14, 2009, Page 8

At the close of the third round of talks between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) late last month, Chen urged Chiang to “keep going.”

In an apparent response to Chen’s exhortation, an advertisement with the headline “Taiwanese people need Chairman Chiang Pin-kung” was printed, undersigned “chairpersons of Taiwan business associations throughout China.”

The ad seemed to target President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). These associations, whose formation Chen has promoted during his tenures as director of the Taiwan Affairs Office and chairman of ARATS, proved very effective on this occasion. Ma quickly appeared on television, urging Chiang to stay in his post. The next day, Ma paid a rare visit to Chiang at the SEF office, accompanied by National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi (蘇起). Begging Chiang not to resign, Ma’s apologetic attitude betrayed the extent to which he acts at Beijing’s beck and call.

Chiang made a big show of tendering his resignation precisely because he knows Ma dare not touch him — especially with Chiang and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) forming a united front.

Wu assailed Ma’s party allies, saying: “People spreading rumors are scoundrels. I warn you not to push people like Chiang and me against the wall.”

Whether or not Ma makes a bid for the KMT chairmanship next month, Wu is scheduled to lead a delegation to China at that time. Ma, intimidated into silence, dared not mention criticism about conflicts of interest involving the Chinese business ties of members of Chiang’s family, nor their purchase of a luxury villa in the US. Instead, Ma praised Chiang’s contributions to the nation.

With such a timorous president, it is hard to know whether to laugh or cry. The unabashed Chiang promised to prioritize national interests and do whatever needed to be done. In the end, Ma came out playing second fiddle to a more confident Chiang.

Cross-strait relations have developed a great deal over the past five years, from the KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) platform to the recent talks between the SEF and ARATS.

Let us remember that Chiang is also first deputy chairman of the KMT. It is evident that the CCP has connections throughout Taiwan’s political parties, government, business and media and knows the various factions like the back of its hand.

Taiwanese businesspeople in China are simply hostages.

The CCP can slowly extend its influence over Taiwan unbeknownst to the Taiwanese. China no longer needs to resort to military means to impose its will on Taiwan. The most recent example was at the World Health Assembly, where Taiwan will now need China’s approval each year to be invited to the assembly.

China has killed two birds with one stone: It need not worry about another transfer of power in Taiwan.

The SEF is an important player in cross-strait exchanges, but the whole organization, including its leadership, is in the hands of the CCP. This was illustrated by Beijing’s behind-the-scenes support for Chiang. At the same time, Ma is accelerating his rapprochement with China.

As time goes on, China is intervening more brazenly in the appointment of senior Taiwanese officials, as at the SEF. Beijing no longer needs to rely on threats to move Taiwan toward unification, because Taiwan’s democratically elected president is looking increasingly like a puppet.

Lu I-ming is the former publisher and president of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily.