Wu bows out as Ma runs for KMT chair
　

SPECULATION CONFIRMED: The president said that he would run in the July 26 KMT chairman election, while the opposition expressed concern about checks and balances

By Mo Yan-chih
STAFF REPORTER
Thursday, Jun 11, 2009, Page 1

“He [Ma Ying-jeou] can do whatever he wants. No one can control him anyway.”— Lo Shu-lei, KMT legislator
　

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) announced yesterday he would run in the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman election on July 26 to push for closer cooperation between the government and the party.

“I am prepared to join the next KMT chairmanship election, to again lead this party that has established and protected the Republic of China and to continue party reform ... I have decided to run in the party chairman’s election not to expand my power, but to fulfill my responsibility,” Ma said at a press conference at KMT headquarters yesterday afternoon.

Ma, accompanied by KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) and top party officials, thanked Wu for his long-term support and for taking over as KMT chairman after Ma stepped down over the mayoral special allowance fund case.

Wu said he would not run in the election. He said Ma had told him about his intention to run for the chairmanship two days ago. Wu said he would cooperate by not running in the election.

“I am under tremendous stress these days ... I’ve made it clear that it would be impossible for me to compete with President Ma in the election,” Wu said.

Ma and Wu had planned to finalize the issue next Monday when registration opens for the party’s chairmanship election, but decided to hold a joint press conference yesterday to explain the issue after speculation mounted over a power struggle between the two.

Wu yesterday said he had brought up the KMT chairmanship with Ma in April last year and had said he had no intention of getting involved in any power struggles.

Taking over as KMT chairman two years ago was not part of his plan, Wu said, adding that he was grateful for cross-strait developments and the victories in legislative and presidential elections that he helped the party achieve.

“I have no intention of competing with anyone and I hope my decision today will help [the party] turn to the next generation. A 70-year-old man should know when to quit,” Wu said.

Ma is 59 years old.

Ma later confirmed Wu had consulted with him in April last year about the possibility of his taking over the party chairmanship shortly after he won the presidential election, but he had not thought it would be necessary to double as party chairman.

Wu mentioned the issue again last September and the two agreed to discuss it this month.

Ma yesterday denied that the lack of cooperation between the party and the government prompted him to change his mind, and reiterated that taking over the chairmanship would help the government function more smoothly.

When asked to comment on his previous opposition to the idea of the president doubling as party chairman, Ma said no laws banned the president from doing so.

“I thought it would be unnecessary [to double as KMT chairman] when I took office last year, but I now believe that the party and the government should fully cooperate as we have faced various challenges over the past year,” Ma said.

As to the forum between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, Ma declined to confirm whether he would attend and meet Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in his capacity as KMT chairman. The KMT chairman election is scheduled for July 26 and the new chairman will formally take over the position on Sept. 12.

KMT caucus deputy secretary-general Lu Hsueh-chang (呂學樟) said yesterday the party should still complete its democratic procedures to elect its next chairman. Another caucus deputy secretary-general, John Wu (吳志揚), son of Wu Poh-hsiung, said his father was glad to hand over the position to the president.

KMT Legislator Lo Shu-lei (羅淑蕾) held a different view, expressing concern about the impact of Ma’s decision. Now the president would enjoy absolute power and no one would be able to influence his decisions, she said.

“He can do whatever he wants,” Lo said. “No one can control him anyway. He now becomes the most powerful person in Taiwan.”

At a separate setting yesterday, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said that after Ma becomes KMT chairman, Taiwan’s democratic system would be in danger because the system of checks and balances would totally lose efficacy. Only referendums would remain to check Ma’s power, she said.

DPP Legislator Chai Trong-rong (蔡同榮) said the spirit of democracy lies in the division of power, but Ma wants to control the government, the military, the intelligence, the party and the legislature, “and become a dictator of the country.”

Former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) also voiced her concern, saying that these are signs of Ma’s intention to gain more control over politics and move Taiwan closer to unification with China via the KMT-CCP exchange platform.

“Once Ma becomes the [KMT] chairman, he will have the power to nominate candidates for the year-end local government head elections, as well as for the next legislative election,” Lu said. “With nomination power, all KMT politicians who seek to run in elections — including those who would often disagree with Ma — will have to listen to him.”

Congress’ Taiwan support could extend to F-16 sale
　

By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON
Thursday, Jun 11, 2009, Page 1

A Washington conference has been told there is a general consensus on Capitol Hill in support of Taiwan that could extend to selling it F-16 fighter planes, while a leading Republican congresswoman called on US President Barack Obama to move quickly on the sale.

The conservative Heritage Foundation hosted the conference to discuss “The Taiwan Relations Act’s Enduring Legacy on Capitol Hill.”

Congressman Joe Wilson, a South Carolina Republican, said: “The US should not dictate any particular outcome of Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland. But we must see that the relationship develops peacefully and with the consent of the people in Taiwan. I am committed to ensuring that Taiwan has the military wherewithal to negotiate from a position of strength.”

Standing in for Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Wilson said that Taiwan’s interest in China did not extend to unification.

MISSILES

He added that while the people of Taiwan may want to maintain the status quo forever, China does not and that is why it has more than 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan.

Wilson said that any well-meaning reconciliation would require dismantling the missile threat to Taiwan and there was no sign that China was prepared to do that.

He said: “What about the rest of the Chinese military build-up? They tell us it’s not aimed at us. Who is it aimed at? The Taiwanese know. That is why they want F-16s and that is why we should provide F-16s. It would be a deterrence to military adventurism and I believe it would promote peace through strength.”

Saying that a recent resolution supporting the 30-year-old Taiwan Relations Act passed the Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, Wilson said there was “broad and enthusiastic consensus” on Capitol Hill in favor of Taiwan.

He said that he was not aware of any direct discussions to date with the Obama administration on the sale of F-16s to Taiwan.

PUSH FROM CONGRESS

Asked if there was currently a push in Congress to sell F-16s to Taiwan, Wilson said: “It is my view that the vote we had on March 24, reaffirming our support for Taiwan, including a strong national defense for Taiwan, showed that members of Congress want that.”

Ros-Lehtinen was unable to attend as principal speaker at the conference because of last-minute scheduling of Foreign Affairs Committee business, but Dennis Halpin, a senior member of her staff and an expert on Taiwan, read long quotes from the speech.

Ros-Lehtinen was to say in her speech: “Beijing has given no indication that it has altered its ultimate objective of forcibly dominating Taiwan. Beijing has undertaken no confidence building measures to accompany the recent thaw. It has continued unabated in its buildup of missiles.”

CROSS-STRAIT THAW

“All this implies that the recent cross-strait thaw may be no more than an early rise in temperatures to be followed by an even bleaker winter of discontent. Beijing also continues its expansion in submarines and other naval vessels seeking to turn the Western Pacific into a Chinese lake,” she added.

“The March incident involving the US surveillance ship, the [USS] Impeccable, is only the latest evidence of Beijing’s attempt to dominate the international waters in the general vicinity of Taiwan. I wish that Taiwan already had those diesel submarines first promised by the Bush Administration in 2001,” the speech said.

VITAL

“I have always been a strong advocate legislatively in the Congress of making those weapons systems vital to the defense of Taiwan readily available, as called for in the Taiwan Relations Act. I also advocate the provision of a new generation of F-16 aircraft for the defense of Taiwan and hope that the Obama administration will act expeditiously on this matter,”she said.

Why an ECFA referendum is key
　

By Tung Chen-yuan 童振源
Thursday, Jun 11, 2009, Page 8

On May 20, the first anniversary of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) inauguration, Ma repeated his view that only issues involving independence or unification need to be put to a referendum, and that there was no need for a referendum to decide on his proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China.

On the same day, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Central Standing Committee initiated a push for a referendum on the ECFA proposal. This again highlighted the distance between the ruling and opposition camps, as well as the fact that, in lieu of a consensus-building mechanism between the government, the opposition and the public, referendums have become a last resort.

The Ma government has emphasized that an ECFA referendum is unnecessary because the pact is an economic matter unrelated to sovereignty, and that public opinion can be understood through opinion polls.

The results of a poll released by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in mid-April showed that 70 percent of people believe signing an ECFA is “necessary.” Memorandums issued by the MAC and the Ministry of Economic Affairs also said referendums were almost never held when other countries signed free trade agreements. So why would an ECFA referendum be necessary, given that the issue does not involve sovereignty, is supported by a majority of voters and that there is no precedent for it?

There are a number of reasons. First, the confrontation over sovereignty between Taiwan and China makes an ECFA highly political and controversial even if it does not refer to sovereignty directly.

For example, the government refused to accept China’s proposed Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement because of sovereignty concerns. Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) stressed that an ECFA would only be signed if it would not damage Taiwan’s sovereignty. Beijing would also not be allowed to impose a “one China” framework before cross-strait talks, and the ECFA would have to be reported to the WTO after being signed.

Second, many Taiwanese worry about the negative political impact of an ECFA.

The results of an opinion poll released by the DPP in mid-March showed that 48.8 percent of respondents said an ECFA would result in excessive economic dependence on China and affect Taiwan’s autonomy, while 43 percent disagreed. A TVBS poll that same month found that 28 percent of respondents agreed that an ECFA would push the sides toward unification, while 53 percent disagreed. In an MAC poll in April, 37.7 percent of respondents said an ECFA would belittle Taiwan’s sovereignty, while 53.6 percent disagreed. And a Council for Industrial and Commercial Development (CICD) poll in late April said 56.2 percent of respondents worried that Taiwan was economically dependent on China.

Third, there are limits to the reliability of polls. The TVBS and DPP polls found that 71 percent and 44.7 percent of respondents respectively were unclear about the ECFA. The CICD poll showed that merely 10 percent of respondents understood the content of the ECFA, while 47.5 percent did not know whether to support it or not. As most people do not understand the ECFA, there is a large gap between these results and the high support ratings reported in the MAC poll.

Fourth, the government is not telling the truth, as there are numerous examples of referendums on economic integration agreements. For example, 19 of the EU’s 27 members held referendums on economic integration as part of the EU. Elsewhere, Costa Rica held a referendum in October 2007 on whether to join the US-proposed North America Free Trade Agreement.

Fifth, most Taiwanese support a referendum on the ECFA. The TVBS poll found that 48 percent of respondents favored a referendum, while 36 percent did not. The DPP poll found that 63.8 percent of respondents believed an ECFA involved sovereignty and that the issue should be put to a referendum; 32.3 percent opposed disagreed. Finally, a Taiwan Solidarity Union poll on April 21 found that 59.8 percent of respondents said the issue should be determined by referendum; 23.3 percent disagreed.

In light of serious cross-strait tension and intensifying conflict within Taiwan’s political scene, society in general may not be able to reach a clear consensus through dialogue.

As the government pushes for cross-strait talks on an ECFA, greater confrontation between the ruling and opposition camps will emerge. This may prompt resistance from the industries and the labor groups that stand to suffer the most.

A referendum resolves this issue at the lowest social cost. It would also strengthen the legitimacy of the ECFA policy.

Tung Chen-yuan is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.

Toward conditions for coexistence
　

By Wen Liao
Thursday, Jun 11, 2009, Page 8

For two decades, Chinese diplomacy has been guided by the concept of the country’s “peaceful rise.”

Today, China needs a new strategic doctrine, because the most remarkable aspect of Sri Lanka’s recent victory over the Tamil Tigers was not its overwhelming nature, but the fact that China provided President Mahinda Rajapaksa with both the military supplies and diplomatic cover he needed to prosecute the war.

Without that Chinese backing, Rajapaksa’s government would have had neither the wherewithal nor the will to ignore world opinion in its offensive against the Tigers. So, not only has China become central to every aspect of the global financial and economic system, it has now demonstrated its strategic effectiveness in a region traditionally outside its orbit. On Sri Lanka’s beachfront battlefields, China’s “peaceful rise” was completed.

What will this change mean in practice in the world’s hot spots like North Korea, Pakistan and Central Asia?

Before the global financial crisis hit, China benefited mightily from the long boom along its eastern and southern rim, with only Burma and North Korea causing instability. China’s west and south, however, have become sources of increasing worry.

Given economic insecurity within China following the financial crisis and global recession, the government finds instability in neighboring territories more threatening than ever. Stabilizing its neighborhood is one reason why China embraced the Six Party Talks with North Korea; became a big investor in Pakistan (while exploring ways to cooperate with US President Barack Obama’s special representative, Richard Holbrooke); signed on to a joint Asia/Europe summit declaration calling for the release of Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi; and intervened to help end Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war.

The calculus behind China’s emerging national security strategy is simple. Without peace and prosperity around China’s long borders, there can be no peace, prosperity and unity at home. China’s intervention in Sri Lanka and its visibly mounting displeasure with North Korea and Myanmar suggest that this calculus has quietly become central to the government’s thinking.

This calculus is also being applied to China’s regional rivals. For example, though China said little in public about Russia’s invasion and dismemberment of Georgia last summer, Russia is making a strategic mistake if it equates China’s public silence with tacit acquiescence in the Kremlin’s claim to “privileged” influence in the post-Soviet countries to China’s west.

Proof of China’s displeasure was seen at the last summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional grouping that includes former Soviet countries that share borders with China and Russia.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev pushed the SCO to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But the SCO balked. The group’s Central Asian members — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — would not have stood up to the Kremlin without China’s support.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin famously described the break-up of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.

From China’s standpoint, however, the Soviet collapse was the greatest strategic gain imaginable. At a stroke, the empire that gobbled up Chinese territories for centuries vanished. The Soviet military threat — once so severe that Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤東) invited US president Richard Nixon to China to change the Cold War balance of power — was eliminated. China’s new assertiveness suggests that it will not allow Russia to forge a de facto Soviet Reunion and thus undo the post-Cold War settlement, under which China’s economy flourished and security increased.

So far, China’s rulers have regarded emerging strategic competition with India, Japan, Russia and the US as a jostling for influence in Central and South Asia. China’s strategic imperatives in this competition are twofold: to ensure that no rival acquires a dangerous “privileged influence” in any of its border regions and to promote stability so that trade and the sea lanes through which it passes is protected (hence China’s interest in Sri Lanka and in combating Somali pirates).

In the 1990s, China sought to mask its “peaceful rise” behind a policy of “smile diplomacy” designed to make certain that its neighbors did not fear it. China lowered trade barriers and offered soft loans and investments to help its southern neighbors.

Today, China’s government seeks to shape the diplomatic agenda in order to increase its options, while constricting those of potential adversaries.

Instead of remaining diplomatically aloof, China is forging more relationships with its neighbors than any of its rivals. This informal web is being engineered not only to keep its rivals from coalescing or gaining privileged influence, but also to restrain the actions of China’s local partners to dampen tension anywhere it might flare up.

China’s newfound assertiveness, rather than creating fear, should be seen as establishing the necessary conditions for comprehensive negotiations about the very basis of peaceful coexistence and stability in Asia: respect for all sides’ vital interests.

In recent years, such an approach ran counter to Washington’s foreign policy predisposition of favoring universalist doctrines over a careful balancing of national interests. With the Obama administration embracing realism as its diplomatic lodestar, China may have found a willing interlocutor.

Wen Liao is chairwoman of Longford Advisors, a political, economic and business consultancy.